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When is a person dead? This is a difficult and perhaps impossible ques-
tion to answer—but it is fascinating to think about and explore. It is a 
question that has many different meanings and iterations depending 
on the context in which it is asked. Today, if we ask a physician to cal-
culate when the death of someone has occurred or will occur, we will 
get approximate times based on particular biological indications drawn 
from their training and technologies. If we ask a bereaved family the 
same question we will probably get very different answers based around 
other, non-biological, indicators, customs, and timeframes.1 These might 
include the times when the person lost their identity, when the ritual 
of burial or cremation took place, or when legal or criminal proceed-
ings decided on death certification, or the status of a present, but “brain 
dead” person. Asking the same question 200 years ago, of course, would 
have resulted in a different set of answers altogether.
Dwelling on the question of death timings, then, is like peeling back 
the layers of an onion—it soon starts to open up a range of further tem-
poral issues and uncertainties about when life ends and death begins. 
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When does a person die—really, fully, and absolutely? Is it when signs of 
life cannot be found in a body? Is it when a person, corpse, or life-force 
no longer has any agency in the world? Or is it when living people recog-
nise a person as socially dead and outside the frame of everyday relation-
ships? Death as an event is clearly something that comes with multiple 
temporalities for living and dying people. These death timings cut across 
biological, social, legal, and ethical ways of defining when a person is and 
when a person is no longer. How, then, do we begin to investigate the 
stages, sequences, and chronologies that flow through the time between 
the end of life and the start of death?
This book arises from a conference entitled “When is Death?” that 
was hosted by the University of Leicester in 2015. This gathering was 
part of the work of an experimental interdisciplinary team of research-
ers at Leicester who were funded by the Wellcome Trust to investigate 
the power of the criminal corpse in European culture and history.2 
The criminal corpse was chosen as an object of focus because it was a 
force that harnessed legal, medical, and popular discourses about death 
and agency in the period 1500–1900. Individually, we researched top-
ics such as the technology of the gibbet, criminal execution and dissec-
tion, folk-beliefs about the dead, and bioethics.3 Collectively, we came 
to realise that we all had concerns about the “when” of the deaths we 
were investigating. These included: living individuals who became 
socially dead; criminals who survived their own executions; and deaths 
whose timelines were stretched out for decades by the unending spec-
tacles of post-mortem punishment. By looking at the journeys of par-
ticular bodies towards and beyond death we argued that the timing of 
death—something that at first seemed so certain and absolute—was 
deeply uncertain and open to interpretation. This raised a set of issues 
and contexts that called for an exploration of the question from multiple 
perspectives—an interdisciplinary endeavour which led to the contribu-
tions in this book.
Scholars working in the field of death studies regularly analyse and 
discuss the ideas of philosophers and thinkers as varied as Thomas 
Browne, Fustel de Coulanges, Martin Heidegger, Philippe Ariès, and 
Elisabeth Kübler-Ross. Yet ideas and themes in popular culture provide 
us with other and equally fruitful routes into thinking about death tim-
ings. I suggest that Weekend at Bernie’s (1989)—one of the more unu-
sual movies of the 1980s—offers us a range of ways to think about the 
timing of death. The plot of the movie can be summed up as follows: 
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during a baking hot New York summer Larry and Richard, two employ-
ees in an insurance corporation, uncover fraudulent accounting and go 
to their boss, Bernie Lomax, with the information. Realising that his 
crimes have been rumbled, Bernie hires a mobster to kill the two young 
men at a party he will host at his exclusive Long Island beach-house. 
However, instead the mobster has Bernie killed for having an affair with 
his wife. Excited about their weekend of partying at Bernie’s house, 
Larry and Richard arrive to find Bernie dead in his chair. Thus begins 
a black comedic narrative in which Bernie’s corpse retains its liveliness 
in many biological and social ways. Fearing that they will be suspected 
of Bernie’s murder, Larry and Richard delay informing the police. As 
Bernie’s house starts to fill up with partygoers they see that nobody real-
ises that their quiet host, sitting on the couch in a pair of sunglasses, is 
actually dead. Rather, Bernie’s friends greet and kiss him, massage him, 
haggle with him, and treat him as a living person. Larry and Richard 
therefore decide to “postpone” Bernie’s death so that they might have 
a fun weekend. They respond to Bernie’s social liveliness by acting as his 
guardian, explaining to the others that he is drunk. Without ever being 
noticed, they carry him, move his limbs about, and speak for him when 
the need arises.
It is quite remarkable how many social interactions the corpse has in 
the movie. Over the course of the weekend Bernie smokes, waves, and 
goes waterskiing; he is “murdered” a further two times by the mobster 
assassin (who comes to question his own sanity when Bernie won’t die); 
and even has sex with his mistress who visits the beach-house to find out 
why he had not been in touch. This prompts the immortal line: “This 
guy gets laid more dead than I do alive!”. Even more remarkable is the 
fact that, despite the sweltering weather on Long Island, Bernie’s body 
does not decompose nor show any signs of rigor mortis.
Weekend at Bernie’s demonstrates how forms of life and liveliness can 
continue beyond biological death if the person is still a part of social 
life. In this fantasy of death denial, the “when” of Bernie’s death is not 
recognised by his friends and is pushed into a distant temporal horizon 
by the two young men so that they can enjoy themselves in his com-
pany. In an even more macabre turn of events, Bernie’s corpse is reani-
mated—really this time—through voodoo magic in the sequel, Weekend 
at Bernie’s II (1993). In other words, corpses have power and social 
lives through their own actions/reactions and the actions/reactions or 
assumptions of living people.
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the trAditionAl irish wAke
In its celebration of life and social interaction amid death, the plot of 
Weekend at Bernie’s has much in common with the ritual of the tradi-
tional wake in Ireland. This funeral custom was a prominent feature 
of early modern and modern Catholic Irish culture and it still occurs 
today, albeit in a different form. In its earlier form, the wake was a spe-
cial period of time marked out from the normal course of events by the 
watching over of the corpse before its burial, usually for two nights. 
Wakes in Ireland involved a ritual of sequences and timings that exposes 
some of the paradoxes surrounding death. On the one hand, the corpse 
became a time-telling object, displaying all the biological indications of 
death, but on the other hand the corpse continued to be regarded as 
socially alive and an active participant in the merriment of its send-off. 
We can therefore think of the wake as a ritual time during which the per-
son and the corpse slowly transitioned to other states. The living marked 
these journeys by “resetting” the time of death through these customs.
We can trace out three temporal stages in the wake, each with their 
own crossing-cutting timelines: The first stage came in the lead-up to the 
wake; before death has arrived, it already has a temporal horizon. There 
was a general desire for death to be “done well” and it was known for 
the poor to endure privations in order to scrape together the means for 
a “fine wake” and a “decent funeral”.4 Old and sick people were seen as 
most likely to die in the short-term and this held out the tantalising possi-
bility of a merry wake for the young people in the village. One commen-
tator told the story of visiting a man who was ill with consumption, but 
expected to live, and found the kitchen full of men and women dressed 
in their Sunday best. Asking them why they were there, the man received 
the answer: “‘We are waiting for the wake’. I inquired who was dead, ‘No 
one; but the man within is all but dead and we are chatting a bit that we 
may help the widow to lift him when the breath goes out of his body’”.5
Another nineteenth-century folklore collector reported:
So great was the amusement carried on at an Irish wake-house, that all the 
persons of both sexes were anxiously on the look-out for the deaths of cer-
tain old men and women in the parish. When some of the young men met 
a very old poor woman, the usual salutation was: ‘How are you to-day, 
Biddy? you are living a long time. What time will you give us the pleasant 
night over you? We are expecting it now for the last seven years, and you 
are still as tough as ever, though you are near a hundred years old!’6
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Irish folklore is full of examples of signs that a death was impending: 
when a crow lands on ones shoulder; when a frog enters a house; hear-
ing a crying or knocking at the door. If the corpse at a wake was not 
stiff, people interpreted it as a sign that another person would die soon 
enough. Omens observed on the funeral walk also presaged a new cycle 
of death: when a gap developed in the cortege it was said that there 
would be another death in the village. This folklore echoed vernacular 
senses of time as being fragmented and contingent—futures could be 
known and, to some extent at least, predicted and controlled. When 
a death was sudden, untimely, or was that of a child, it is notable that 
wakes were more private and mournful than the traditional merry wake.
Through customs relating to clocks and watches, folklore also shows us 
that people literalised the idea that death was timed by stopping the house-
hold clock when a person died. This is a story collected on Rathlin Island:
[Informant] 1: The clocks always stopped [at the time of a death].
[Informant] 2: Well, I had never heard that story about clocks or anything 
else to do with clocks. And there was a man here died…he was very ill, 
and he died this night…And here, Francis had not long got that clock 
and it kept excellent time, only had it a few weeks. And for some rea-
son, what time…did he die? And here the clock had stopped at that exact 
time. Well…I thought that was a bit funny, the clock should stop then you 
know. I was standing, the day of the funeral and he’d to go by that way 
you see, to go up to the chapel, the body was to go up there and Francis 
was away at it, and I was standing here…I was watching them going by 
up there, you know, following the funeral. Honest, I’ll never forget it, and 
the clock all of a sudden, just as the body went by started ‘tick tock tick 
tock’, it started up again. It scared me stupid. I says, ‘Why should it start 
up again then?’ You know, this was about two days later, the clock started. 
It was the weirdest thing.
Inf. 1: You see, it was always the custom, they always stopped the clock 
whenever someone died in the house, they used to stop it as soon as they 
died.
Inf. 2: So you wouldn’t go into the house and ask them.
Inf. 1: Aye, that was the reason, that, when you went in, you just looked at 
the clock and then you knew what time they died at.7
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Old people used to say that if the cock crowed at midnight it was a sign 
of impending death, or that strange sounds in the clock presaged death.8 
It was also believed that the “dead man’s tick”, a sound in the wall like 
the ticking of a clock, indicated a death was imminent.9 The wake, then, 
was the ritual time after the clock—or the passing of normal time—was 
temporarily stopped.
The second stage in the wake commenced after the moment of death 
was noted. However, this moment was dangerous and not easy to time. 
In Connemara, County Galway, when a man was dying of consump-
tion it was customary to tie some unsalted butter in a piece of cloth and 
hang it up in the rafters. Just as the sick person gave his last breath, the 
consumption left the body and looked to enter another. If there was a 
relative present it would enter them, but if not it would go up into the 
butter, which was then taken down and buried. The relatives, meanwhile, 
stayed outside the house “til he’s dead—and wel dead”.10
When a person died in Ireland, news spread quickly. Work in the fields 
ceased and preparations were made to care for the corpse and stock the 
house (or barn) for the wake with funeral provisions (pipes, tobacco, 
alcohol, etc.). In the meantime, the corpse was laid out and prepared by 
female mourners. The body was first allowed some undisturbed time so 
that the soul could communicate with God before the women washed 
the corpse, wrapped it in a sheet, habit, or suit, and then placed it on 
its back on a table, door, or bed. In many cases a crucifix was placed on 
the breast and rosary beads were entwined in the fingers. It was impor-
tant that no tear was shed on the body during this stage (which took 
two to three hours) because it had not “settled” yet. Ritualised crying, 
or “keening” [Irish: caoineadh] would only begin after the women’s 
preparations were done and they withdrew from the body. This stage of 
preparation and caring for the body also served to mark and pass over a 
time of physiological changes. The settling of the corpse was coincident 
with the periods of rigor mortis and algor mortis, during which muscles 
contract, the joints are immobilised, the body cools, and the skin loses its 
elasticity. In this context, caring for the corpse by positioning it peace-
fully, closing the eyes, and tying the jaw, also performed the crucial task 
of ascertaining that the person really was biologically dead.
The third stage of the wake was a time to ritually mark the bonds that 
bound the living and the dead. Like death rituals in other cultural con-
texts, the motivations for attending a wake in Ireland were varied: peo-
ple gathered around the corpse in order to celebrate life and remember 
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the dead; to guard the corpse from evil; to ensure that death had really 
occurred; and to placate the soul of the dead.11 Wakes traditionally took 
place over two nights before burial on the third day, and the corpse was 
never to be left alone. This wake-time was passed, then, in a slow man-
ner with candles always burning, or as often as the householder could 
afford. Wake-time was not simply passed in an unconscious manner—
rather, people stayed awake through structured time. Time was peri-
odically marked out by rituals and rhythms that reminded mourners 
about the presence of the corpse and the well-being of the dead. With 
seats arranged around the walls, encircling the body, the bean chaointe 
[keener] led periodic laments; spontaneous or planned rosaries were 
said; and the priest visited to lead prayers for the dead. This scene was 
described by an English traveller in the seventeenth century:
[The mourners] spend most of the night in obscene stories, and bawdy 
songs, until the hour comes for the exercise of their devotions; then the priest 
calls on them to fall to their prayers for the soul of the dead, which they per-
form by the repetition of Aves and Paters on their beads and close the whole 
with a de profundis and then immediately to the story or song again, till 
another hour of prayer comes; thus is the whole night spent ‘till day.12
These moments had the power to effect reconciliation between the 
dead person and his or her surviving friends and family and achieve their 
incorporation with the inhabitants of the afterlife.13 There was, then, 
another temporal horizon gestured at in the prayers for the dead‚ for the 
amount of time that the soul of the deceased spent in purgatory con-
cerned those who attended wakes. In 1813, a Purgatorian Society was 
founded in Dublin and, for the price of a penny a week, every subscrib-
ing member was entitled to have post-mortem masses said for them and 
their family to relieve the burden of time spent in purgatory. Members of 
the society also recited the Office of the Dead Latin at wakes.14 The time 
being passed by the dead in the afterlife after burial was also marked by 
the recurring recital of prayers by the living as well as the custom of the 
“month’s mind” requiem mass.
In contrast to these devotional means of timing and relating to 
death, unruly and boisterous customs were kept to constantly re-social-
ise the dead person as the body was passing further and further into 
death and decomposition. These customs—increasingly targeted by 
ecclesiastical authorities in the nineteenth century as uncivilised and 
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superstitious—included feasting, alcohol consumption, wake games, and 
other licentious behaviours. Together, these customs symbolised the hos-
pitality that the dead person, as host, was providing for the guests and 
the reciprocal celebration and sustenance that the living provided for the 
dead. The dual role of the corpse at the wake goes some way towards 
explaining why visiting observers and critics could be shocked by the 
swift transitions between “holy sorrow” and “orgies of unholy joy” at 
Irish wakes.15 They were an enactment of community, with the merri-
ment and mourning of each wake a prelude to another—an endless cycle 
of death and rebirth, of hosting and being hosted. As Maria Edgeworth 
put it in her Castle Rackrent (1800):
Deal on, deal on, my merry men all,
Deal on your cakes and your wine,
For whatever is dealt at her funeral to-day
Shall be dealth to-morrow at mine.16
Tobacco was a central feature of the merry wake, both as a stimulant 
with symbolic properties and as a means of passing wake-time. The plate 
of tobacco was therefore placed on a table over the corpse, or on the 
corpse itself, or underneath the table, and was offered on arrival to all 
guests by a young server as the “dealing” or gift of the dead. Tobacco 
was taken as snuff or smoked in a new clay pipe, and even if one was 
not a smoker, it was customary to have a few puffs in memory of the 
deceased and whisper Beannacht Dé ar anamnacha na marbh [Lord have 
mercy on the dead]. Tobacco was also provided at the graveyard and in 
the west of Ireland it was known for celebrants to leave their pipes on 
the grave as a token.17 According to folklore collected in the twentieth 
century, the origin for the use of tobacco at wakes came from the time 
of Christ when the watchers over his tomb found it hard to stay awake. 
Suddenly a plant appeared and beside it was a pipe. One of the watch-
ers plucked the leaves of the plant, put it in the pipe, and smoked it, and 
since then they are given at wakes.18
While the ritual use of tobacco and whiskey, or poitín, were still com-
mon features of wakes into the twentieth century, the practise of wake 
games declined swiftly in the period after the Great Famine (1845–1852) 
due to a fracturing of communities, steady decline in the use of the Irish 
language, and clerical criticisms of popular mortuary practices. These 
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games were often aggressive and played by the young men who had the 
energy to stay awake all night. They included potato or turf-throwing 
in the dark, slapping games, wrestling matches, and other rough pranks. 
There were also many different kinds of mock trials against an unlucky 
booby, and cycles of “mobbing”—back and forth battles of wits among 
men that could lead to fights. The dead person symbolically participated 
in some of these games, as in “Lifting the Corpse”, in which a stout man 
would lie prone on the floor with straight legs and four men tried to 
raise him off the floor with only one thumb each. The corpse was also a 
direct participant in rough play by being pushed around, or being made 
to hold a hand of cards or smoke a pipe. It was also a well-known trick 
to stitch a distracted mourners’ coat-tails to the corpse’s winding sheet.19 
The folkloric record is also rich with darkly humorous examples of the 
dead person “reviving” at the wake: this was typically achieved by the 
prankster tying a rope around the corpse before rigor mortis set in (espe-
cially if the deceased had a hunchback or bow legs) and then cutting it 
at an opportune moment to make the body sit up and frighten everyone 
present.20
To judge from edicts and directives issued by Catholic bishops 
stretching back to the seventeenth century, the Church was especially 
concerned about erotic and transgressive games such as “Building the 
Ship” and “Building the Fort”. In the latter game, young men ran at 
each other with “spears” before one fell down as if mortally wounded:
then all the hooded women came in again and keened over him, a male 
voice at intervals reciting his deeds, while the pipers played martial tunes. 
But on its being suggested that perhaps he was not dead at all, an herb 
doctor was sent for to look at him; and an aged man with a flowing white 
beard was led in, carrying a huge bundle of herbs. With these he per-
formed sundry strange incantations, until finally the dead man sat up and 
was carried off the field by his comrades, with shouts of triumph.21
Clearly these games were linked to courtship rituals between young men 
and women, and indeed it was frequently said that more love matches 
were made at wakes than at weddings. This background motivation was 
brought to the foreground in the practice of mock marriages by mock 
priests at wakes. In an account of one of these marriages the priest, 
dressed “in robes of straw carrying rosary beads made of potatoes, sur-
mounted by a frog for a cross” joined together two young people with 
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the words: “‘may the full blessing of the beggars descend upon you; may 
ye have plenty of ragged children’”.22
The time spent with the dead was clearly considered necessary for a 
decent send-off for the deceased and for the community to engage in 
social interaction surrounding death and burial. However, on occasion, 
the length of time that wakes took before burial was a cause of concern 
for the authorities. This was chiefly due to the fact that the timeline of 
decomposition was not coincident with the social timeline that the body 
was still a part of. In 1871, for instance, an Irish labourer named Tehan 
died in Southwark, London, and was waked for some five days. A coro-
ner’s inquest report stated that since the man’s death his large family had 
lived and slept with the corpse:
Since the death of deceased a perpetual ‘Irish wake’ had been kept up, and 
every evening the friends of Tehan had met, drunk whiskey, and told tales 
of the dead, whilst women every now and again howled frightfully. The 
body was laid on the bed, and surrounded by eighteen candles. For three 
nights prayers had been said over it, and it had been ‘sat by’ with great cer-
emony. The face of the deceased was uncovered, and the body strewn with 
flowers.
The body “presented a shocking appearance” and was in an advanced 
state of decomposition. The coroner wanted to abolish the “disgraceful” 
practice and remove the body to a dead-house, but it was reported that 
the family resisted this move.23
It is a testament to the symbolic importance of merry wakes in 
Ireland that they continued to be held despite official directives from the 
Church. This suggests that the ritual activity of wake-time had a func-
tional purpose for both the family affected and the wider community.24 
In gathering people together to mark out the deceased person’s transi-
tion to a new state, the traditional Irish wake made death timely through 
rituals and customs. These customs began to fade in the second half of 
the nineteenth century as mortuary practices became “faster”. Wakes 
were shortened to one night; games and keening were no longer held; 
and mourners were given less time to work out the paradox of death. 
As priests ensured that the corpse spent the second night in the Church 
(the “removal”), the funeral on the third day became the primary rite of 
passage. The care shown to the dead was reset into another, less socially 
interactive, timeframe: this is the situation that persists in Ireland today.
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chApters in this book
Thomas Laqueur writes: “Death in culture takes time because it takes 
time for the rent in the social fabric to be rewoven and for the dead to 
do their work in creating, recreating, representing, or disrupting the 
social order of which they had been a part”.25 In their different ways, the 
contributors to this book address Laqueur’s argument, suggesting that 
the time of death (if indeed there is one single point in time when life 
can be said to be extinct) is social, as much as it is biological.
In Chap. 2, “Being Dead in Shakespearean Tragedy”, Mary Ann 
Lund looks at how speech acts indicate death timings on the English 
Renaissance stage. In his tragedies, William Shakespeare used the power 
of language to stage self-referential games of being dead and playing 
being dead. A scene in Othello provides a good example of this: When 
Othello first smothers Desdemona, he does not succeed in killing her: 
“Not dead? Not yet quite dead?”. Othello continues smothering her 
until he states, “She’s dead”. However, even then, Desdemona’s death 
is not certain at all. Death in Shakespeare, Lund argues, is a participatory 
process that is dependent on staging, performance, and language.
Moving from drama to political history, in Chap. 3, “‘A Candidate 
for Immortality’: Martyrdom, Memory, and the Marquis of Montrose”, 
Rachel Bennett looks at the death and afterlife of James Graham, 1st 
Marquis of Montrose. Executed as a traitor in Edinburgh in 1650, 
Montrose was a key figure in the military and religious conflicts which 
ripped Britain apart in the mid-seventeenth century. However, as 
Bennett shows, far from being the final stage on Montrose’s journey, his 
execution, or legal death, came some time after his excommunication 
and social death. This was followed by an exhumation and honourable 
reburial in 1661, while his scattered body parts were “re-membered” 
by royalists for centuries afterwards. The “when” of Montrose’s death, 
Bennett suggests, was a matter of political debate and conflict.
Although for many of us in Europe and North America, the dead 
body is a distant and infrequent presence, spectacles like Gunther von 
Hagens’s Bodyworlds exhibitions stage face-to-face encounters with 
conserved corpses for millions of ticket-holders. As Veronique Deblon 
and Kaat Wils show in Chap. 4, “Overcoming Death: Conserving the 
Body in Nineteenth-Century Belgium”, these types of encounters, and 
the mixed emotions they provoke, have a long history. Deblon and 
Wils explore how new conserving procedures were developed in the 
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nineteenth century in response to a growing disgust at the decaying 
corpse and a growing desire to create a corpse that looked as if it was 
sleeping. In Belgium, anatomists responded to this increasingly senti-
mentalised relationship with the dead by making anatomical preparations 
in a highly aesthetic manner. Although treated, injected, and embalmed, 
these prepared bodies and body parts seemed to convey the consoling 
message that death could be peaceful.
In contrast to this representation, many people were haunted by the 
disturbing message that some of the dead were perhaps not so “dead” 
after all. In Chap. 5, “Premature Burial and the Undertakers”, Brian 
Parsons focuses his attention on how the fear of premature burial 
changed the way dead bodies were cared for and disposed of in nine-
teenth-century Britain. Far from being an irrational modern iteration 
of a primeval fear, concerns about premature burial arose due to a defi-
ciency in the law which meant that physicians did not have to check for 
signs of life before certifying death. Because of this, people developed 
a range of strategies to ensure that they, or their loved ones, were truly 
dead. These included: delaying burial; safety coffins; paying for a crema-
tion instead of a burial; or hiring an undertaker to embalm the corpse. In 
his survey of this landscape of disposal, Parsons concludes that by testing 
for death, undertakers gained “a new status as quasi-medical practitioners 
and helped shed the Dickensian image of disreputability inherited from 
their nineteenth-century forebears”.
From Elvis Presley to Lord Lucan, many of the famous or notori-
ous dead circulate as undead in popular culture, returning repeatedly in 
rumours, purported sightings, and conspiracy theories. Perhaps no figure 
illustrates this phenomenon more than Adolf Hitler, said to have com-
mitted suicide in his Berlin bunker in 1945 (but memorably imagined 
by Monty Python’s Flying Circus as living out his days in a small guest-
house in Minehead, Somerset). In Chap. 6, “The Death of Nazism? 
Investigating Hitler’s Remains and Survival Rumours in Post-War 
Germany”, Caroline Sharples looks at the phenomenon of Hitler survival 
stories and traces their endurance to the failure of the Allies to conclu-
sively identify his remains in 1945. As she persuasively argues, both the 
Allies and the Nazis before them cast doubt on the timing of Hitler’s 
death in order to further their own interests. When put together with, 
on the one hand, obfuscation from the Soviet authorities who forensi-
cally examined the scene and, on the other, the denazification pro-
cess (which “disappeared” Hitler’s remains and all Nazi iconography), 
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the reasons for believing his death had not occurred quickly becomes 
apparent.
In 2016, a survey revealed that 52% of people would like their 
Facebook page to be updated after they died. This could take the form 
of replies to those leaving sympathy messages on their page, or the regu-
lar reposting of photographs, videos, or other memories of the “dead” 
person.26 As our social lives and our social media lives are becoming 
increasingly interchangeable, online presence after death is taking on pal-
pable and interactive forms. The loss of a loved one is now, perhaps more 
than ever, paradoxically wrapped up in their throbbing presence, whether 
through digital recordings, virtual reality, or automated post-mortem 
activities. Is death now impossible? In Chap. 7, “Death’s Impossible 
Date”, Douglas J. Davies explores some of the philosophical intricacies 
of the question “when is death?” Raising the themes of animacy, grief, 
burial, and the “mortality paradox”, Davies echoes other contributors 
in this book by claiming that death has an impossible date because “the 
‘when’ of death is not coeval with ‘the time of not being’”.
In Chap. 8, “The Legal Definition of Death and the Right to Life”, 
Elizabeth Wicks examines the legal implications of modern means of 
ascertaining death and life. Every day in hospitals and courts, medical 
and legal authorities are making profound and difficult decisions about 
the biological status and destination of vulnerable bodies. In October 
2016, for instance, a terminally ill 14-year-old girl won a legal fight to 
have her body cryogenically preserved after death because she “‘wanted 
to live longer’” and have a chance “‘to be cured and woken up’”.27 
Focusing on debates surrounding the issue of brain death in her con-
tribution, Wicks raises the tension between our legally enforceable right 
to life and the state’s lawful withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in 
the case of people in a persistent vegetative state. This withdrawal is, she 
concludes, “sometimes ethically appropriate, morally good, and respect-
ful of the human being’s rights”. The right to life, then, “is always lim-
ited, both in terms of state obligations and its application to mortal 
beings”.
An execution is a usually a strictly timed event: a sentence of death 
is passed, the defendant’s days are “numbered”, and the execution 
itself follows a sequence of rites and behaviours. The “when” of the 
condemned criminal’s death, then, is known for certain. In Chap. 9, 
“The Last Moment”, Jonathan Rée focuses on this disturbing kind of 
death timing. He suggests that people experience a particular thrill and 
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empathy when they imagine the final minutes and seconds of a person’s 
life. Surveying examples from literature, philosophy, and the history of 
crime, Rée finds that the evolution of execution narratives has a lot to do 
with social attitudes about capital punishment and, in particular, an urge 
to think about our own last moments of life.
Finally, in Chap. 10, Thomas Laqueur’s afterword focuses on the pos-
sibility of future breaths—determined by the apnea test in brain death 
situations—as a way to think about the end of life. Brain dead people 
may subsist for decades attached to ventilators and participate in the 
same biological milestones as everyone else (puberty, pregnancy, death). 
Despite the expanding chronologies of the “living dead” through sci-
ence and technology, however, Laqueur argues that the “when” of death 
starts at the time when it is shown that a person will never breathe again 
without artificial assistance. This particular death sentence, of course, 
does not discount the reality that becoming dead also takes time in 
other, non-biological ways of thinking.
In its movement from history and literature, to philosophy and ethics, 
the contributions in this book attest to a pervasive dynamic between finality 
and continuance, between death as a concrete biological event and death 
as a social negotiation. The question we have addressed is inherently inter-
disciplinary. It will continue to fascinate scholarly and lay audiences alike, 
because death timings allow us to make sense of who we are as individuals 
and societies in the midst of time, shorn between long memories and imag-
ined futures on the one hand, and a single irrevocable destiny on the other.
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CHAPTER 2
Being Dead in Shakespearean Tragedy
Mary Ann Lund
In his novel Being Dead (1999), Jim Crace intertwines the life of a mar-
ried couple, both zoologists, with an account of what happens after their 
deaths. We learn at the beginning of the novel that they have been mur-
dered on a beach, and their bodies lie undiscovered for some time. Their 
physical decomposition is described in details that are simultaneously 
scientific and loving. The unfurling of this story is prefaced by an epi-
graphic verse, “The Biologist’s Valediction to his Wife” (purportedly by 
Sherwin Stephens, a pseudonym for Crace), which provides a quite dif-
ferent perspective on being dead. Where the novel is tender, the poem is 
comically stark. The speaker of the poem declares to his wife that there 
is no chance of eternal life: “You’re dead. That’s it. Adieu. Farewell”. 
Death is an entirely one-way process of “Rot, Rot, Rot,/As you regress, 
from Zoo. to Bot.”. The wife’s being is eroded by putrefaction, and while 
he assures her that he will grieve for her, he also dismisses the value of so 
doing, since:
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…Grieving’s never
Lengthened Life
Or coaxed a single extra Breath
Out of a Body touched by Death.1
No strength of feeling will move the addressee back from “Bot.” to 
“Zoo.”, even momentarily. The facts of biological death and decay are 
bare and brutal. Crace’s verse is an anti-elegy that seems to express 
mourning while dispassionately describing the physical processes of 
death. Yet, alongside this rather shocking viewpoint, what is notable 
about this poem is the way the woman is addressed: she is both informed 
that “You’re dead” and called “Departing wife”. We imagine that the 
wife is about to die, but the biologist is imagining her as dead already 
as he gives her this helpful cold comfort. There is an odd paradox in this 
flippant bit of verse: even while he is envisaging her as no more than 
“manure”, there is still a sense of being attached to her (and even the 
botanical classification gives her some life).
This chapter looks at the speech acts that denote and surround death, 
and more specifically, the part they play in enacting and indicating death 
timings on the English Renaissance stage. According to the ground-
breaking language theory propounded by J.L. Austin, speech does not 
only say, but also does: it performs something through the act of speaking 
(in his terminology, it has perlocutionary force).2 For example, when a 
member of the royal family says the words “I name this ship…” in the 
appropriate circumstances, the ship becomes named through the speak-
ing of the words. To return to my earlier example, the phrase “You’re 
dead” is not a merely descriptive act. It is also a performative utter-
ance that is, moreover, heavily context-dependent. When the speaker of 
Crace’s poem says, “You’re dead”, he is imagining his “departing” wife 
as already departed, and in a sense, is creating her as socially dead before 
she is biologically so. At the same time, his choice of words militates 
against his ruthlessly biological reading of death as simple physical decay 
and taxonomical change. By addressing her as dead, he allows the sub-
ject to persist, acknowledging that there is still a “you”, not an “it” or 
even a “she”. As we shall see, the tragic drama of William Shakespeare 
(1564–1616) has a similar fascination both with the experience of dying, 
and with the paradox expressed in the notion of simultaneously being, 
and being dead.
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the borderlAnds of deAth: renAissAnce trAgedy
The drama of late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England is 
heavily occupied not only with deaths, but with the depiction and vocali-
sation of the stages around them. Most obviously, the afterlife speaks and 
walks on the stage in the supernatural manifestations of ghosts hungry 
for vengeance—a staple element of the revenge tragedy tradition. In the 
Shakespearean canon, Richard III, Julius Caesar, Hamlet, and Macbeth 
all feature revenants of some kind who communicate with the living, and 
even play a significant part in the plot (in the case of Julius Caesar, the 
title character himself returns from the dead to haunt his own play). Such 
memorable, and sometimes lurid, figures are not the only dramatic reflec-
tion on mortality to command attention. Thomas Kyd’s (1558–1594) 
highly influential revenge play The Spanish Tragedy (a story framed by the 
narrative of a ghost seeking revenge for his murder) exploits the full dra-
matic potential of deaths that are not what they seem. At the climax of 
the tragedy, a living avenger, Hieronymo, stages his own play and invites 
other characters to participate. What they do not realise is that the guilty 
parties will be killed for real, when they naturally assume that they are 
only acting. It only gradually becomes apparent to the audience that the 
play-within-a-play has become enacted in truth: the dead characters are 
not going to stand up again, and the blood from their wounds is not 
fake. Yet they will stand up, of course, and the blood is fake, because they 
are actors playing characters who play characters: the fake-real-fake-real 
feint Kyd uses is as much a self-referential game as is the custom of boy 
actors playing female characters, who in turn dress up as men.
Renaissance dramatists experimented with, and challenged, the audi-
ences’ expectations and assumptions about how death occurs on stage. 
If we witness a character being strangled and see her immobile body 
lying on the stage or concealed behind a curtain, we assume that she is 
dead and gone, even though we know, and perhaps can even see, that 
the actor playing her is still breathing. As we shall later see, Shakespeare 
uses various conventions to indicate death, in particular verbal cues. Yet 
conventions can also be overturned, to complicate our notions of death 
timings. In some cases, the audience is privy to the secret that a charac-
ter is not dead despite seeming to be so, a knowledge kept from other 
characters on stage. For example, in Romeo and Juliet we witness Friar 
Laurence explaining to Juliet his plan to reunite her with her exiled lover 
Romeo: she should drink a potion to suppress her physical responses, so 
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that “No warmth, no breath shall testify thou livest”; each part of her 
body “Shall, stiff and stark and cold, appear like death” (Romeo and 
Juliet, 3.5.98, 103).3 When the unknowing Romeo breaks open her 
tomb, we know that he has misread the signs given by her body, and 
when he poisons himself—“Thus with a kiss I die!” (5.3.120)—we are 
acutely aware of the horrendous nature of this tragedy; Juliet will soon 
rise up from her drugged sleep-as-death to find the still-warm corpse of 
her new husband Romeo, and she will herself commit suicide.
Juliet’s second death by stabbing is genuine and observed as such 
(the watchman pronounces her “bleeding, warm, and newly dead,/
Who here hath lain this two days” (5.3. 174–175)), but not all women 
in Shakespeare’s tragedies pass away so swiftly or evidently. A strange 
contrast to Juliet’s case is that of Desdemona, smothered by her hus-
band Othello in a jealous rage. In such a death, there are no immedi-
ately readable signs like Juliet’s fresh blood, especially since, as Othello 
himself has observed earlier, Desdemona has “whiter skin […] than 
snow,/And smooth as monumental alabaster” (Othello, 5.2.4–5). Even 
when she is alive and in good health, Othello imagines her as a dead fig-
ure like that on a stone tomb, perhaps to lessen his guilt for what he is 
about to do. Her physical self presents a dramatic contrast to Juliet, in 
whom, even when she is drugged and seemingly “dead” within a vault, 
Romeo notices that “Beauty’s ensign yet/Is crimson in thy lips and in 
thy cheeks” (Romeo and Juliet, 5.3. 94–95). When Othello first smoth-
ers Desdemona, he does not fully succeed, and remarks as much—“Not 
dead? Not yet quite dead?” (Othello, 5.2.95)—continuing until he can 
pronounce firmly that “She’s dead” (5.2.100). But shortly afterwards, 
we discover that we cannot trust his reading of the external signs of 
mortality, when we hear her voice from behind the bed-curtains: “O, 
falsely, falsely murdered!” (5.2.126). Although we may initially conclude 
that she is a ghost, we soon realize that she has indeed revived, just for 
long enough to proclaim her innocence, and also to exonerate, rather 
than accuse, her husband. Her maid, Emilia, asks her “who hath done 
this deed?”; Desdemona’s final words are “Nobody, I myself” (5.2.132, 
134).
Othello is not the only example in Renaissance drama where a suffo-
cated woman temporarily revives. Shakespeare’s Jacobean contemporary 
John Webster (1580–1634) takes the idea even further: when the epony-
mous heroine of his play The Duchess of Malfi is strangled on the orders 
of her brother, she revives over a hundred lines after she has seemingly 
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“died”. The man who has carried out the murder, Bosola, realises that 
“She’s warm, she breathes”, “her eye opes”, and he tells her that her 
husband is still alive, allowing her to die happily: “Mercy” is her final 
word.4 This revivification of women may, as Kaara Peterson convincingly 
argues, be connected to the early modern medical understanding of the 
female disorder hysterica passio, in which women “display the symptoms 
that mimic death”, a representation reflecting a wider cultural anxiety 
that “women’s bodies cannot be trusted to reflect their most fundamen-
tal status as living beings”.5 Perhaps Renaissance audiences were more 
sceptical about whether a female character’s death was definitive unless 
clear signs were exhibited. Moreover, such a medical understanding 
allows, and even enables, the fantasy that grief can coax a single extra 
breath out of a body touched by death; a particular preoccupation of 
Shakespeare’s late drama. In his play Pericles, a coffin washed up on the 
shore is opened to reveal a still-pink body of Thaisa, buried at sea, who 
is revived back into life by a skilful doctor, and at last reunited with her 
husband; in The Winter’s Tale, there is another pink female form—the 
statue of the wronged late Queen Hermione—that miraculously steps off 
its plinth and reveals itself to be a breathing woman. The borderlands of 
death allow redemption as well as consolation.
becoming deAd in shAkespeAre
Renaissance drama reminds us that the boundaries between life and 
death can be paper-thin, that observed signs may not be sufficient, and 
that characters and actors inhabit worlds of being and not-being. The 
most striking reminder of death as merely performance is the jig at the 
end of a play, a traditional coda to the action. There may be a pile of 
bodies, or a funeral procession, but in a Renaissance tragedy that is not 
“it. Adieu. Farewell”. As the play’s action ends, the actors re-enter to 
dance, an experience recounted by the Swiss traveller Thomas Platter, 
who visited London in 1599: “On the 21st of September, after dinner, at 
about two o’clock, I went with my party across the water; in the straw-
thatched house we saw the tragedy of the first Emperor Julius Caesar, 
very pleasingly performed, with approximately fifteen characters; at the 
end of the play they danced together admirably and exceedingly grace-
fully, according to their custom, two in each group dressed in men’s and 
two in women’s apparel”.6 There is something of the danse macabre to 
this idea of reanimated corpses, but the revival of this tradition in the 
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Globe Theatre in recent years demonstrates how dancing provides a 
sense of release for actors and audience, an emotional and aesthetic com-
plement to the catharsis of watching tragedy.
The question “when is death?” finds a particularly nuanced response 
in two of Shakespeare’s plays: Hamlet and King Lear. Both tragedies are 
invested not only in death, but in the process of becoming dead, and 
do so through their male protagonists. I have suggested that the phrase 
“You’re dead” seems paradoxical, and we hear an equivalent one on the 
Renaissance stage:
Hamlet, thou art slain.
No med’cine in the world can do thee good.
In thee there is not half an hour of life;
(Hamlet, 5.2.266–268)
The words are spoken by Laertes, who has killed Hamlet in revenge for 
the murder of his father, Polonius, and the death of his sister, Ophelia. 
Having challenged Hamlet to a duel, Laertes poisons the tip of his foil so 
that even a flesh wound will kill his rival; during a scuffle in the sword-
play, the foils are accidentally switched, and both men are wounded and 
fatally poisoned. Laertes is able to say, “thou art slain” not only because 
he has administered the poison, but also because he too is on the verge 
of death: “Lo, here I lie,/Never to rise again” (5.2.271–272), he says. 
His own internal feeling of approaching death becomes projected onto 
Hamlet, while Hamlet can see his own death in Laertes. Laertes becomes 
a living emblem of the traditional tomb inscription, “Eris quod sum” 
(“what I am, you will be”).
Hamlet’s recognition of what Laertes has told him reveals itself 
in a phrase even more paradoxical than “thou art slain”: “I am dead” 
(5.2.285, 290). Hamlet says the phrase twice within a single speech to 
his friend Horatio, just after they have witnessed Laertes dying. At first, 
we might think that Hamlet is indulging in a touch of melodrama by 
repeatedly drawing attention to his own process of dying. Certainly, 
his death is among the most protracted in the Shakespearean canon: 
he dies 60 lines after he has been wounded, which is twice as long as it 
takes Laertes to die from the same poison. As is often the case on the 
Renaissance stage, theatrical demands and medical theory meld in the 
behaviour of characters’ bodies. Hamlet dies more slowly than Laertes 
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because he is the protagonist, and his death should take centre stage, but 
also because of his physiology. According to the prevailing Galenic medi-
cal understanding of the body in this period, those people with a hot or 
dry (sanguine or choleric) temperament were believed to be more sus-
ceptible to the workings of poison, because the natural heat in their bod-
ies made the poison work faster, and because they were believed to have 
wider arteries.7 As the preacher John Donne would later put it, “Poyson 
works apace upon cholerike complexions”.8 The hot-headed Laertes dies 
before the melancholic Hamlet, whose cold humoral temperament pre-
serves him longer, just as the dramatist allows him the prolonged time to 
give his “dying voice” (5.2.340), being acutely aware of his own theatri-
cality in front of the “audience to this act” (5.2.320).
What does Hamlet mean when he says “I am dead”? Perhaps it is just 
another way to say, “I am dying”; “I’m as good as dead”; or “I’m done 
for”. But this phrase is hardly colloquial. In a search across English writ-
ing of the same period, instances when someone says, “I am dead” (usu-
ally in drama) are typically preceded by “when”, or “imagine”, words 
that make clear that the speaker is predicting or imagining, not inhab-
iting death as Hamlet does.9 Hamlet’s phrase appears to be unique on 
the English stage. I would argue that the mirroring of Laertes’ phrase 
is more than simply a substitute for saying that he is dying. Hamlet, the 
student, is well versed in ontology, and has already revealed his reflec-
tions on what it is like to be dead, “not to be”:
…To die, to sleep.
To sleep, perchance to dream. Ay, there’s the rub,
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil
Must give us pause. (3.1.66–70)
Hamlet has spent most of the play’s action thinking about and prepar-
ing himself, firstly, to revenge the murder of his father by his uncle, King 
Claudius, and secondly to die. Within 10 lines he has finally achieved 
both: he has at long last successfully taken on the role of avenger, killing 
Claudius (who, incidentally, takes a mere five lines to die) with a combi-
nation of poisoned implements, and he has also become the revenged: he 
has taken on the status of being dead, while he is still conscious.
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There are further dimensions to Hamlet’s extraordinary speech act 
“I am dead”. The editors of the Arden edition of Hamlet note of these 
lines that “If Hamlet is already ‘dead’ when he kills the King, this may 
be Shakespeare’s solution to the moral dilemma of the blood-guilt of 
the successful revenger”.10 I think this explanation fails to account for 
Hamlet’s own deep investment in the theology and ethics of revenge; 
for Hamlet to absolve himself of guilt through this speech act seems 
a solution too neat and untroubled for him. Hamlet’s expression of 
simultaneously being, and being dead, is perhaps better understood as 
an articulation of death being experienced in different timings, rather 
than as a single event. From a legal and medical (if not an ethical) per-
spective, he may see himself already as a dead man. When Hamlet hurts 
the king with his poisoned foil, there is a general cry of “Treason, trea-
son!” (5.2.275). Hamlet has not been tried for treason, but he has 
fully taken on the responsibility for killing a king, and there is hence a 
legal sense in which Hamlet is already dead: those who are condemned 
for treason (not necessarily through trial) lose all their civil rights and 
capacities, and forfeit their estates and their ability to transmit property 
to descendents.11 Hamlet himself characterizes death as “this fell ser-
geant” who is “strict in his arrest” (5.2.288–289), exploiting the idea 
of himself as a prisoner. Furthermore, a medical symptom may over-
lay his legal and philosophical awareness. He tells Horatio that “the 
potent poison quite o’ercrows my spirit” (5.2.305), an expression of the 
moment of death as it is being experienced. The words “I am dead” 
may be a manifestation of that, of the symptom angor animi: that is, 
“the sense of being in the act of dying, differing from the fear of death 
or the desire of death” encountered, for example, in angina patients.12 
“Angor animi” might be translated as “anguish of the spirit”, and in 
Shakespeare’s time, the term referred to mental anguish and melan-
choly, of the kind to which Hamlet was well-accustomed. Here, I 
suspect, he is also experiencing that more modern sense of the term: 
feeling death rather than just contemplating it.
textuAl deAths in Hamlet
If we re-pose the question “when is death?” in Hamlet, we should look 
further at the protagonist’s final words. There is no ambiguity about 
his passing moment in the way that there is about Desdemona, or the 
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Duchess of Malfi—no trick where an extra breath is coaxed out of him 
after he seems to have breathed his last. There is, however, an interest-
ing textual variation that serves to highlight the ways in which death can 
be signalled, both on stage and in a reading of the printed text. Hamlet 
experiences death in three different ways, according to which version 
of the play is consulted. The first time that Hamlet appeared in print, 
in 1603 (the First or so-called “bad” Quarto), was in a version signifi-
cantly shorter and markedly different from later editions; possibly it was 
a reconstruction of Shakespeare’s play from memory by an actor or audi-
ence member, a “bootleg” edition with some notably garbled passages.13 
In this version, Hamlet’s words are (to us) unfamiliar, but conventionally 
final:
What tongue should tell the story of our deaths,
If not from thee? O my heart sinckes Horatio,
Mine eyes have lost their sight, my tongue his use:
Farewel Horatio, heaven receive my soule.             Ham. dies.14
Hamlet asks his friend Horatio not to commit suicide and accompany 
him in death, but instead to remain alive and bear testimony to what has 
happened. As the poison takes effect, the First Quarto Hamlet acts as 
a kind of witness to the physical symptoms of dying he is experiencing. 
The sinking heart and loss of senses are conventional medical indicators 
that death is near: one manual lists “difficultie of breathynge, dimnesse 
of sight, dulness of sense” among the warning signs.15 His articulation 
of physical experiences and symptoms as a representation of an unobserv-
able, interior state is also a dramatic convention, being characteristic of 
the Senecan mode to which Elizabethan tragic theatre was indebted.16 
But it is a firmly Christianized Senecanism, as Hamlet’s final words indi-
cate in the form of a spiritual piety, “heaven receive my soul”. The stage 
direction confirms the obvious: “Ham. dies”. The First Quarto, then, 
gives a triple set of indications of the moment of death: in verbalized 
medical symptoms, in spiritual preparation, and in an instruction to the 
actors (and, by extension, to the reader of the printed text).
Yet, this version is mostly rejected by editors; in the Second Quarto 
of 1604, he dies quite differently, or indeed, not at all (textually, at 
least). He starts to give a message for the Norwegian prince Fortinbras 
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(whom Hamlet would like to take over the rule of Denmark), but he 
stops halfway through his sentence: “So tell him, with th’occurrants 
more and lesse/Which have solicited, the rest is silence”.17 The abrupt 
last phrase is unaccompanied by any stage direction, and it is his friend 
Horatio’s words in response that make clear that he has died: “Now 
cracks a noble hart, good night sweete Prince,/And flights of Angels 
sing thee to thy rest”. In the First Folio, the collection of plays pub-
lished 7 years after Shakespeare’s death, Hamlet’s last lines are nearly 
identical, but the text gives him a death groan “O, o, o, o” and a stage 
direction: “Dyes”.18
Although the versions are different, Hamlet’s ending is unambigu-
ous. There is no indication that he lingers on after his final line. Indeed, 
between the three editions we can observe a combination of methods 
by which death is indicated at a textual level in an English Renaissance 
play. The clearest is the stage direction: “Dyes”. This, like all stage direc-
tions, is used sporadically in printed texts; it is altogether common to 
find no such stage direction, which means that the modern editor of a 
play usually puts one in (and sometimes has to make an educated guess 
about where it occurs). A death groan in a printed text (“O, o, o, o”) 
must be a shorthand for the combination of unscripted sound and ges-
ture with which tragic actors such as Richard Burbage performed their 
death throes. It is worth remembering that the sightlines of public play-
houses, with a raised stage and standing spectators in the yard, make dif-
ferent demands of a performed death from those in modern theatres; 
although the traveller Thomas Platter praised the layout of English play-
houses where “everyone can well see everything”,19 an actor lying down 
on the stage would need to die vocally as well as visually, in order to 
communicate to those standing round the stage. A resounding final line 
is another clear way of doing this. A rhyming couplet is a traditional way 
to end a long speech in blank verse, and is also commonly used to end a 
character’s life. Brutus in Julius Caesar meets a self-determined death by 
stabbing—the “Roman way” of suicide—with a similarly self-determined 
couplet, and Othello does exactly the same (stabbing is generally a quick 
death in Shakespeare, and characters tend to die within two lines, with 
the exception of Antony in Antony and Cleopatra, who bungles his sui-
cide and takes a horribly protracted hundred lines to die, split over two 
scenes). And the last indicator of death (although the least reliable) is a 
pronouncement by another character. This is often, though, where ambi-
guity can creep in.
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produce the bodies: King lear
I will finally turn to King Lear, another of Shakespeare’s tragedies where 
the promised end is textually, medically, legally hard to pinpoint. When 
the aged and mentally frail Lear enters the stage for the last time, it is 
to the shock of anyone who knows only the historical source of the 
play. In the English chronicle histories which Shakespeare drew on as a 
source, the ancient English king Leir is outlived by his youngest daugh-
ter Cordeil. But in Shakespeare’s version, Lear comes in carrying her 
seemingly lifeless body: “Howl, howl, howl […] she’s gone for ever” 
(King Lear, 5.3.255, 257). He declares authoritatively that “I know 
when one is dead, and when one lives,/She’d dead as earth”, yet even 
so, he immediately demands the materials for testing life, a mirror and a 
feather, and claims that “This feather stirs, she lives” (5.3.263). In most 
productions, and indeed in many editions of the play, the possibility that 
Cordelia is still alive is rejected, and Lear’s behaviour is taken as a poign-
ant exhibition of grief and delusion.20 Yet the possibility is still hinted at, 
and once again the play-text supports this ambiguity. Even more than 
in Hamlet, there are significant variations between versions—in this case 
the First Quarto (1608) and the First Folio (1623)—but both have the 
same stage direction: “Enter Lear with Cordelia in his armes”, not “with 
the body of Cordelia”.21 This phrasing is particularly telling since, a little 
earlier, Lear’s other daughters, one poisoned, the other stabbed, are car-
ried on, and the stage direction specifies that “The bodies of Gonerill and 
Regan are brought in”. The stage directions thus appear to distinguish 
between the representations of two who are obviously corpses, and one 
who may or may not be. Lear’s pain is all the more prolonged if signs of 
Cordelia’s life appear and recede, a reminder that biological death is by 
no means instantaneous. Shakespeare fills the stage with bodies—unusu-
ally, even those who have died offstage are brought in—so that, by the 
end, the royal father and the three daughters for whom he divided his 
kingdom are all seen lying together and carried out in the final ritual 
of tragedy; the First Folio even specifies the musical accompaniment: 
“Exeunt with a dead march”.22
I have suggested that Cordelia’s death timing is ambiguous where 
that of her sisters Goneril and Regan is not—they are identified as “bod-
ies”—but the latter case is worthy of further scrutiny. The last scene of 
King Lear, like the character Hamlet, shows a preoccupation with the 
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liminal state of being both alive and dead, one which all of the Lear 
family occupy at some point. Early on in the scene, Goneril’s husband 
Albany takes charge of the court, as the full wickedness of a plot involv-
ing the two sisters Goneril, Regan, and their lover Edmund is revealed. 
Albany directly charges Edmund, as well as his own wife Goneril: “I 
arrest thee/On capital treason, and in thine attaint/This gilded serpent” 
(5.3.83–85). Attaint or attainder signifies “the legal consequences of 
being condemned for treason, i.e., death and forfeiture of wealth and 
honour, as if the blood were […] irretrievably stained”.23 Edmund, hav-
ing been attainted for “heinous, manifest and many treasons” (5.3.93), 
is ordered to a trial by combat, which he loses, but Goneril quibbles 
with the legality of this. When Albany confronts her with the paper evi-
dence of her infidelity, she responds that “the laws are mine, not thine./
Who can arraign me for’t?” (5.3.156–157). Albany has married into her 
power and lands, and she is moreover a queen and, in her eyes, above 
the law.
The conflict between Albany and Goneril thus becomes a struggle 
over different assertions of legal authority, and, by extension, over the 
control of life and death. By pronouncing an attainder on Edmund and 
Goneril, Albany is staking a claim for his power to pronounce them both 
legally dead, before they are biologically extinct. When Goneril later poi-
sons her sister and stabs herself, Albany orders attendants to “Produce 
the bodies, be they alive or dead” (5.3.229). Albany’s careful wording 
reasserts the authority that Goneril has disputed: the sisters take on the 
status of “bodies” through habeas corpus, and also as people attainted 
of high treason. The equivalent is “bring up the bodies”, as used in the 
novel of the same name by Hilary Mantel (2012), a reference to an order 
to bring Anne Boleyn’s supposed lovers to court; the same language was 
used in the trials for high treason of Henry, Duke of Suffolk in 1554 and 
Patrick O’Collun in 1594.24 Goneril and Regan are in all senses dead 
when they are brought in, and problems of jurisdiction have been side-
stepped; for Albany, it is “This judgement of the heavens that makes us 
tremble” (5.3.230).
Ideas of medical and legal forms of death are thus raised through 
the demise of Lear’s three daughters, but at last it is Lear’s own death 
that shows us the full tragic force of the “when is death?” question. As 
Emily R. Wilson puts it, “[t]he exact moment of his passing is obscure: 
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the other characters on stage seem puzzled about when Lear dies and 
wary of saying prematurely that ‘He is gone indeed’. Lear has already 
experienced practical death so many times that the moment of his physi-
cal death seems unimportant”. Lear is, in Wilson’s words, an example 
of “tragic overliving”.25 In the First Quarto, he gives a dying groan 
(“O, o, o, o”) and gives an envoi to a world of pain in his last words, 
“Breake hart, I prethe breake”; there is no stage direction to mark the 
precise timing of his death.26 In the later First Folio, there is a clear stage 
direction “He di[e]s”,27 but this revised text also erases the other for-
mal signs of dying in Lear’s own speech, and the line “Breake heart, I 
prythee breake” becomes an expression not of a dying moment, but of 
pain and grief spoken by another character who witnesses Lear’s death. 
Lear, indeed, is looking at his dead daughter’s lips, “Looke there, looke 
there”, when the stage direction indicates that he dies—fading away, per-
haps in hope that there is a sign of life.
Shakespeare’s tragic drama is deeply invested in the question of how 
death timings occur, and in the issues of power that surround them: 
medically, legally, philosophically, and emotionally. Because they are per-
formed, moments of passing become a participatory process in which the 
character (or actor-as-character), other characters on stage, and the audi-
ence play a role in enacting them. The words spoken by the witnesses to 
King Lear’s death, “O let him pass” and “he is gone indeed” (5.3.312, 
314), do not only recognise the stages of death, but also enjoin audience 
members or readers to let Lear pass—perhaps in a way akin to Prospero’s 
epilogue to The Tempest, when he asks the audience to “release me 
from my bands/With the help of your good hands” (Epilogue, 9–10). 
For the process of becoming dead in a tragedy extends beyond the final 
lines, into the solemn music of the funeral march, the procession that 
carries the bodies off stage, and finally the actors’ re-entry, revived, for 
the jig and the audience’s applause. The medical and legal dimensions of 
becoming dead, Hamlet’s testimony of death as it is being experienced, 
and Lear’s fading moments all connect us to that communal experience 
of seeing and feeling staged death—part of the Aristotelian understand-
ing of cathartic tragic drama.28 The statement to which tragedy always 
gestures, in the paradoxically pleasurable way that drama does, is not 
“you’re dead” or “I am dead”, but “we are dead”.
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CHAPTER 3
“A Candidate for Immortality”: Martyrdom, 
Memory, and the Marquis of Montrose
Rachel Bennett
A salient theme in this book is that death neither has an entirely static def-
inition nor does its timing always have a discernible chronology. To quote 
Thomas Laqueur, natural death is something that happens in an instant 
but “becoming really dead…takes time”.1 This chapter engages with the 
central question of “When is Death?” by looking at the death of one man 
in particular, James Graham, the 1st Marquis of Montrose (1612–1650). 
Montrose played a prominent role in the early part of the mid-seven-
teenth century religious and military conflicts between the Covenanters 
in Scotland and the Stuart monarch of the three kingdoms of England, 
Scotland, and Ireland. His place in the history of the struggle was com-
plex because he initially supported the Covenanting cause before switch-
ing to support King Charles I. This chapter demonstrates that Montrose’s 
death had multiple timings and that the use of his body highlights an 
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important interplay between issues of power and punishment, and mar-
tyrdom and memory.
First, this chapter provides a brief timeline of the events that made 
Montrose a key figure in the struggle between Covenant and King, and 
which made his death noteworthy. Second, it investigates the multiple 
stages of what will be defined as his “legal death”. Montrose led Royalist 
forces in battle against the Covenanters, and for this he was outlawed, 
excommunicated, and attained for the crime of treason in 1644. Thus, 
the process of his legal death began years before he was finally captured 
and publically executed in Edinburgh in 1650. This section also shows 
how Montrose’s capture began a social death, as he was paraded from 
northern Scotland to Edinburgh with his crimes advertised and his name 
degraded. Within the black catalogue of offences that carried a capital 
punishment in this period, the crime of treason was set apart in how it 
was punished. The punishment for treason extended beyond the extinc-
tion of life as the corpses of traitors were used to send out stark and 
richly symbolic messages. In Montrose’s case, his head was spiked on 
top of Edinburgh’s Old Tolbooth and his limbs were displayed in four 
of Scotland’s main towns. However, as the third section of this chapter 
demonstrates, he was still not yet truly “dead”.
After the wars of the three kingdoms, and the Interregnum of repub-
lican government, the three kingdoms were restored under Charles 
II in 1660. This led to a wave of Royalist sentiment, and the martyred 
Montrose was used to propagate the themes of loyalty and sacrifice. In 
1661, the first parliament of Charles II resolved to provide some “hon-
ourable reparation” for the barbarity committed upon him.2 Montrose’s 
dismembered body, once used to mark out his criminality, was gathered 
together and given a full public funeral at the King’s expense in order 
to mark a legal, spiritual and social rehabilitation. This, again, provokes 
questions over the timing of his death. The third section of the chapter 
charts the journeys of particular parts of Montrose’s body, namely his 
heart and one of his arms. These body parts were not buried with the 
rest of his body in 1661 and they have legacies of their own. In 1925, a 
newspaper article discussing the potential sale of Montrose’s arm argued 
that the desire to possess it came from “our interest in the past and a 
craving for the most convincing form of testimony.”3 These body parts 
were transformed into relics and were passed down through the genera-
tions, attracting beliefs about Montrose and also about the power of the 
dead body.
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montrose: covenAnter And cAvAlier
In 1638, Scottish nobles and common people alike signed the National 
Covenant, the purpose of which was to provide a written document 
stating their commitment to the Reformed religion and the principle 
of a church that was not controlled by the crown, but whose followers 
remained loyal to their king. It was signed in the Kirkyard of Greyfriar’s 
in Edinburgh by the great Scottish lords, including the Marquis of 
Montrose, a young and energetic military campaigner. King Charles I 
alienated his Scottish subjects by reforming the liturgy and discipline of 
the church, leading to fears of an eventual return to popery. To the King, 
the Church of Scotland was greatly inferior to the Anglican Church as 
it lacked proper liturgy and its bishops did not have a suitably exalted 
status.4 After the signing of the Treaty of Berwick in 1639, which ended 
the early hostilities known as the First Bishop’s War, Montrose was sent 
to discuss the religion question with Charles I, and it was not long after 
this that he began to switch his allegiances. John Buchan argues that 
Montrose became aware that the governance of Scotland was increas-
ingly in the hands of certain individuals, notably his great enemy the 
Marquis of Argyll, who he feared were committing the very breaches of 
the law for which they had previously condemned the King.5
In 1644, Montrose pledged allegiance to the King and, soon after, 
was appointed the Viceroy and Captain-General of Scotland. In the 
same year, he was attained and outlawed for treason as well as being 
excommunicated by the Covenant Committee of Estates, thus marking 
the beginning of his legal, but also his spiritual death, in the eyes of his 
enemies. Montrose’s cavalier forces went on to achieve victories in vari-
ous parts of northern Scotland, including a particularly bloody campaign 
in Aberdeen that blackened his reputation. In an account of the suffer-
ings inflicted upon the Church of Scotland, the early eighteenth-century 
ecclesiastical historian Reverend Robert Woodrow called Montrose and 
others who supported the King “malignants and anti-Covenanters”.6 
Even the anti-Covenanter Sir George Mackenzie referred to Montrose as 
a “vain-glorious butcher” for his actions in the Highlands.7
In contrast, Montrose fared better in later interpretations of 
the period. Robert Chambers, in his History of the Rebellions in 
Scotland (1828), argued that the conduct of the Covenant meant that 
Montrose—his hero—had to join the King to protect the rights of 
society from church oligarchy.8 Other accounts praised his “heroic 
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moderation” and the lack of malice in his military campaigns.9 Although 
Montrose missed out on a heroic status in life, he enjoyed a vibrant after-
life in works of fiction that portrayed him as a romantic hero. Catriona 
MacDonald shows how, in the post-1745 Jacobite Rebellion period, 
Montrose’s legacy was refashioned, along with that of the Highland 
clans, to exemplify Scottish national virtues in works such as Sir Walter 
Scott’s A Legend of Montrose (1819).10
Despite winning some significant victories, Montrose encountered 
a lack of support in the Scottish Lowlands and he fled to Norway in 
1646. It was not until 1649, following the execution of Charles I, that 
Montrose was restored to the lieutenancy of Scotland by the King’s 
son and heir Charles II. In the following year, Montrose landed in the 
Orkney Islands with a small force of Royalists, but he failed to gain 
significant clan support and was defeated by Covenant forces at the 
Battle of Carbisdale in April 1650. He spent a few days on the run in 
the Scottish Highlands before coming upon a previous ally named Neil 
McLeod. However, instead of offering him assistance, McLeod appre-
hended Montrose and handed him over to the Committee of Estates 
for a bounty. This perceived treachery fed into the Royalist cult of 
martyrdom in the wake of Montrose’s death. When he was appre-
hended by McLeod, Montrose apparently requested that he be killed 
quickly where he stood, rather than be handed over to his enemies.11 
However, McLeod refused this request and the Covenant made plans 
to use his death to make a political statement about their strength and 
to avenge Montrose’s betrayal. The Committee of Estates wanted to 
bring Montrose to Edinburgh to be put to death before King Charles 
II arrived in Scotland and interceded to prevent the execution. Despite 
this urgency, they made the execution a three-day long public spectacle 
replete with all possible ignominy.
the execution of montrose
Montrose had been attained, convicted, and excommunicated by the 
Committee of Estates in 1644 and this still stood at the time of his 
capture in 1650. Therefore, in this sense, his legal death had already 
begun years before he was physically present to hear his death sentence. 
Following his capture, Montrose was brought from northern Scotland to 
Edinburgh. While this journey was intended to bring shame to his name, 
and mark the continuation of his social death to Covenanters, Montrose 
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actually received a multitude of reactions during the procession. In some 
places he was given food, comfortable shelter, and fine clothes thought 
befitting to his status. However, at places where his forces had been vic-
torious, a herald was placed above him that proclaimed, “here comes 
James Graham, a traitor to his country”.12
On 19 May 1650, Montrose was met at the city gates and conveyed 
with all possible ignominy to the Old Tolbooth. He was placed in a cart 
bare-headed and tied to a specially made seat to ensure that he was in 
full view of the crowd.13 Although the distance between the gates and 
the Tolbooth was little more than half a mile, the procession took 
three hours as special stops were made along the way, including a lengthy 
pause outside the house from which the Marquis of Argyll and other 
Covenanting authorities viewed the spectacle. The city’s ministers urged 
people to throw things at Montrose and abuse him during the proces-
sion to add further shame. However, some in the crowd were moved by 
his dignity and courage in the face of his ordeal, and various commenta-
tors spoke of a “tense air of sympathy and startled admiration” for him.14
The day after his arrival in Edinburgh, Montrose was taken before 
the Committee who repeated their charges of rebellion against the 
state and desertion of the National Covenant. He was not given a for-
mal trial because he was already attained, and thus convicted, for his 
crimes. Montrose was sentenced to be hanged on 21 May at the Cross 
in Edinburgh on gallows that were 30 feet high. Throughout Europe 
during this period many noble traitors were executed by behead-
ing, perceived as a more honourable end than hanging. However, this 
concession was not extended to Montrose because of the desire of the 
Covenanters to add even further infamy to his death. His private chap-
lain George Wishart wrote a biography of Montrose that favourably 
detailed his previous military campaigns, and this book was ordered to 
be placed around his neck as a reminder of his crimes. After the body 
was hung for three hours, it was ordered that it be cut down, beheaded 
and quartered. Montrose’s head was to be fixed on top of the Tolbooth 
and his legs and arms distributed to Stirling, Glasgow, Perth, and 
Aberdeen. Various ministers visited him before the execution because 
it was stipulated that if he repented his crimes, the sentence of excom-
munication would be lifted. However, Montrose stated that, although 
he continued to hold to the Covenant he had taken, he could not sup-
port any actions against the authority of the King, to whom he pledged 
a greater allegiance and in whose authority he had acted. Furthermore, 
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Montrose apparently stated that he thought it an honour to have his loy-
alty remembered in Scotland’s five most eminent towns.15 During the 
Restoration regime, such reports of Montrose’s gallantry when faced 
with unjust death were used to further establish his position as one of the 
most celebrated Royalist martyrs of the period.
On the morning of his execution, Montrose ascended the scaffold 
wearing fine scarlet with white gloves and silk stockings that had been 
provided by friends. Traditionally, criminals about to suffer the last pun-
ishment of the law were given the opportunity to address the watching 
crowd in order to express public penitence for their offences and to rec-
oncile themselves with their fate. However, fears that Montrose might 
be rescued meant the authorities limited his access to the public. He 
was only permitted to address those immediately around him, one of 
whom recorded what he said. In his investigation of the behaviour and 
last dying speeches of the Jacobite rebels, Daniel Szechi argues that, dur-
ing his execution, Charles I had set a precedent in refusing to publicly 
accept the justice of his sentence.16 Instead of showing penitence during 
his last moments, Montrose reaffirmed his loyalty to God and the King, 
and expressed satisfaction that he was to follow in the footsteps of the 
martyred Charles I.17 Reporting upon Montrose’s gallant deportment, 
a contemporary pamphlet commented that “it is absolutely believed that 
he hath gained a better repute by his death than ever he did in life”.18
After hanging for three hours, Montrose’s body was cut down and 
his head and limbs were cut off with an axe—a scene that was met with 
sounds of regret from the crowd.19 The Covenant then began to display 
their authority and justice by distributing the body parts. Montrose’s 
head was spiked on top of the Old Tolbooth to mark out his treason-
ous criminality and to prolong his public humiliation beyond execution. 
One of his arms was put up at Justice Port in Aberdeen, and another was 
sent to Dundee. The legs were sent to Stirling and Glasgow.20 Often, the 
torsos of victims thus dismembered were given to relatives for burial; this 
was not the case with Montrose, however. Because he had been excom-
municated, his torso was buried in unconsecrated ground under the gal-
lows on the Borough Muir. At the time, this final insult by the Scottish 
Kirk was considered a greater torture than the punishments inflicted 
upon his body in life.21
These post-mortem punishments were broadly consistent with other 
treatments meted out on the corpses of traitors during the period. The 
legal death sentence was designed to deny the condemned a decent 
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burial and also to harness the power of the criminal corpse to make a 
political statement: this is what happens to traitors. In many cases, the 
dismembered body parts of the executed remained on display for years 
until they rotted away to nothing, or were eventually taken down with-
out ceremony and lost to historical record. Montrose’s body, however, 
became a vehicle to promote an entirely different political message in 
1661.
“An honourAble repArAtion”
In his biography of Montrose, Wishart called him a “candidate for 
immortality”, and provided one of the earliest examples in which 
Montrose’s death was held up as iconic in the Royalist cause. When 
lamenting Montrose’s treatment by the Covenant, Wishart stated that 
his death “was not bewailed as a private loss but rather as a public calam-
ity”.22 However, following the Restoration, Charles II’s first parliament 
resolved to bestow upon Montrose “an honourable reparation” for the 
barbarity committed against him and sought to officially rehabilitate him 
as a martyr.23 While this would finally give Montrose the decent death 
he had previously been denied, his funeral also served a broader politi-
cal purpose. The Restoration gave rise to a wave of Royalist sentiment in 
which the themes of loyalty and sacrifice were carefully woven into the 
fabric of the regime.24 Because of its political currency, Montrose’s story 
was told and retold by Scottish Royalists into the eighteenth century and 
beyond.25 In 1661, his courage in fighting for the King’s cause and his 
defiance in the face of death was rewarded by a lavish funeral, the like of 
which had not been seen in Scotland since the coronation of Charles I in 
Edinburgh in 1633.
Montrose’s attainment for treason in 1644 was intended to attach 
shame to his family’s name and contribute to his social death in the eyes 
of the Covenant. However, in 1661, this social death was undone. Those 
“nearest in blood” to Montrose, including members of the Graham and 
Napier families, became a focal part of the funeral proceedings with one 
contemporary pamphlet commenting that the event marked a resto-
ration of the good name of the Graham family.26 On 7 January 1661, 
the funeral procession made its way through Edinburgh to the sound of 
drums, trumpets and the firing of cannons, to collect Montrose’s torso 
from the Borough Muir. It was disinterred from under the gallows and 
carried under a velvet canopy to the Old Tolbooth where his head was 
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taken down by members of his family, before the procession continued 
to Holyrood Abbey. He was placed in a coffin where he lay in state until 
the funeral was held in St Giles on 11 May, followed by a large banquet 
in his honour. During his invasion of Scotland, Oliver Cromwell had 
supposedly ordered Montrose’s displayed limbs to be taken down. The 
arm sent to Aberdeen was interred in the vault of fellow Royalist George 
Huntly, 2nd Marquis of Gordon, who had been beheaded in 1649. In 
1661, it was raised up and put in a velvet-covered box and carried by 
a procession of over 500 people through the city.27 The celebration in 
Aberdeen was an important milestone in Montrose’s public rehabilita-
tion, as during his campaigns in the 1640s, he had attacked and plun-
dered the city.
The funeral was conducted at the King’s expense and was directed 
by Sir Alexander Durham who, as the Lyon King of Arms, was respon-
sible for overseeing state ceremonies in Scotland. Durham’s accounts 
show that he distributed, at least, the enormous sum of £802 sterling for 
Montrose’s funeral. This lavish expenditure was more than mere remorse 
on the part of the monarch for a fallen cavalier. If we examine the great 
number of nobles and gentry who were present for the whole spectacle, 
it becomes clear that it brought together Montrose’s friends and foes.28 
This demonstrates that the Restoration regime intended the spectacle to 
act as a vehicle to propagate the value of loyalty and to show its strength 
after a generation of civil wars. Following the funeral, Montrose’s 
remains were buried in the cathedral of St Giles, in the vault of his 
grandfather, a previous Viceroy of Scotland.29 Although the funeral and 
burial were intended to provide Montrose with an honourable death, not 
all of his body found its final resting place in the vault in St Giles. The 
next section looks at the separate journeys of one of Montrose’s arms 
and his heart in order to highlight the beliefs that were attached to them 
and to demonstrate the continued agency of his body.
“A most convincing form of testimony”
There were various ways to think about, and be affected by, dead bod-
ies in seventeenth-century Britain. These included: debates about 
when a person was medically dead; debates about the religious impor-
tance, or power of corpses; and beliefs about the potency of the dead 
and the healing properties of certain body parts.30 Popular ideas about 
dead bodies were frequently noted at public executions, where people 
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showed a desire to possess mementos, such as the blood, hair, clothing, 
and personal possessions of the executed person. Indeed, at the execu-
tion of Charles I, the monarch gave friends pieces of his clothing as rel-
ics, while after his death, his silk shirt and gloves became coveted curios. 
As was customary, the silk stockings worn by Montrose for his execu-
tion were claimed by the executioner. He had taken care not to cut them 
when severing the limbs, and after the event, they were purchased by 
Montrose’s niece Elizabeth Erskine, Lady Napier. In 1856, a descend-
ent of Lady Napier mentioned that the family was still in possession of 
the stockings, along with other relics of Montrose.31 While this was an 
example of the repatriation of Montrose’s possessions and memory by 
his family, Royalists were also concerned to “re-member” his body by 
tracing down his missing arm and heart.
It appears that the left arm sent to Aberdeen was the only one of the 
four distributed limbs to be collected in 1661. The right arm sent to 
Dundee to be nailed up above the principal town gate was subsequently 
carried to England by a Cromwellian officer named Pickering.32 When 
one of Pickering’s descendents left England for Spain in 1704, he placed 
the arm into Ralph Thoresby’s antiquarian collection in Leeds. Upon 
Thoresby’s death in 1725, the arm was purchased by Thomas Graham of 
Woodhall in Yorkshire.33 It remained in the Graham family for decades 
and one his descendents, John Graham, wrote about the arm in 1752, 
stating its journey thus far and attesting to its authenticity. By 1834, Mr. 
C. Reeves of Woodhall, perhaps a descendent of the Graham family of 
Yorkshire, was in possession of the arm, and he provided details about 
its current condition. It was a mummified limb, he said, that had been 
cut off at the elbow and was in an excellent state of preservation.34 In 
1891, the arm was purchased by Mr. J.W. Morkill, along with a writ-
ten statement of authenticity, and in 1925—the same year Charles’ silk 
waistcoat was donated to the Museum of London—Morkill attempted to 
sell it at Sotheby’s auction house. At the time, one newspaper stated that 
the arm was more than a gruesome relic because it offered a very defini-
tive indication of the character of Montrose: “for understanding eyes 
it is an historical document, in addition to being a relic coveted by all 
who have fallen under the spell of a very gallant gentleman.”35 However, 
Morkill’s notice of sale caused a public outcry and he withdrew the arm 
from Sotheby’s. It was not mentioned again until 1932 when it was 
left to Morkill’s son, Mr. Alan Greenwood Morkill, in his will.36 After 
1932, the arm disappeared from the historical record. Yet, despite the 
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uncertainty of its final destination, the journey of the arm across almost 
three centuries demonstrates that people considered it to be a powerful 
curio as it was a tactile memento of the great Montrose worth possess-
ing, and because the stories about it generated a sense of authenticity.
Following the execution and dismemberment, Montrose’s torso 
was buried at the Borough Muir with the gallows used to hang him. 
However, when his body was disinterred in 1661, it was discovered 
that the chest had been broken open and heart removed. This had been 
done on the orders of his niece, Lady Napier. The post-mortem journey 
of Montrose’s heart can be traced through a letter written by Alexander 
Johnson, a descendant of Lady Napier, to his daughter in the early nine-
teenth century.
According to Johnson, Lady Napier had the heart embalmed and 
enclosed in a case made from Montrose’s sword. It was then placed into 
a gold filigree box that had been gifted to the Napier family from a Doge 
in Venice, and then placed inside a silver urn. She sent the heart to the 
Netherlands, where Montrose’s son was in exile. After this, the heart was 
apparently lost for some time until a friend of the fifth Lord Napier rec-
ognised the gold box in a collection of curiosities in the Netherlands and 
purchased it for him. The Napier’s had him sign a certificate attesting to 
its authenticity and the circumstances by which he had acquired it and 
Johnson wrote that it was then taken back to the Napier ancestral home 
at Merchiston. Johnson’s grandfather often told the story of Montrose’s 
heart to his mother and when he died he had left the heart to her. As a 
child, Johnson travelled to India with his mother and father, who was 
an officer in the East India Company, but on the voyage their ship had 
been attacked and the gold box was damaged. In India, his mother had 
it repaired by a goldsmith and also had another silver urn made with an 
engraving, in the two most common languages of the southern penin-
sula of India, telling the story of Montrose. The Johnsons displayed the 
urn in their home in Madura and, because of his mother’s care for it, the 
locals believed it to be a talisman with the power to protect the bearer in 
battle. Owing to this superstition, it was stolen and sold to a powerful 
chief. But this was not the end of the heart’s journey.
In his letter, Johnson recalled how he was often sent to hunt with 
local chiefs in order to learn more about their culture, and on one trip he 
earned the praise of a particular chief for an act of bravery. In a remark-
able twist of fate, this was the chief who had purchased Montrose’s 
heart, without knowing it had been stolen, and he agreed to return it 
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to the family. (Interestingly, some years later, the chief was executed for 
his part in a rebellion, but before this, he told his attendants the story 
of Montrose and asked them to preserve his heart in the same way.) 
Montrose’s heart then returned to Europe with the family in 1792, but 
during their journey through France, they found out that the revolution-
ary government was confiscating gold and silver. The Johnsons therefore 
entrusted the gold box into the safe keeping of an English woman in 
Boulogne named Knowles. When Knowles died soon after, the family 
were unable to trace the heart.37 But still, the trail did not go cold.
In 1931, Captain H. Stuart Wheatley-Crowe, the president of 
the Royal Stuart Society, led an investigation into the missing heart. 
Wheatley-Crowe had in his possession an embalmed heart that was 
believed to have been brought to England from France during the 
Revolution by the ancestors of the Perkins family who claimed it was the 
heart of Montrose. He had a medical examination carried out upon the 
heart that found it to be approximately 300 years old, but could find no 
other definitive proof of its authenticity.38 In 1951, Wheatley-Crowe sent 
the heart to Canada to a person he believed had a claim to the relic, a 
Mrs. Maisie Armitage-Moore.39 Another turn of events came in 2012 
when the largest ever collection of memorabilia marking the life of James 
Graham was exhibited in the Montrose Museum, a museum that opened 
in the town of Montrose in 1842, to mark the 400-year anniversary of 
his birth. The exhibition included paintings, documents, weapons, and 
a heart believed to be that of Montrose himself. The museum’s curator 
acknowledged that there were two recorded accounts of different hearts 
believed to belong to Montrose and they had located one. However, 
it is unclear if this was the same heart that had been sent to Canada in 
1951.40 Despite the lack of proof of its authenticity, the heart was placed 
alongside other artefacts definitively related to Montrose, and this per-
haps is a suitable final destination.
conclusion
While awaiting his execution in the condemned cell of the Old 
Tolbooth, Montrose remarked to the guard “even after I am dead I 
will be continually present…and become more formidable to them [the 
Committee of Estates] than while I was alive”.41 Despite making this 
statement, Montrose could not have foreseen how both his body and 
his legacy would be utilised by both the Covenanting and the Royalist 
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causes to propagate entirely different values. His three-day execution 
spectacle was replete with the hallmarks attached to the punishment for 
offences against the state, from the ignominious public procession to the 
multiple stages of the execution itself. Furthermore, the displaying of his 
corpse to indefinitely mark out his criminality was intended to prolong 
his legal death beyond the extinction of life. However, in conducting a 
public funeral, the Restoration regime changed Montrose’s identity from 
that of an executed traitor to that of a murdered martyr and reconciled 
him religiously and legally.
We can draw parallels between the posthumous treatment of 
Montrose and other influential corpses from the Civil War, Interregnum 
and Restoration period. Following his execution for treason in 1681, 
the remains of Oliver Plunkett, the late Roman Catholic Archbishop of 
Armagh and Primate of All Ireland, were exhumed in 1683 and went on 
a journey of spiritual rehabilitation across Europe before he was even-
tually canonised in 1975. In contrast, upon his death in 1658, Oliver 
Cromwell, the late Lord Protector of the Commonwealth, received an 
elaborate state funeral which was intended to serve as a reinforcement 
of the Protectoral regime. However, this did not to mark his final rest-
ing place or his final legal death. By order of the Restoration regime, he 
was posthumously convicted and executed as a regicide with his spiked 
head on top of Westminster Hall serving as a reminder of the reward 
for treason.42 The chronology of Cromwell’s multiple deaths presents an 
almost reverse pattern to those of Montrose who suffered an ignomini-
ous execution in 1650, but received a lavish funeral in 1661 to mark his 
official death at the same time as his rehabilitation in the public memory.
Will Montrose ever die? This chapter has shown that, even after the 
honourable reparation afforded to Montrose in 1661, he was not, and 
perhaps is not yet, truly dead. Some of his body parts, once the dis-
membered remains of a traitor, were refashioned into coveted relics and 
instead of marking out his criminality, they attested to his gallantry and 
loyalty to the king. Spanning four centuries, the journeys of Montrose’s 
arm and heart drew forth beliefs about body parts as signs of punish-
ment, curious relics, icons of political memory, and curated exhibits. 
For the Covenant, Montrose’s execution in 1650 marked the end of his 
life, but for Royalists it was the honourable funeral of 1661 that marked 
his legal death and repatriation into a political community. Montrose 
remains an iconic figure in Scottish history; indeed, the First Marquis 
of Montrose Society was founded in 1995 to promote his name and 
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memory. This contemporary relevance, alongside the mobility and multi-
ple meanings attached to his body parts, make it unlikely that Montrose’s 
post-mortem journeys are over yet.
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CHAPTER 4
Overcoming Death: Conserving the Body 
in Nineteenth-Century Belgium
Veronique Deblon and Kaat Wils
The start of the nineteenth century coincided with the development of 
a new aesthetics of death. Funerary rites became more elaborate; cem-
eteries and tombstones were increasingly adorned, and corpses were 
embellished before their burial. At the centre of this beautification of 
death movement was a new individualised and “sentimentalised” rela-
tionship with the dead.1 Paying respect and tribute to the personhood of 
the deceased became an important aspect of mourning and funeral cul-
ture. At the same time, a more romanticised view of the afterlife was por-
trayed with an emphasis on the promise of reunion in life after death.2 In 
European funerary culture, the “death as sleep” metaphor became a pop-
ular representation of death as it allowed mourners to separate the idea 
of death from a final state of being and corresponded with the Christian 
narrative of resurrection. In this narrative, the transition from life to 
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death allowed the soul to fall asleep, only to awaken for the final judge-
ment.3 As Sarah Tarlow indicates, the comparison between sleep and 
death allowed for a “figurative understanding” of death (as the deceased 
were granted an eternal rest in peace).4 The death as sleep narrative was 
accordingly part of the commemorative culture of Christian worship and 
it was materialised in tombstones and grave inscriptions.5
The grave as a peaceful place of sleep stands in sharp contrast with the 
reality and corporeality of death—of decomposition and putrefaction. 
The process of decay is inevitable in the body once organs stop func-
tioning and bacteria and enzymes start decomposing bodily tissue. In the 
nineteenth century, new conserving procedures for the dead body were 
developed in response to a growing fear about the decaying corpses of 
the dead. New embalming techniques seemed to materialise the death 
as sleep metaphor: the preserved corpse appeared to be sleeping. These 
conservation methods were developed in the anatomical theatre, where 
corpses were preserved for scientific research or educational purposes. 
Even though embalmed corpses destined for burial and anatomical prep-
arations were displayed in a different context, they both represented the 
corpse lingering between life (or sleep) and death. Moreover, defining 
death as sleep offered anatomists a visual language to connect their prac-
tices to contemporary funeral culture. By looking at the use, display, and 
popularisation of conservation procedures for corpses, we will show how 
death was overcome by preserving the body and suggesting a state of 
sleep in both medical and funeral culture. The display of sleeping corpses 
further aligned medical practice to Catholic death rites and an emerging 
conspicuous funeral culture.
This chapter presents a case study on nineteenth-century Belgium, 
where anatomists explicitly connected their practices to a funeral culture 
by preserving and displaying dead bodies as if they were still alive and 
seemed to be merely sleeping. The death as sleep metaphor received a 
new application in these treatments of the corpse. In doing so, anato-
mists testified to a sentimentalised relationship with individual corpses. 
At the same time, they helped shape nineteenth-century death culture by 
presenting their conserved corpses as if they were sleeping.
The practice of conserving corpses was not entirely new in Western 
Europe in the nineteenth century. This first part of the chapter looks at 
an early modern method for conserving bodies used by the Dutch anato-
mist Frederik Ruysch (1638–1731). Ruysch’s work (re)gained renown in 
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the nineteenth century when interest in the conservation and beautifi-
cation of corpses was high. Inspired by Ruysch, the Belgian anatomist 
Adolphe Burggraeve (1806–1902) preserved corpses in such a way that 
they appeared to be alive and seemed to be sleeping peacefully. Focusing 
on the death as sleep metaphor, we examine how Burggraeve’s “sleep-
ing corpses” became familiar representations of death in an era in which 
embalming was popularised in Belgium. The final part of the chapter 
will look at how anatomical preparations impacted on death cultures and 
people’s perceptions of what death looked like.
conserving the deAd body:  
the prepArAtions of frederik ruysch
For medieval physicians and churchmen, the conserving and collecting 
of body parts was a routine practice that formed an important aspect of 
how medical knowledge was passed on and how Christianity was prac-
tised. The first medical collections contained several osteological remains 
such as skeletons, while in churches different bones and skulls of saints 
were preserved. These collections of anatomical specimens and holy rel-
ics were designed to be displayed, and by the Renaissance period, they 
became increasingly adorned and made into commodities.6 However, in 
the seventeenth century, anatomists working on (lay) bodies developed 
techniques to conserve tissues by macerating and storing body parts in 
alcohol-filled jars. This meant that they could create new spectacles of 
death, beyond the dry skeletons that originally filled their cabinets.
Frederik Ruysch showed particular interest in the conservation of 
corpses, both as embalmed and anatomical preparations. Ruysch was 
particularly known for his skeletons of foetuses that were preserved and 
often mounted in a “landscape” of human body parts, such as injected 
arteries or kidney stones. The lifelike skeletons—that were placed in an 
upright position—held different vanitas symbols, such as feathers, pearls, 
and handkerchiefs. The inscriptions that accompanied the anatomical 
preparations reminded visitors of the frailty of life. For example, labels 
of the tableaux read: “Death spares no man, not even the defenceless 
infant”, or “What is life? A transient smoke and a fragile bubble”.7 The 
tableaux of foetal skeletons were intended to present spectators with 
a moral message on death as the inevitable fate of man and served as 
memento mori.
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Ruysch also developed a conservation technique for the preservation 
of human tissue by injecting them with substances such as (coloured) 
wax or mercury and storing them in alcohol. Though Ruysch was not 
the first to employ this method, he developed the skill to create speci-
mens that mimicked the body’s natural state.8 The uncanny character of 
the preparations came from their lifelike appearance: contemporary visi-
tors to Ruysch’s collection emphasised the “rosy complexions” of the 
bottled babies, which made it appear as if “they had never died”.9 His 
injection technique not only restored the suppleness of the body in its 
living state, it also allowed him to map fine anatomical structures such as 
the capillaries.
Ruysch’s lifelike specimens also formed a tribute to the infinite power 
of a divine Creator. His cabinet was recommended as a place where visi-
tors stood “face to face with manifestations of the creation” and could 
observe the ingenious structure and functioning of the human body 
as it was designed by the Creator.10 In his study on the preparations 
of Ruysch, Van de Roemer emphasises that the attributes of the speci-
mens, such as embroidered textile, strengthened the religious reflections 
of visitors to the anatomical cabinet. The delicate lace that covered the 
anatomical preparations offered a visual association between the texture 
of textile (made by man) and the texture of the body (as created by a 
divine power).11 Moreover, the lifelike appearance of the preparations 
supported the emotional connection between dead body parts and their 
spectators.
Given this link between the display of bodies and musings on mor-
tality and Creation in early modern collections, anatomical prepara-
tions could be seen to have similar functions to holy relics.12 Anatomical 
preparations offered mourners a “material and emotional link to the 
deceased” and “represent[ed] the living” in the same way that relics 
did.13 While relics had a power associated with their origin in the bod-
ies of saints and narratives of martyrdom, why did Ruysch’s preparations 
need to be beautiful in order to inspire people to reflect on death? The 
artistic embellishing of preparations helped to deal with people’s disgust 
at the corpse; the anatomical artistry consciously referenced the divine 
work of God, a juxtaposition that gave anatomists like Ruysch a spec-
tacular power.14 Marieke Hendriksen further argues that the “elegancy” 
of anatomical preparations in the early modern period was a necessary 
means by which anatomical knowledge was transmitted. The senses of 
touch, sight, and smell might overpower those who approached the 
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(unpreserved) corpse to learn, yet the beauty of the preparations dem-
onstrated the beauty of the anatomical body. In turn, the perfection of 
dissected or injected body parts generated anatomical knowledge.15 
Though the taste for elegance in seventeenth-century anatomical prep-
arations soon waned, Ruysch’s work was celebrated until well into the 
nineteenth century precisely because he was able to eliminate “the dis-
gust inspired by the cadaver”.16
deAth in nineteenth-century belgium
In the early modern period, representations of the decaying body served 
as memento mori—a reminder of one’s own mortality—but by the nine-
teenth century, the thought of bodily dissolution came to be seen as dis-
tressing. Nineteenth-century death culture aimed to conceal the “reality 
of death and decay”.17 This was because, from the late eighteenth cen-
tury onwards, there was a transformation in how people mourned. An 
individualised relationship with the dead emerged and burial became 
increasingly aestheticised as part of the wish to pay tribute and respect to 
the personhood of the deceased.18 This created a new sensitivity about 
the decay of the corpse, because it threatened to affect people’s emo-
tional relationship with the dead, and raised fears about the medical dan-
gers of rotting bodies.
In nineteenth-century funeral rituals, more attention was paid to the 
bodily integrity of the deceased. Amid the cultural shift towards an indi-
vidual relationship with the dead, anatomists and medical students at 
European universities developed new and more efficient ways to con-
serve the corpse for use in their studies. Their desire to halt decay did 
not exclude their desire to beautify the corpse; rather, these new conser-
vation methods overlapped with the aesthetic methods that upper-class 
mourners were using in their funerary practices.19
In France, new embalming techniques were popularised and com-
mercialised by medical men in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
A similar shift occurred in America where new conservation techniques 
were marketed by funeral directors in the emerging funeral industry.20 
In Belgium, funeral rites and ceremonies were exclusively in the hands of 
the Catholic Church in the first half of the nineteenth century. Religion 
played a crucial part in the moments leading up to death and in the 
organisation of funerals. Confession, absolution, and prayer accompanied 
the final hours of a dying person.21 In Catholicism, the final sacraments 
54  V. DEBLON AND K. WILS
allowed the soul to live on in the afterlife and supported the idea of 
heavenly immortality.
After death, the laying out of the corpse was part of a dignified fare-
well. This particular task was usually performed by the sisters of a 
Catholic order and was often reserved for the highest echelons of society. 
For example, the bodies of bishops were washed, covered with odorous 
spices and laid out after death. Displaying the corpse was seen as a mark 
of respect and appreciation for the deceased. Care for the dead body was 
an expression of faith in resurrection and the immortality of the soul.22 
Cherishing the corpse would provide that dead body with the opportu-
nity to resuscitate and reunite with the soul in the afterlife. Physicians 
who wanted to promote their embalming techniques capitalised on this 
belief: conserving the corpse equalled care for the corpse and guaranteed 
its physical integrity.
In the homes of the destitute, the laying out of corpses was more of 
a necessity than an aspect of the funeral rite. Due to the lack of munici-
pal morgues, pauper corpses often stayed in people’s one-bedroom 
houses in attendance of a funeral.23 As the embalmment of corpses in 
nineteenth-century Belgium was exclusively reserved for royals, nobility, 
and the bourgeoisie, the preservation of pauper corpses in the domestic 
sphere was often problematic.24 Decaying pauper corpses were increas-
ingly seen as a medical hazard. The time between the moment of death 
and the actual funeral was therefore strictly limited. Yet, the presence 
of the beloved deceased in the domestic sphere also contributed to the 
image of the “corpse at peace”.25 In her study on the expression of grief 
among the working classes in nineteenth-century Britain, Julie-Marie 
Strange notes that the “relaxation of the facial muscles” and the simi-
larities between “shroud and nightdress” led spectators to associate death 
and sleep.26
The post-mortem fate of paupers who died in the hospital was radi-
cally different from those who passed away at home. Patients’ corpses 
were transferred to the anatomical theatre and dissected when the fam-
ily was unable to cover the funeral costs. The putrefying corpses in the 
anatomical theatre evoked repugnance among the people in the neigh-
borhood who often complained about bad odours. The practices of 
anatomists therefore enjoyed a bad reputation among a non-medical 
audience. Anatomists tried to disconnect the corpses from the realities of 
death by embalming and conserving their source material.
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between life And deAth: the prepArAtions  
of Adolphe burggrAeve
While Ruysch’s anatomical preparations had been excessively adorned 
with textile or attributes in the early modern period, by the end of the 
eighteenth century, a more realist, “representational” and modest style 
was developed for anatomical representations of the body.27 Elaborate 
displays of decorated body parts went out of fashion. As anatomy 
moved away from providing spectacles of death for lay audiences, anat-
omists developed more sober representations of the anatomical body.28 
However, the desire to overcome the disgust and horror of the corpse 
remained an important aspect of the work of anatomical collectors into 
the nineteenth century.29 This removal of disgust chimed in with con-
temporary mourning cultures and provided a new context for the display 
of anatomical preparations.
In Belgium, the creation and institutionalisation of anatomical col-
lections was an important aspect of the development of a national 
science after its independence in 1830. Anatomists at the new univer-
sities put great effort in the establishment of anatomical museums. At 
the University of Ghent, Adolphe Burggraeve and his aide Edouard 
Meulewaeter developed several conserving techniques to ensure the 
expansion of the institution’s anatomical collection in the 1830s. 
Together they created mercury-injected specimens, injected bone prep-
arations, and injected preparations of the mucous membrane next to 
larger wet specimens of diseased organs or foetuses. Their preparations 
were lauded for their natural appearance and delicacy, and were seen as 
the ultimate proof of Burggraeve’s craftsmanship. Though elegance went 
out of style, the preparations housed in the anatomical museum at the 
University of Ghent show that anatomists were still concerned about cre-
ating the most lifelike preparations possible.
Burggraeve searched for years for a preservation method that could 
equal the results of Ruysch. Inspired by an encounter with some lifelike 
preparations in the Netherlands, Burggraeve devised a procedure that he 
felt matched that of Ruysch. With the assistance of his aide Meulewaeter, 
Burggraeve found a way to inject corpses with coloured gelatine, and 
then conserved the preparations in soured alcohol. They added over a 
1000 specimens to the University’s anatomical cabinet, but only a few 
preparations from the original collection have survived. One of them is 
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a newborn child dressed in a white christening gown, floating in a trans-
parent glass jar (Fig. 4.1). This preparation received considerable atten-
tion in the nineteenth-century medical press; its natural skin tone and 
the rosiness of the cheeks and lips were particularly lauded. The veluti-
nous quality of the skin was said to give the preserved body the “trans-
parence of life” and suggested the bodies were at peace.30 A preparation 
of a half-dissected girl displays a similar serenity, but paradoxically it also 
incorporates the violence of a dissection (Fig. 4.2). On the one hand, the 
girl on display is clearly dead; her head is cut in half to show the matter 
within. On the other hand, she appears to be sleeping peacefully. When, 
in 1837, Burggraeve presented some of his preparations to a medi-
cal audience, their lifelike appearance caused many to recall the work of 
Ruysch, an association Burggraeve was keen to highlight. Indeed, like 
Ruysch, Burggraeve adorned his preparations with textile decorations 
and kept his conservation method a secret.31
The purpose of the textile decorations was twofold: Firstly, it was 
meant to cover up mutilated body parts, as was its function in the sev-
enteenth century.32 The autopsy scars on the body of the newborn 
infant, for example, were concealed by the christening dress. Secondly, 
the adherence of textile to body parts also had a symbolic function: the 
christening gown of the newborn infant emphasised the innocence of 
the child, but also confirmed the possibility that the child would live a 
peaceful afterlife.33 In the nineteenth century, it was customary to bury 
babies in their baptismal clothing as proof that they had been baptised 
and could enter the Kingdom of Heaven.34 By dressing the child in a 
white gown, Burggraeve aligned the preparation of the child with con-
temporary funeral practices.
As an anatomical preparation, the body of the newborn child hardly 
demonstrated anatomical structures or knowledge. However, it did visu-
alise a new “death way” to visitors to the anatomical museum. The dress 
softened the harsh reality of death, made the corpse into an aesthetic 
object, and hid the scars inflicted by the post-mortem examination.In 
Burggraeve’s preparation of the girl, the reality of the dissection was 
not hidden. Rather, the traces of the dissection and the carving of the 
scalpel were clearly visible on the body. Her trunk appears to have been 
detached violently from her chest, and Burggraeve highlighted her ana-
tomical structures by means of coloured gelatin injections. The textile 
attached to the preparation, however, served the symbolic purpose of 
drawing out an association with sleep. Draped as if it were a pillow, the 
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fabric seems to suggest that the deceased is resting and has found peace, 
despite the disintegrated state of her body.
Burggraeve’s preparations not only caught the attention of his fellow 
medical professionals, but the results of his injection method were also 
noticed in the Belgian newspaper press where audiences read about how 
Fig. 4.1 Anatomical preparation of a newborn child (Museum for the History 
of Medicine, Ghent. Collection: University Museum, Ghent)
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one could hold onto the bodies of the deceased. Burggraeve’s inven-
tion was contextualised by referring to the human fascination with the 
dead body and our wish to overcome the “destruction” of life. In one 
newspaper article the “idea of death” was said to be “too dreadful for 
man”, which explained, for the journalist, why many different cultures 
embalmed and conserved the dead.35 The display of lifelike anatomical 
preparations to a lay audience, it is clear, allowed for a peaceful and con-
soling confrontation with death.
embAlmment mAniA: JeAn-nicholAs gAnnAl’s 
conservAtion method
Anatomists continually sought for better ways to conserve putrefying 
corpses. In the anatomical theatre, the same corpse that served as an 
object of scientific enquiry one day could be the locus of fears about ill-
ness and disease from medical students the next day. A fear of rotting 
Fig. 4.2 Anatomical preparation of a girl with hand (Department of Basic 
Medical Sciences, Anatomy and Embryology Research Group. Collection: 
University Museum, Ghent. Photographer: Benn Deceuninck)
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corpses also prevailed among the citizens of densely populated areas who 
saw the dead body as a breeding ground for diseases such as typhus and 
cholera.36 In this context, anatomists intervened in medical and popu-
lar fears about the dead by developing ways to conserve bodies, preserve 
their physical integrity and extend their “liveliness”. In the 1820s and 
1830s, the French chemist Jean-Nicholas Gannal (1791–1852) gained 
critical acclaim for his procedure to embalm cadavers. After working as 
an apothecary in the army of Napoléon Bonaparte, Gannal grew inter-
ested in the conservation of anatomical preparations and small animals, 
and later created a method for embalming human corpses from his oper-
ating base in Paris. He did this by making a small incision in the neck, 
rinsing the arteries, and then injecting the corpse with arsenic. At first, 
only corpses destined for the anatomical theatre were treated this way, 
but later on he also developed a conservation method that became popu-
lar in the funeral industry.37
As news about Gannal’s embalming procedure spread across Europe, 
hospitals and hygiene commissions became interested in applying his 
method for the conservation of corpses for dissection. The Medical 
Commission of the city of Brussels looked to Gannal’s method as a pos-
sible solution to the health risks and insalubrity caused by the circula-
tion of cadavers for anatomical courses.38 Anatomists claimed that the 
embalming of corpses could halt the exhalation of “mephitic miasmas” 
and the emanation of “poisonous gas”, which caused typhoid fever.39 
The teaching hospitals—where corpses were dissected—also reacted posi-
tively to Gannal’s method. Embalming was considered an excellent solu-
tion to the problem of the high number of accidents and illnesses caused 
by “le piqure anatomique”, or injuries caused by infection from dissection 
instruments.40 In 1841, four years after Gannal had patented his injec-
tion method, Cécilien Simonart, the prosector of the Brussels anatomy 
department, approved Gannal’s method for the conservation of anatomi-
cal preparations and for embalming procedures.41
Following the popularity of Gannal’s conservation procedure, many 
scientists took it upon themselves to create new embalming methods. 
Research on new embalming procedures rocketed in the 1840s, which 
caused the Gazette médicale belge—a publication that regularly reported 
on new conserving techniques—to ask its readers “when will this 
embalmment mania stop?”42
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the ApplicAtion of conserving procedures
News on Gannal’s embalming technique reached Belgium at the same 
time as Burggraeve displayed his preparations. Like Burggraeve’s 
method, Gannal’s injection technique received considerable atten-
tion in the newspaper press where it was also presented as a successor 
to Ruysch’s procedure.43 Burggraeve’s anatomical preparations and 
Gannal’s embalmed corpses were described in similar terms by journal-
ists, who lauded the freshness of their conserved bodies that had all the 
“appearances of life”.44
Both of these conserving procedures were developed behind the 
doors of the anatomical theatre, but it was Gannal who successfully 
tapped into a new market by attracting the interest of the funeral indus-
try in France. In fact, Gannal claimed to have created two methods for 
the embalming of bodies. The first method was used in the anatomi-
cal theatre, whereas his second injection technique was used in funeral 
treatments. His commercial endeavours were so successful that Gannal 
patented his embalming method for funerals. Gannal’s fame grew and 
Belgian newspapers eagerly reported on the eccentric embalmer from 
Paris who had transformed the way dead bodies appeared. As one jour-
nalist wrote: “we can say that the physiognomy of death has become 
nothing more than that of sleep and rest”.45 Gannal’s procedure gained 
even more fame when it was allegedly used to conserve the already 
decaying body of Napoléon in 1840 after its exhumation.46
In 1845, the anatomist Charles Poelman (1815–1874) acquired 
Gannal’s embalming patent for Belgium and received critical acclaim 
for it among his fellow physicians. Gannal’s method had been cel-
ebrated for its low cost, allowing for a “popular application” of the 
embalming procedure.47 Although Poelman did not use the method 
to advance medical education, the medical press in Belgium supported 
its application because it evoked the “interest and affection of families” 
who wished for their beloved ones to “remain after death the way they 
had been”.48 Another reason for the popularity of the Gannal method 
was that it respected the integrity of the body during the conservation 
process. In contrast to earlier embalming techniques, Poelman did not 
remove organs or the brain, thought of by Poelman as the instrument of 
the soul, “that which man made into man”.49 This respectful technical 
process supported the desire among upper-class Belgians for corpses to 
appear as if they were sleeping.50
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Through his embalming, Poelman responded to, and redefined, 
funeral rituals in Belgium. He acknowledged the growing importance of 
the tomb as a “pious object of veneration that speaks to our soul” and 
place where the living and the dead could reunite in an “invisible com-
munion”.51 Poelman urged that people considering a tomb should also 
consider embalming as a means to commemorate the dead, something 
he called a “sacred obligation”.52 As presented by Poelman, embalming 
was a consolation for the living and a means by which they could still 
maintain a relationship with the dead.
In the 1840s, just as Poelman promised to create a corpse that 
appeared to be sleeping, a Belgian pharmacist named Joseph Michiels 
promised to immortalise the corpse as a kind of living statue. Michiels 
experimented with several bodies in an effort to conserve them by cov-
ering them with copper, gold, or silver. His efforts were praised in the 
Belgian medical press as a method to conserve pathological specimens 
and as a form of embalming.53 Michiels presented his preparations at one 
of the meetings of the Belgian Royal Academy of Science and Fine Arts 
in 1843, where an audience admired the “perfect representation of the 
traits of the face” in the preparations.54 Though Michiels presented his 
conservation method in the form of anatomical preparations, the scien-
tific community encouraged and discussed its application in a non-med-
ical context: “families can place their parents in accessible galleries, as an 
alternative to enclosing them in dark tombs”.55 Instead of tracing the 
features of the face, as the death mask process did,56 Michiels traced the 
entire body and transformed it into a sculpture, or a “statue for every-
one”, as one local newspaper reported.57 Michiels’s conservation method 
allowed families to hold on to the corpse, literally, and keep it at home as 
if it were a jewel or decoration. As the Journal de Médecine de Bordeaux 
noted: “it seems that a gilded corpse would do well in a comfortably fur-
nished apartment”.58
overcoming deAth: the post-mortem subJect
In the anatomical theatre, the corpse was fragmented and exposed for 
the purposes of medical education and spectacle, but in a funeral con-
text, the integrity and respectful treatment of the corpse was paramount. 
Medical historians therefore connect the practice of anatomy with pro-
cesses of objectifying the corpse.59 By cutting, injecting, and display-
ing body parts, anatomists turned the corpse into an object that lacked 
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personhood. However, the creators of anatomical preparations frequently 
elided this process by signposting the identity and personality of the 
deceased.
Take Burggraeve’s anatomical preparations at the University of Ghent. 
The newborn infant was conserved in its entirety and wore a gown that 
symbolised youth and innocence. It also suggests a link with the fam-
ily of the deceased infant. Baptism clothing was often recycled from the 
mother’s wedding dress and was used to baptise several children from 
the same family. Burggraeve probably used the dress to suggest that the 
separation between the child and its family was only temporary. While 
this kind of preparation appealed to upper class Belgians, it was likely 
that the child was from the poor and destitute class that usually provided 
bodies for anatomists.
Burggraeve’s preparation of the girl, meanwhile, made her recognis-
able and appealed to visitors who saw a person sleeping in a glass tomb. 
The addition of the hand to the preparation gave an extra dimension to 
the display of the body, emphasising the personality, femininity, and ele-
gance of a body that was fragmented and placed in a jar. Like the tex-
tile, the hand also served a symbolic purpose, probably referring to the 
well-known preparations of children’s hands by Ruysch and the Dutch 
anatomist Bernhard Siegfried Albinus (1697–1770). The excellence of 
the conserved hand also alluded to the manual skills of the anatomist.60 
Although both of these bodies were anonymous, visitors sensed the sub-
jectivity of the people in the jars and this made death seem less unpleas-
ant. As a journalist put it, “we can please ourselves by contemplating 
the sweet animation of life in the corpse”.61 Burggraeve’s bodies can be 
defined as “post-mortem subjects”, a category John Troyer uses to think 
about the emergence of preservation technologies that made “the dead 
body look more alive”.62 Burggraeve’s preparations seem to hover some-
where between life and death, an uncanny situation that led one jour-
nalist to describe how “the tricked eye can still see the blood and life 
circulating”.63
In the preparation of the girl, the presence and colour of the hand 
suggests life, but the state of the head points to the liminal position of 
the anatomised subject. Her head is literally positioned between life and 
death: on the one side she is peacefully sleeping; on the other side, her 
open skull makes the brain visible to visitors. In this, the preparation 
resembled nineteenth-century wax anatomical models in its form and 
in its connection with funerary sculptures through their incorporation 
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of life and death in the body.64 This disconnection from the realities of 
death echoed a wider cultural transformation in the status of the dead, 
embalmed body. By the nineteenth century, the scientific value of ele-
gant or elaborately decorated anatomical preparations had diminished. 
However, Burggraeve’s lifelike preparations had renewed value as icons 
that could diminish people’s fear of corpses. The beauty of these prepara-
tions becomes “apparent in contrast to [their] destruction”, disguising 
the presence of death and decay.65
conclusion
The work of nineteenth-century anatomists and embalmers impacted on 
how people were mourned and their dead bodies considered in Belgium. 
Preservation showed that death did not inevitably lead to decay, that 
death could be thought of as a sleeping. In the Belgian newspaper press, 
Gannal and Burggraeve’s techniques were compared to the work of 
Ruysch, who had used a secret method to create his lifelike preparations. 
This chapter has argued that anatomists and embalmers materialised the 
death-as-sleep metaphor. Belgium shared with other nations a concern 
about the health issues associated with decaying bodies and anatomical 
practice. On an individual level, people desired an illusion that death was 
not the end, and that the personality of the deceased could be frozen in 
the corpse itself. Responding to this, anatomists developed methods for 
conservation in a medical context which received broader cultural appli-
cations. The displays discussed in this chapter demonstrate the journey 
of conserving and embalming practices from the anatomical theatre to 
the funeral parlour, from the world of medical education to the world of 
mourning practices. While anatomists could exert control over bodies and 
their decay through the use of preservatives and chemicals, visitors to ana-
tomical cabinets could feel that they also exerted control over their own 
destiny by imagining that dead bodies looked like they were sleeping.
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CHAPTER 5
Premature Burial and the Undertakers
Brian Parsons
Although legislation to register deaths was introduced in England and 
Wales in the 1830s, it was not mandatory for a physician to examine 
a body after death. For many people, the absence of a final check for 
signs of life led to fears of premature burial. In the 1890s, a pressure 
group called the London Association for the Prevention of Premature 
Burial (LAPPB) was founded to highlight the issue and it campaigned 
for improvements in death certification along with the building of “wait-
ing” mortuaries. Despite this move, the lack of any large-scale evidence 
that people were being buried alive meant that there was little interest 
in achieving greater changes in law or practice. Furthermore, by this 
stage, the context of the disposal of dead bodies was changing, a devel-
opment evident in the increased responsibility undertakers were given 
for the treatment of the corpse. This might have been an opportunity 
for undertakers to promote themselves as verifiers of mortality, offering 
the bereaved peace of mind by testing for death. However, the tentative 
moves to provide this service failed to gain any legitimacy because under-
takers were seen as usurping the role of medical professionals, tradition-
ally regarded as the chief certifiers of death.
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Historical in its approach, this chapter explores the landscape of the 
disposal of the dead in Britain from the 1830s, focusing, in particular, on 
the tension caused by the absence of secure certification of the dead and 
the changing role of the undertaker.
Concerns about premature burial, or “vivisepulchure” as Behlmer 
terms it, have existed in Britain since the eighteenth century, if not 
longer.1 This fear inspired many writers to speculate on the horrors of 
waking up in a coffin after interment: Edgar Allen Poe’s “The Premature 
Burial” (1844) is one of most widely known takes on the subject. The 
possibility that a trance-like state could be mistaken for death stimulated 
people to invent “safety” coffins, many kitted out with warning devices 
that could be activated by the supposedly deceased.2 These fears car-
ried through into the twentieth century, with the London coffin manu-
facturer Dottridge Bros continuing to market their “Life-Saving coffin” 
until around 1914.3
Those with the greatest fear of being buried alive used their will to 
stipulate the means by which physicians should check for signs of life. 
For instance, Jeanette Caroline Pickersgill, the first person to be cre-
mated at Woking Crematorium in March 1885, stated in her will:
I direct my executors after they have obtained a certificate (medical) of my 
death and before the coffin is closed to cause the arteries or large veins to 
be opened and I bequeath to my executors the sum of five pounds five 
shillings to be paid by them to Dr Langdon Down or any surgeon who 
may open the veins of my neck aforesaid.4
In this case, Dr. Down did not receive payment as Mrs. Pickersgill was 
subjected to an autopsy before cremation. Another example from 1909 
also involved a physical assault on the corpse:
In the will of Dame Katherine Millicent Palmer, of Dorney House, 
Buckinghamshire, who died on January 10th, aged sixty-six years, widow of 
Sir Charles James Palmer, leaving estate of the gross value of £2,876, with 
net personalty £2,598, the following direction is set down concerning her 
remains: ‘I have a great horror of being buried alive; therefore I wish my 
finger to be cut, and bequeath £10 to Dr Wilmot or any other doctor who 
is attending me at my death for such service’.5
The nineteenth-century fear that death-timings could be mistaken can be 
traced to a deficiency in the Registration of Births and Deaths Act 1836. 
5 PREMATURE BURIAL AND THE UNDERTAKERS  71
This Act required a physician to supply a certificate confirming death, 
but it did not stipulate that a physical examination of the body must take 
place prior to its issue. On the medical certificate of the cause of death, 
the doctor could simply append “I am informed”, leaving any person 
without medical qualifications or experience to state that life was extinct. 
As with all medical services at the time, the mandatory requirement for 
an examination would have involved the payment of a fee; for the poor, 
this would have represented a tax on death. Furthermore, tests for death 
would have been rudimentary and, perhaps, not necessarily conclusive. 
If a doctor was summoned, the diagnostic equipment in his bag would 
have comprised of little more than a stethoscope, a thermometer, an 
ophthalmoscope (for detecting decomposition in the retina), a hypoder-
mic syringe (for injecting ammonia to detect inflammation), and a mag-
nesium lamp (for examining circulation between the skin of the fingers).6
Among the poor, one fail-safe indicator that death had occurred was 
decomposition, especially the appearance of a green patch on the abdo-
men.7 Keeping the deceased at home in the interval between death and 
burial would have provided sufficient time for this change to become 
apparent.8 During this period, the undertaker would call to take a meas-
urement and return to encoffin the body; a return visit may also have 
been necessary to seal the coffin if significant deterioration had taken 
place. It was not until the 1920s, that bodies were brought to the under-
taker for more extensive treatment and transition to the chapel of rest, 
so an extended access to the body was important for assuaging fears of 
premature burial among the nineteenth-century poor.9 Long periods 
between death and burial were not uncommon. In his account of work-
ing as a gravedigger in the Suffolk village of Akenfield from the inter-
war years onwards, William Russ indicated that bodies would be kept 
at home for up to twelve days, not only because people “didn’t care to 
part with it,” but also because they “were afraid the corpse might still be 
alive.”10
the chAnging context of disposAl
Population expansion in the nineteenth century presented numerous 
social and economic challenges. As regards the disposal of the dead, 
the 1830s saw the introduction of death registration and the end of the 
Church of England’s near-monopoly on burial provision by the estab-
lishment of proprietary cemetery companies. By the 1850s, Burial Board 
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cemeteries funded by local ratepayers were transforming the landscape of 
burial in urban areas. With the increase in places approved for burial, and 
an increase in the means for disposing of the dead, the interval between 
death and burial was shortened. This allowed fears of premature burial 
to flourish, causing further changes in services for the disposal of bodies. 
The next section considers five of the main changes that occurred in the 
late nineteenth century.
The first development was cremation. In January 1874, the publi-
cation of Sir Henry Thompson’s seminal paper “The Treatment of the 
Body after Death” led to the founding of the Cremation Society of 
England (CSE) and the building, five years later, of the first cremato-
rium at Woking (however, because of issues concerning the legality of 
cremation, it was not until March 1885 when the cremator was used for 
the first time).11 At first, this alternative to burial was not popular; there 
were two further cremations in 1885, ten in 1886, and thirteen in 1887. 
By 1900, only 444 cremations took place at the four crematoria then in 
operation, representing only 0.07% of deaths in the UK.
The CSE were aware that cremation could be used to conceal crime 
so Thompson joined his fellow physicians in the Society (including the 
surgeon Sir Thomas Spencer Wells and Ernest Hart, the editor of the 
British Medical Journal) in devising the certification required to ensure 
the cause of death had been ascertained. The CSE was influenced by the 
French system in which a Medecin Verificateur was engaged by the state 
to confirm death; indeed, Sir Henry included an example of a form used 
in the French system in his 1899 book Modern Cremation: Its History 
and Practice. Based on this system, the Society required the comple-
tion of a series of certificates by three physicians: one to give the cause of 
the death; a second to confirm this information; and a third, appointed 
by the crematorium to be the “medical referee,” who independently 
reviewed all the documentation. Initially, Thompson himself vetted all 
the documents in his capacity as the first Medical Referee at Woking. A 
slightly modified system of this death certification was adopted by all the 
other crematoria opening after Woking, and the usage of these docu-
ments became formalised in the Cremation Act 1902. Between 1885 and 
the commencement of the legislation in 1903, nearly 3,300 cremations 
took place using this documentation.
The second key development was the building of mortuaries. From 
the 1870s onwards, the medical press published numerous accounts of 
the insanitary conditions in which bodies were retained at home, along 
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with the continued prevarication by parishes, districts, the Metropolitan 
Board of Works and the Home Office over the provision of mortuar-
ies.12 In 1875, the British Medical Journal surveyed facilities in London 
and found that out of the 20 districts that replied, just under half had 
no mortuary accommodation, whilst 13 had no post-mortem room.13 
The few mortuaries that had been opened, such as at Clerkenwell, 
Marylebone, and Bow, were poorly appointed and this put off the people 
who needed them most. A report on the health of Marylebone published 
in 1875, suggested that the use of the parish mortuary for storing cof-
fins had declined. The Lancet remarked: “The duty of educating the poor 
to overcome their prejudice against using mortuaries is as clear as is the 
duty of the urban sanitary authorities to provide them”.14 This view was 
still prevalent in the 1920s when Bertram Puckle noted,
The thought that the bodies of friends and relations should be taken to a 
mortuary suggests to the average mind an indignity, a social degradation. 
The mortuary is regarded as especially provided by the State for the bod-
ies of unfortunate outcasts picked up from the gutter, or dragged from the 
river, or at the best, as a place where the suicide or a person meeting with 
some dreadful accident is impounded till a jury can be called together for 
an inquest. We associate it mentally with the prison and the workhouse.15
The Public Health (London) Act 1891 finally made it mandatory 
for every sanitary authority in the capital to provide a mortuary.16 
Mortuaries could take many different forms: in 1904, the Borough of 
Kensington constructed a “chapel of rest”, as it was termed, in Avondale 
Park, Notting Hill.17 Despite being located in an area of dense housing, 
its use was only modest, as was reported over 20 years later:
We fear, however, that there is a still a tendency of the part of persons liv-
ing in tenements of one, two or three rooms to retain in their tenements 
the bodies of deceased relatives awaiting burials, and that the accommoda-
tion afforded by the chapel was greatly overlooked.18
Despite being designated a “chapel of rest”, this facility was on a similar 
footing to any other mortuary, being no more than a communal storage 
space provided by the local authority. It was, however, undertakers who 
addressed popular prejudice against mortuaries by opening private chap-
els of rest where the coffin could rest until the funeral. Furnished in an 
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ecclesiastical manner and open to access without charge, such chapels can 
be found from around 1914, particularly in the urban areas. These early 
mortuaries and chapels of rest were, however, spaces to accommodate 
the dead; they were not akin to the “waiting mortuaries” provided in 
Paris and elsewhere in Europe, to which the dead were transferred until 
decomposition confirmed death.
The third point concerns change within the funeral industry. The 
two key functions of the nineteenth-century undertaker were the pro-
vision of the coffin, and the subsequent arranging of transportation to 
the place of disposal. Other goods and services were also supplied for 
those who could afford it, such as mourning wear (including hatbands 
and gloves). As already identified, the undertaker’s contact with the 
dead body was no more than lifting it into a coffin, although occasion-
ally embalmments took place for overseas transportation of the dead. 
In 1900, there was a turning point in the function of the undertaker 
when two embalming tutors toured Britain, leading sessions in the craft 
of arterial preservation of the dead, a technique already well-developed 
in the United States.19 Practitioners of this method formed an associa-
tion, the British Embalmers’ Society, with the support of fluid manu-
facturers, from whom it was hoped undertakers would make purchases. 
The Undertakers’ Journal, which had been founded in 1885 and regu-
larly published articles penned by the leading US practitioners, lent 
its support to embalmers. However, as with cremation, change was 
slow to come to the funeral industry. Very little embalming took place 
in the early part of the twentieth century, and when it did, treatment 
was at home and was costly. Nevertheless, embalming gave undertakers 
a professional credibility by their acquisition of anatomical and sanitary 
knowledge, the founding of a qualifying association and, in 1908, the 
publication of a code of ethics. This trend toward professionalisation was 
symbolised by the creation of the British Undertakers’ Association, with 
the primary objective being state registration.
The fourth aspect of changing services in the late nineteenth cen-
tury concerns legislation relating to aspects of disposal. Whilst burial 
grounds became increasingly regulated, doctors were still not required 
to examine the deceased before giving a death certificate. The CSE pro-
moted the Disposal of the Dead (Regulations) Bill 1884, which was 
designed to regulate cremation and also introduce a physical examina-
tion of the deceased, but their initiative failed. Meanwhile, in 1893, the 
Departmental Committee on Death Certification drew attention to the 
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absence of mandatory inspection of the body and noted that “in some 
instance a skilled observer would only be able to pronounce whether life 
was extinct”.20 Again, few of its recommendations were implemented.
The fifth area was the reform of the funeral sector. Around the time 
that cremation was being promoted in the mid-1870s, the surgeon 
and etcher Sir Francis Seymour Haden defended the practice of burial 
against the cremationists. Haden argued that, if carried out correctly, 
using wicker or papier mâché “Earth to Earth” coffins interred in sandy, 
porous soil, would allow the body to deteriorate swiftly to its constitu-
ent elements. This would also allow others to reuse the grave.21 Another 
attack on emboldened undertakers came from the Church of England 
Funeral and Mourning Reform Association, founded in 1875 by the 
Reverend Frederick Lawrence. This group concerned itself with the 
“excessive cost and cynical manipulation of funerals by undertakers”.22
Within the funeral industry, the Paddington-based funeral director 
and proprietor of The Undertakers’ Journal, Halford Lupton Mills, also 
pursued a reform agenda.23 He encouraged the use of the open-sided 
horse-drawn hearse, rather than an elaborate closed carriage, and dis-
missed the sale of unnecessary paraphernalia, including the use of mutes 
and the carrying of trays of feathers. The trend for advertising a scale of 
charges for funerals in newspapers and trade directories also suggests that 
some undertakers were keen to distance themselves from the unscrupu-
lous behaviour of some colleagues. Whilst the overall purpose of these 
reforms was to reduce funerary expenditure through simplified disposal 
practices, they did not, however, address the issue of certification, nor 
did they provide reassurance to those concerned by the possibility of 
being buried alive. It was the latter that led to the founding of a pressure 
group specifically for this purpose.
premAture buriAl And the undertAkers
In 1896, the London Association for the Prevention of Premature Burial 
(LAPPB) was established by William Tebb and a Gloucester-based gen-
eral practitioner, Dr. Walter Hadwen. Tebb and Hadwen were stimulated 
by accounts of vivisepulchre in the popular press during 1895, and the 
following year Tebb wrote a book on the subject with Edward Vollum 
entitled Premature Burial and How It May Be Prevented. Both Tebb and 
Hadwen were on the fringes of medical orthodoxy because of their sup-
port for anti-vaccination, anti-vivisection, and vegetarian causes. Between 
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1901 and 1914, the Association intervened in debates on funerary 
practices through its journal, the Burial Reformer (renamed Perils of 
Premature Burial in 1909).
Despite the generous coverage of LAPPB in The Undertakers’ 
Journal, it mirrored the funeral sector as a whole in oscillating between 
expressions of ridicule and support for the movement. For instance, in 
1898, the editor commented that “Premature burial, [was] an unwhole-
some and unnecessary subject in England”,24 whilst previously stat-
ing that “Tenders for the supply of premature burial stories are not 
invited at this office”.25 In 1909, when the title of the Burial Reformer 
changed, the editor of The Undertakers’ Journal suggested as alternatives 
The Medical Sinecurist (insinuating that physicians could earn a healthy 
income from certifying deaths) or The Burial Fiction Monthly.26 In its 
journal, the LAPPB published many accounts of people who were buried 
alive.27 Of these, only a case of catalepsy in 1905 contained any measure 
of credibility. This involved a young woman who was certified dead by a 
physician acting on information provided by the family. Luckily, she was 
discovered alive by an undertaker taking a measurement for her coffin.28 
The response of The Undertakers’ Journal was to publish letters request-
ing definite cases of premature burial. The LAPPB must have been very 
disappointed when Dr. Frederick Waldo, the South London Coroner, 
stated that he had come across no proven cases of premature burial.29
In the year following the founding of the LAPPB, the Secretary of 
State for the Home Office was asked about a Lancet report that stated 
that 15,000 people were buried annually without medical certificates.30 
This figure was denied and it was further stated that no cases of pre-
mature burial had been brought to the attention of the Home Office. 
This did not persuade Sir Henry Thompson who pointed to a national 
problem:
Previous to cremation, let me say that it is sine qua non that a careful 
examination of the body by two medical practitioners (neither of whom 
is related to the deceased) must be made, and the cause of death clearly 
stated…In England and Wales an average of fifteen thousand are buried 
annually without a certificate of any sort, and the proportion is much 
larger in Scotland, amounting to about 50 per cent.31
The lack of mandatory death certification was an issue that energised 
undertakers, and those concerned about premature burial. In 1905, 
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the British Undertakers’ Association (BUA) was founded, and it joined 
the LAPPB in addressing the issue. However, for the undertakers, this 
campaign was part of their desire to offer more services and develop 
professional credibility; the LAPPB preferred to raise awareness of the 
deficiencies in the certification system through sensational reporting. 
Despite this, The Undertakers’ Journal backed up some of the claims of 
the LAPPB in 1908, when it was stated that thirteen cases of premature 
burial were reported in the previous year.32
Despite this sensationalism, practical proposals did emerge. Inspired 
by examples in France and Germany, the LAPPB campaigned for the 
building of “waiting mortuaries” where the corpse could rest until signs 
of decomposition proved death had occurred. With grudging use of 
public mortuaries as they were, there was certainly no appetite for this 
initiative. The following year, the LAPPB suggested that the occupier of 
a household should be obliged to instruct a Medical Officer of Health to 
remove a body into their care prior to burial or cremation.33 Encouraged 
by a proposed bill in Massachusetts in 1903, they drafted legislation that 
floated the idea of a “death verifier” whose role would be to allow burial 
only after the body showed signs of decomposition.34
On the part of the undertakers, the funeral director James Broome 
argued that medical examiners [death certifiers] were too expensive and 
that people were not insured if they used their services. He proposed a 
solution: “Where uncertainty of death exists…call in a member of the 
British Embalmers’ Society who is conversant with signs and tests”.35 
Broome recommended that all funeral directors carry out tests for death, 
while the founding father of the British Undertakers’ Association and 
embalming pioneer, Henry Sherry, appropriately suggested that embalm-
ers should be trained in resuscitation.36 In 1909, a “Death Registration 
and Burial Bill” was discussed at the BUA convention by Albert 
Cottridge, a London funeral director and advocate of embalming and 
the registration of funeral directors. Cottridge argued that each district 
should appoint a public certifier of deaths; that no death should be reg-
istered unless a medical certificate had been completed following exami-
nation of the deceased; that a physician completing a medical certificate 
should be paid 2s 6d (12½p); and that the person registering the death 
should receive a certificate from the registrar, then hand this to the cem-
etery for endorsement before being returned to the registrar. The regis-
tration of stillbirths was also to be included.37
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Outside the funeral sector, weaknesses in the certification system were 
highlighted. In 1910 a John Bull article by the barrister and legal expert 
on burials, Alfred Fellows, raised the issue, while the following year the 
Coroners’ Law and Death Certification (Amendment) Bill sought to 
introduce recommendations from the 1893 and 1908 Select commit-
tee on death certification and Coroner’s legislation respectively. None of 
these efforts, however, yielded any major change and there appeared to 
be little in the way of parliamentary or medical support. In 1910, The 
Undertakers’ Journal wearily noted that “The present law of death cer-
tification offers every opportunity for premature burial and every facility 
for concealment of crime”.38
The outbreak of World War I curtailed the enthusiasm of the LAPPB, 
but by 1919 it was still calling for a public certifier of deaths. One of its 
members, the Reverend Hugh Chapman, chaplain of the Savoy Chapel, 
suggested that if a Cabinet Minister were to be buried alive, public atten-
tion might be awakened to the issue.39 In 1922, a less sensational com-
ment came from the Association’s president, Sir George Greenwood MP, 
who declared that the present certification system was “a disgrace and 
a national danger”. The following year, it was the turn, once again, of 
the undertakers to propose legislation, and the BUA’s secretary, James 
Hurry, suggested that all undertakers enlist the support of their MPs to 
change the law. He proposed:
That it shall be compulsory for medical men to view the body after 
death before granting a certificate
That the cause of death shall be placed on the certificate by the 
Registrar
Registration of still-born children.40
This coincided with the undertakers also drafting legislation for state reg-
istration containing a clause that members must attend a course of study 
in sanitation (embalming) and care of the deceased.41
Further proposed bills to improve the certification system were 
discussed by the BUA in 1922, whilst the President of the British 
Medical Association, Professor David Drummond, advocated a com-
pulsory post-mortem examination. This was a certain, but costly and 
controversial way of preventing premature burial.42 Some improve-
ment came with the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1926, 
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particularly in respect of stillbirths and certification before disposal, 
but there was no broad political support for the public certifier and 
still no requirement for a doctor to see the body after death, despite 
the insertion of a clause requiring this during the third reading of the 
bill.43
By the interwar years, the landscape of funerals and the work of the 
funeral director had changed. In 1927, a second association, the British 
Institute of Embalmers (BIE), was founded to provide formal train-
ing and a qualification. As the number of practitioners and availability 
of the treatment increased, the cost decreased and more funeral direc-
tors advocated embalming. Recognising the issue of premature burial, 
the BIE syllabus commenced with instructions on how to test for death 
before treatment. Whilst the comment of the American embalmer, O.K. 
Buckhout, that “embalming prevents the possibility of premature burial” 
was correct, the consequence of raising and injecting the carotid artery 
if the person was still alive would have been catastrophic.44 Testing for 
death by funeral directors and embalmers was logical as they had the 
experience of handling the dead on a routine basis. Cottridge included a 
chapter on the subject in his book Anatomy and Sanitation, published in 
1925, while Medical Officers of Health addressing the annual BUA con-
vention frequently referred to the need for the tests to be carried out.45 
The merits of the different tests often became a discussion point within 
the pages of the trade journals.46
In this changed landscape, testing for death was a service that gave 
people confidence that funeral directors and embalmers could treat the 
body appropriately. This confidence was especially important in the 
1930s when it was claimed that 60% of deaths were certified without 
the doctor having seen the body.47 Despite some support from general 
practitioners for their practice, funeral directors and embalmers did not 
receive universal backing from the British medical community. Not only 
did training for embalming lack external accreditation, but embalming 
tutors did not typically have medical experience. But perhaps the key rea-
son for the reluctance of the medical community to approve of funeral 
directors having a role, similar to the French Medecin Verificateur was 
that this would have usurped the doctor’s presence at the dying person’s 
bedside.
Despite the lack of formal validation in their quest, undertakers con-
tinued to be interested in the tests for death. In 1927, a dye was dem-
onstrated at the BUA Convention that could be injected into the body 
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to determine whether life was extinct. The effects of the “infallible and 
harmless” Obiturin were discussed in a report of the proceedings:
Previous to the lecture Mr AG Hurry had submitted himself to an experi-
mental demonstration to the effect of Obiturin on the living human body. 
The injection was made in Mr Hurry’s forearm while a like experiment 
was performed upon the lecturer by Ald [Alderman] Kenyon. The result 
was awaited with great interest and those present had the satisfaction of 
observing an interesting reaction, Mr Hurry going round the room in 
order that all present might examine at close quarters the green discoloura-
tion which proved that he was very much alive.48
By the late 1930s, physicians were required to examine bodies and sign 
death certificates in the increasing number of state institutions in Britain. 
This trend continued particularly after the founding of the National 
Health Service in the late 1940s. Despite a continued low preference for 
cremation (in 1927 only 0.59% of deaths were followed by cremation), 
people could now be confident that premature burial was unlikely given 
the requirement for two physicians to carry out a careful external exami-
nation of the body.49 However, while there is evidence to show that in 
urban areas the preference for cremation shifted dramatically when local 
facilities were provided, it would be another 40 years before the trend 
spread outside the cities. It was only in 1965 that cremations outnum-
bered burials for the first time.50
The LAPPB, meanwhile, limped along into the 1930s.51 Hadwen 
died in 1932, and three years later the Association become affiliated 
with the National Council for the Disposition of the Dead (NCDD), 
an organisation with an agenda to promote cremation along with the 
registration of funeral directors. However, the minutes indicate that by 
the second meeting, the LAPPB was not listed as a participant, and the 
NCDD failed in any case due to lack of support.52 The quest for a public 
certifier and the construction of “waiting” mortuaries was never realised, 
particularly as by the 1940s the vast majority of funeral directors had 
opened chapels of rest in their private premises, where more embalming 
was taking place. Remarkably, the law was never changed to require a 
doctor to examine a person after death, unless cremation was called for.
While concerns about premature burial in the nineteenth century 
had their basis in a deficiency in legislation and medical practice, for 
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most people, declaration of the fact of death would often have come 
from informal care-givers who nursed the dying. Their ability to recog-
nise the boundary between life and death was solely dependent on past 
experience. Given the landscape of death and burial in Britain today, 
with professional funeral directors managing the treatment and disposal 
of most corpses, the informal knowledge about bodies and decomposi-
tion that people, especially the poor, possessed is worth reflecting on. 
Yet, the number of cases where the signs of death were misinterpreted 
needs to be viewed in perspective. While the LAPPB highlighted only 
a few factually proven incidents, the scale of the issue was unknown. 
It was one thing if a person was found to be living before burial, but 
quite another if a person was found to have lived after interment had 
taken place. Theoretically speaking, without mass exhumations, it is 
impossible to know how many bodies show signs of life after interment. 
Undertakers seized on this macabre situation as an opportunity to exer-
cise power over the body by becoming the self-appointed person to carry 
out the tests for death. Although it was not easily gained, this power 
gave them a new status as quasi-medical practitioners and helped shed 
the Dickensian image of disreputability inherited from their nineteenth-
century forebears.
Today, the possibility of premature burial in Britain has been dimin-
ished by several factors: Due to shifts in the culture of death and dying, 
a large proportion of deaths now take place in institutions where phy-
sicians with a range of diagnostic equipment are on hand to confirm 
death. Furthermore, the majority of deaths are now followed by crema-
tion, and this requires two doctors to examine the deceased. In addition, 
the interval of 5–14 days between a person’s death and funeral, along 
with the widespread adoption of embalming, has reduced the possibil-
ity of a premature burial. Nevertheless, knowledge of the tests for death 
still remains part of the Diploma in Funeral Directing examination in 
Britain, while the National Association of Funeral Directors’ Manual of 
Funeral Directing states: “Every funeral director should be able to sat-
isfy himself, and on occasion the family, that death has actually taken 
place”.53 However, as legislation still does not require a doctor to exam-
ine the deceased before completing the Medical Certificate of the Cause 
of Death, the issue continues to engage the minds of funeral directors, if 
not the general public.
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CHAPTER 6
The Death of Nazism? Investigating  
Hitler’s Remains and Survival Rumours 
in Post-War Germany
Caroline Sharples
“Becoming really dead”, argues Thomas Laqueur, “takes time”.1 It has 
been more than 70 years since Adolf Hitler’s suicide in his Berlin bunker, 
yet the passage of time has done little to diminish public fascination with 
the Nazi leader, nor stem speculation surrounding the circumstances of 
his demise. Indeed, some people have doubted whether Hitler died in 
Berlin at all; survival myths remain popular fodder for tabloid newspaper 
articles, sensationalist television documentaries, and best-selling books.2 
Fundamentally, the endurance of such legends is rooted in the chaos of 
the immediate post-war era and the Allies’ failure to positively identify 
any human remains as those of the former Führer. In the absence of a 
body, what counts as irrefutable proof of death?
In 1945, the western Allies’ answer was to establish a clear timeline 
of the events leading up to the suicide, piecing together witness testi-
monies from Hitler’s staff and poring over key documents, such as his 
last will and testament. The first history on this topic, produced by 
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Hugh Trevor-Roper in 1947, reflected this approach, using information 
collected during the author’s service with British Military Intelligence.3 
Potential forensic evidence, gathered by the Soviets, was released only 
gradually. It was not until 1968 that Lev Bezymenski was able to publish 
his account based upon the autopsy reports on the alleged remains of 
Hitler and Eva Braun.4 Since the end of the Cold War, additional mate-
rial from the former Soviet archives has revived scholarly interest in the 
case, spurring reassessments of the available medical evidence by the likes 
of Ada Petrova, Peter Watson, and Daniela Marchetti.5 Yet, while there 
are now detailed—if varying—accounts of the mode of Hitler’s demise, 
there has been little attempt to explain the origins and persistence of 
survival myths, or to locate Hitler’s end within the broader context of a 
National Socialist fixation with the dead.
This chapter, therefore, sets out to demonstrate that the death of 
Adolf Hitler was both a biological and social process. The Nazi regime 
had been constructed around a cult of personality and the leader’s death 
became synonymous with Germany’s total defeat in the Second World 
War, a significant rupture marking the end of National Socialism itself. In 
reality, of course, the regime limped on for an additional eight days with-
out Hitler, and supposed sightings of the former leader kept his mem-
ory very much alive in the public imagination. Hitler’s suicide, then, was 
hardly a “zero hour” for the nation, but an event that serves to demon-
strate the complexity of post-conflict commemorative culture.6 Drawing 
upon British Foreign Office and Military Intelligence records, this chap-
ter traces the Allies’ efforts to sort the fact from fiction. At the same 
time, it also reveals how post-war power struggles to control the narra-
tive of Hitler’s death contributed to the subsequent survival mythology, 
with Nazis and Allies both deliberately casting doubt on the timing and 
cause of death to further their own interests.
To understand initial German reactions to the loss of Hitler, we have 
to situate them within a longer history of Nazi rituals and martyrdom 
legends.7 During the Third Reich, the Nazi regime routinely peddled 
the notion that fallen comrades were not truly dead, but continued to 
fight for Germany as part of an immortal, spiritual army. This was impor-
tant, ideological glue for manufacturing the Volksgemeinschaft (People’s 
Community) and preparing the population for the necessary challenges 
ahead. The anniversary of the 1923 Munich Putsch, in which 16 Nazis 
had been killed, became one of the holiest days in the Nazi calendar. 
Speaking at the commemorations in 1942, for example, Hitler declared:
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Truly these sixteen who fell have celebrated a resurrection unique in world 
history… From their sacrifice came Germany’s unity, the victory of a 
movement, of an idea and the devotion of the entire people…All the sub-
sequent blood sacrifices were inspired by the sacrifice of these first men. 
Therefore we raise them out of the darkness of forgetfulness and make 
them the centre of attention of the German people forever. For us they are 
not dead. This temple is no crypt but an eternal watch. Here they stand 
for Germany, on guard for our people. Here they lie as true martyrs of our 
movement.8
This existing emphasis on the eternal spirit of Nazism constituted a 
ready-made framework for casting doubt on Hitler’s own mortality. 
In addition, the German public had become somewhat accustomed to 
Hitler being able to extricate himself from perilous situations. Hitler had 
survived numerous assassination attempts during his time in power—
most notably, Georg Elser’s bombing of the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich 
in November 1939 and the Operation Valkyrie attempt in the Wolf’s 
Lair in July 1944. Following the latter event, Hitler gave a radio speech 
in which he declared that his survival was proof that his work was blessed 
by Divine Providence.9 Given this background, it is understandable that 
his eventual, ignoble end in a Berlin bunker may have been viewed with 
disbelief.
One of the key challenges facing the Allies in 1945, then, was to dis-
mantle some of these prevailing mythologies. A thorough denazifica-
tion programme was intended to cleanse Germany of every last vestige 
of National Socialism, including the removal of Nazi symbols from the 
landscape. The elaborate memorials that had been constructed in hon-
our of the “old fighters” killed in Munich were removed and the iron 
sarcophagi that had housed their mortal remains were recycled for use 
in repairing regional railway lines. “Ordinary” cemeteries were also 
affected by the political transition away from fascism: gravestones were 
purged of swastikas and other Nazi imagery or, in some cases, destroyed 
altogether. The Allies’ central aim was to prevent the formation of pil-
grimage sites that could be used to sustain National Socialist ideology. 
Consequently, those who had died fighting for Nazism were now being 
subjected to a form of “social death”, stripped of their previously exalted 
status with their past achievements now rendered taboo in public dis-
course.10 The fate of Hitler himself quickly became entangled with this 
denazification process. With his image banned after the war, and access 
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to the former Reich Chancellery and bunker controlled by the Allies, the 
German people had little outlet for mourning their fallen leader. This 
may have come as something as a culture shock after the sophisticated 
state funerals of the Third Reich. Unlike the posthumous history of 
other dictators, such as Stalin or Mussolini, there was no public memo-
rial or display of Hitler’s body. Consequently, John Borneman argues 
that the population endured “an enforced silence about the scene of 
death and the whereabouts of the corpse”.11 The extent of this “silence” 
can, of course, be called into question by the sheer number of rumours 
that emerged immediately over the timing, manner, or actuality, of 
Hitler’s death.
It was at 10.30pm on Tuesday, 1 May 1945, following three sol-
emn drum rolls, that Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz took to the airwaves 
of North German radio to make a crucial announcement: “German men 
and women, soldiers of the armed forces: our Führer, Adolf Hitler, has 
fallen. In the deepest sorrow and respect, the German people bow”.12 
Reflecting on the manner of Hitler’s death, Dönitz added:
At an early date, he had recognised the frightful danger of Bolshevism and 
dedicated his existence to this struggle. At the end of his struggle, of his 
unswerving straight road of life, stands his hero’s death in the capital of the 
German Reich. His life has been one single service for Germany.13
Further reports within the German press the following day elaborated 
on the glorious nature of the Führer’s last stand—and applied a similar 
rhetoric of immortality to that previously assigned to those killed in the 
Munich Putsch. The Hamburger Zeitung, for example, insisted:
We know that he must have perished while fighting bitterly in the Reich 
Chancellery. We know that the enemy will be able to find a body in the 
ruins caused by countless artillery shells and countless flame throwers, and 
that they may say that it is the Führer’s body, but we will not believe it…What 
is mortal of him has perished, has passed away but he has fulfilled his most 
beautiful oath [to give his life to his people]…He began by fighting for his 
people, and he ended that way. A life of battle.14
Similarly, a message broadcast to troops stationed in the Netherlands 
proclaimed: Adolf Hitler, you are not dead, you live on within us. The 
ideals which you gave us cannot be extinguished … Beneath the ruins of 
a devastated Berlin, you remain the fountain of all Germans.15
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In terms of the final pieces of Nazi propaganda, then, the cult of the 
Führer remained very much alive. His memory and, in particular, the 
seemingly dramatic nature of his demise—courageously resisting the 
Soviet advance into Berlin—served as a last-ditch appeal to the German 
people to keep on fighting. These descriptions of Hitler’s final moments, 
though, were designed to obscure the truth. The consensus of scholarly 
opinion and witness testimony suggests that, on 30 April 1945, Hitler 
chose to kill himself rather than end up in the hands of the advancing 
Russians. In his last hours, he married his long-term companion, Eva 
Braun, dictated his will and political testament, and administered cyanide 
to his beloved Alsatian dog, Blondi, to determine the effectiveness of 
the poison.16 Having heard about the public desecration of Mussolini’s 
corpse on 28 April, he made preparations to ensure that no similar 
humiliation would be extended to his remains. Petrol was ordered and 
his staff members were instructed to incinerate his body when the time 
came. Indeed, Hitler’s own precautions would prompt much of the post-
war debate and confusion about his fate.
Almost immediately, the veracity of Dönitz’s account was called into 
doubt by the Allies, and even some high-ranking Nazis. The day after 
Dönitz’s radio address, the Russian newspaper, Pravda, proclaimed the 
whole story to be a “fascist trick to cover Hitler’s disappearance from the 
scene”.17 Observers in Britain and the United States, while noting that a 
death fighting against the “Bolshevik hordes” would have been “quite in 
character” for Hitler, quickly moved to undermine what was left of the 
German war effort by issuing statements challenging Dönitz’s account of 
Hitler meeting a “hero’s death” in Berlin.18 To support their claims (and 
to try and avoid their comments being dismissed as enemy propaganda), 
the western Allies seized upon an account of Hitler’s failing health prom-
ulgated by the head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, more than a month 
earlier. According to notes of a conversation between Himmler and the 
Swedish diplomat Count Folke Bernadotte on 24 March 1945, Hitler 
was “finished”. Himmler claimed that the Führer was suffering from a 
brain haemorrhage and would be dead in a couple of days, if he wasn’t 
already—a sentiment that immediately cast doubt on the precise timing 
of Hitler’s demise.19
For the Allies, disseminating Himmler’s version of events could sow 
the seeds of discord among the remnants of the Nazi leadership and 
shatter any remaining illusions that the general population still har-
boured about their “courageous” leader, preventing the formation of 
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martyrdom myths. A Foreign Office memorandum noted that “there 
is every indication that German propaganda will play up the manner of 
Hitler’s death with a view to establishing the Hitler legend. We must 
do all in our power to play it down”.20 Himmler’s account was pri-
vately regarded as a “good weapon” to encourage the Wehrmacht, now 
released from their oath of loyalty, to surrender and prompt the fall of 
more German cities. A public statement issued by General Eisenhower 
dismissed Dönitz’s statement as an effort “to drive a wedge between the 
British and Americans on one side and the Russians on the other”.21
For Himmler, meanwhile, the original assertion in March 1945 that 
Hitler was in no fit state to rule served to strengthen his own negoti-
ating hand for surrender, enabling him to present himself as the provi-
sional leader of the country. Himmler was conspicuously absent from the 
public discussion of Hitler’s death on 1 and 2 May, suggesting the con-
tinuance of a power struggle between himself and Dönitz. By advancing 
competing accounts of Hitler’s health, the pair cast doubts on the close-
ness of one another’s relationship with the Führer, and their right to rule 
in his stead.22 At the same time, with one eye undoubtedly on the future, 
even Dönitz was rather muted in his eulogy, dedicating just six sen-
tences of his radio broadcast to dealing with Hitler’s death. Having been 
named as Hitler’s successor, Dönitz then used the remainder of his radio 
broadcast to try and rally popular support behind him. Observers within 
the British Foreign Office similarly noted an absence of “fanatical party 
statements” in remembrance of their leader. Given the dire military situ-
ation, this relatively restrained response from Hitler’s fellow Nazis may 
be seen as an attempt to dissociate themselves from the failing regime, 
and an effort to strengthen their own position with the advancing Allies. 
Different parties, then, were able to appropriate Hitler’s death to further 
their own political cause.
Publishing Himmler’s comments in early May 1945 sparked a long-
standing fascination with Hitler’s medical history, including the lin-
gering physical effects of the attempt on his life in July 1944, and the 
psychological strain of living in the Berlin bunker during the final phases 
of the war. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Allies initiated a 
search for any surviving medical records, and interrogated anyone who 
had treated Hitler in the past, knowing that such evidence could play a 
vital role in identifying any human remains. How and where Hitler died 
consequently became the subject of great speculation: was it inside or 
outside of the Führer bunker? Was it the result of a stroke or nervous 
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collapse, cyanide capsule, lethal injection or gun? Could Hitler have 
taken cyanide and still have time to shoot himself in the temple? Had 
death occurred at Hitler’s own hand, or was it the result of his doctor’s 
intervention? Timing too, became a crucial issue. British military intel-
ligence took great pains to reconstruct Hitler’s movements in the final 
days and hours leading up to his death. But had death occurred even ear-
lier than 30 April 1945? In June, the Allies received what they acknowl-
edged to be a “very odd” communication from an Austrian builder to 
the effect that Hitler had actually been shot by an army general in March 
1944, that the infamous July bomb plot later that year had been con-
trived by Nazi propagandists and that his corpse actually lay in a secret 
crypt below Obersalzburg, Hitler’s mountain retreat in Berchtesgaden.23 
American investigators in Bavaria, however, could find no evidence to 
support this claim.
Had Hitler died at all? Amidst the Dönitz-Himmler debate in early 
May 1945, the Daily Telegraph published the testimony of Major Erwin 
Giesing, Hitler’s personal physician, who refuted claims that the Nazi 
leader had been in ill health. In conclusion, the newspaper declared there 
was “some doubt” about the cause of Hitler’s death, adding, “if he is 
dead”.24 By 15 May 1945, Winston Churchill had similarly admitted to 
the House of Commons that he was unable to confirm “beyond doubt” 
whether Hitler was dead.25 The Chief of the US Secret Service, Brian 
Conrad, conceded that “the only decisive evidence … would be the dis-
covery and positive identification of the corpse”. He added, “if such evi-
dence is unavailable, all that remains are the detailed accounts of certain 
witnesses who either knew of his intentions or were eyewitnesses to his 
fate”.26
In terms of the former, the Allies soon appeared to have found 
what they were looking for. On 2 May—one day after Dönitz’s radio 
address—Soviet forces occupied the former Führer bunker in Berlin and 
quickly discovered the remains of Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, 
his wife Magda, and their six children. At the time, two Soviet officers, 
Lozovski and Litvinov, expressed some scepticism about the chances of 
finding Hitler’s body too, believing that he had “gone to earth” along 
with Göring and Himmler.27 On 5 May, however, the badly-burned 
corpses of a man and a woman were found in a bomb crater within the 
garden of the former Reich Chancellery, prompting speculation that they 
were that of Adolf Hitler and Eva Braun. Subsequent examination by 
Soviet forensic pathologists confirmed the presence of glass splinters in 
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their mouths, consistent with biting into a cyanide capsule.28 The male 
corpse was “heavily charred” and missing part of its cranium, but esti-
mated to be “somewhere between 50 and 60 years” old; Hitler turned 
56 in 1945. The other key point of interest for investigators concerned 
the male corpse’s teeth, described as having “much bridgework, artificial 
teeth, crowns and filings”.29 Hitler’s former dentist, Dr Hugo Blaschke 
had already managed to flee Berlin but, under Soviet interrogation, two 
of his former staff members, Käthe Heusemann and Fritz Echtmann, 
were able to describe and sketch Hitler’s distinctive dental work from 
memory. On 9 May, they were invited to examine the physical remains 
retrieved from the bomb crater and concluded that they did, indeed, 
belong to the Nazi leader. Accordingly, on 31 May, KGB officer Ivan 
Serov informed Stalin and Molotov that “there is no doubt that the sup-
posed corpse of Hitler is really his”.30
While the official Soviet records were not released at this time, news 
of the discovered corpses was relayed in the media.31 In June 1945, The 
Times also published a detailed account by Hermann Karnau, a former 
guard, who confirmed that he had seen the bodies of Hitler and Eva 
Braun lying in the grounds of the Reich Chancellery: “both bodies were 
on fire, but were clearly recognisable”.32 Yet this was not to be the end 
of the matter as the Soviets spent the rest of the summer of 1945 sud-
denly casting doubt on their own findings. On 10 June, Marshal Zhukov 
of the Red Army told a press conference: “The situation is very mysteri-
ous … We have failed to discover a body confirmed as Hitler’s. I cannot 
say anything definite about Hitler’s fate”.33
Rumours now spread that the charred remains previously seized upon 
by investigators had belonged to a body double and that Hitler had 
managed to flee the ravaged capital after all. On 5 July, a Daily Telegraph 
correspondent visiting the scene agreed that the previous narrative of sui-
cide and cremation seemed doubtful:
The account of Hitler’s death in the shelter and the burning of the body, 
as told by the German policeman Kernau [sic] at 21st Army Group HQ 
recently, fits in perfectly with the evidence on view here. There are even 
five petrol cans, all marked with the SS sign…Corroboration is so over-
whelming as to be almost suspicious.34
Why did the Soviets refute the dental evidence? The consensus among 
historians, including Russian scholars Vinogradov, Pogonyi and Teptzov, 
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and the British academic Roger Moorhouse, is that this was a typical, 
cynical move by Stalin. In part, it reflected his own paranoia and mistrust 
of the forensic evidence being set before him; but it also became another 
way of exercising a degree of power over the other members of the war-
time alliance. In July 1945, The Times repeated the claim that the jaw-
bone found on the grounds of the Reich Chancellery had been positively 
identified as that of Adolf Hitler, but acknowledged that:
Whatever pronouncement is made, it is certain that many people in 
Germany, especially here in Berlin, will go on believing in the legend of his 
escape under cover of one of the doubles he is supposed to have employed. 
It seems strange that of all the people of authority round Hitler, none has 
been found to give an account of what happened, and the circumstantial 
evidence accumulated from lesser fry could well be an attempt to cover 
Hitler’s trail.35
The Daily Herald concurred, noting, “no one with whom I have talked 
in Berlin believes that Hitler is dead. They all think he ‘got away’”.36
The search for firm proof of death thus continued, although it was 
hampered by missing witnesses and mutual suspicion between the Allies. 
A memorandum produced by the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied 
Expeditionary Force at the end of July 1945 bemoaned the fact that 
“it is impossible to give any authoritative account of Hitler’s last days 
since evidence is still accumulating. That which is already available is 
sometimes contradictory and incomplete and depends often on hear-
say and conjecture. Much of the evidence, too, is in Russian hands”.37 
The Americans, having captured Dr Blaschke themselves, proceeded 
to interrogate him about Hitler’s dental history. Like Heusemann and 
Echtmann before him, Blaschke was able to recreate detailed descriptions 
and diagrams of the treatment he had performed on the Nazi leader—yet 
Allied investigators were hampered by the fact they had no post-mor-
tem evidence to compare this to; Hitler’s alleged jawbone and teeth were 
now archived in Moscow and the Soviets showed no signs of being will-
ing to share this evidence.
To circumvent the lack of medical proof, the British and the 
Americans launched an extensive and time-consuming hunt for as many 
potential bunker eyewitnesses as possible. By the end of the process, 
Hugh Trevor-Roper was able to piece together accounts from secretaries 
Elsa Krüger and Traudl Junge who independently reported that Hitler 
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had shot himself; Hitler Youth leader Artur Axmann who inspected the 
bodies and confirmed a bullet wound to Hitler’s right temple; guard 
Erich Mansfeld who witnessed the removal of a body wrapped in a blan-
ket; tailor Willi Otto Müller who saw five men carrying petrol on the 
evening of 30 April 1945; and the aforementioned Karnau who recog-
nised the bodies as they were set on fire. The evidence, he noted,
is not complete, but it is positive, circumstantial, consistent and independ-
ent…It is considered quite impossible that the versions of the various eye-
witnesses can represent a concerted cover story; they were all too busy 
planning their own safety to have been able or disposed to learn an elabo-
rate charade which they could still maintain after five months of isolation 
from other and under detailed and persistent cross-examination.38
Soviet investigators, meanwhile, spent the spring of 1946 re-visiting the 
purported scene of Hitler’s death. Samples were taken from the blood-
stained sofa in Hitler’s living quarters while further examination of the 
bomb crater unearthed what was immediately considered to be the miss-
ing fragment of Hitler’s skull, complete with apparent bullet hole. Once 
again, though, there was a refusal to make any definitive public statement 
on Hitler’s death and, in the absence of any forensic proof of death, the 
Allies continued to be inundated with stories that Hitler and Eva Braun 
had escaped the bunker altogether. Letters were received from all over 
Germany, describing supposed sightings of the former leader, or promis-
ing to divulge important “facts” about his fate. Some accounts had them 
fleeing by plane to Denmark and thence to Argentina by submarine.39 
Others had them relocating to Munich, Hanover, or Hamburg, living 
under assumed names and the effects of plastic surgery. In September 
1945, for example, the Hamburg story gained particular momentum 
through a series of sensational articles in the international media. Dr 
Karl Maron, Deputy Bürgermeister in East Berlin, inflamed matters by 
stating that he was “firmly convinced” that Hitler was still alive, and sea 
patrols began a search for the mahogany yacht believed to have conveyed 
the couple to safety. The British, who occupied this part of the country, 
were compelled to investigate these allegations, if only to be able to dis-
credit them. A handwritten memo in the Foreign Office archives reveals 
the private sense that it was all “sheer poppycock”. One commentator 
noted succinctly that the so-called “plastic operation” that had “changed 
Hitler’s appearance” was probably carried out with a service revolver in 
the Führer bunker.40
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The fact that such speculation existed owes much to the secrecy and 
contradictory messages disseminated by the Soviets about the forensic 
evidence in the summer of 1945. However, it can also be traced back to 
the sheer chaos in Germany during the final days of the Second World 
War. With the lines of communication broken, no clear political lead-
ership, and the increasing threat posed by the advancing Red Army, 
everything had been in disarray, enabling rumours to spread like wild-
fire. Even Dönitz’s official announcement of Hitler’s death was experi-
enced differently in different parts of the country. In the north, where 
Dönitz was trying to establish his provisional capital, the radio station 
had prefaced the broadcast with three warnings that “grave and impor-
tant” news was about to be revealed, together with the playing of som-
bre music. It then held a three-minute silence in honour of the deceased. 
Consequently, the broadcast was rendered an event on North German 
radio. Listeners in the south, however, missed all of this. As the coun-
try teetered on the edge of collapse, many radio stations and other parts 
of the Nazi propaganda machinery had already fallen into Allied hands, 
reducing the Party’s ability to disseminate a clear, uniform message. It 
was an hour and a half later that southern stations finally issued the news 
that Hitler was dead. Their audiences had not been prepared for this 
announcement as well as their northern counterparts; indeed, relatively 
light and cheerful music had been played up until midnight.41 The tim-
ing of Hitler’s death thus became fluid in the public imagination. The 
lack of a “proper” send-off on some radio stations may also have made it 
easier for people to doubt the accuracy of the reports.
What purpose did the survival stories serve, though? In part, docu-
menting supposed sightings of Hitler may have simply been a form 
of attention-seeking, or even a deliberate attempt to stir up confusion 
between the Allies. It might also be argued that the rumour-mongers, 
having been denied any opportunity to mourn their leader, view his 
body, visit his final resting place or disseminate his image, were rebelling 
against the Allied “containment” of Hitler’s death. Supposed sightings of 
Hitler and Braun enabled people to question the veracity of Allied pro-
nouncements and imagine their own conclusion to the regime, regaining 
some element of control over the narrative. Alternatively, the very fact 
that people were volunteering “information” on Hitler’s whereabouts to 
the authorities may be indicative of a desire to wreak revenge on the man 
held responsible for their current state of affairs, a hope that Hitler might 
yet be discovered and brought to justice for the damage he had inflicted 
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upon the country. However, as Allied investigations focused on follow-
ing potential leads to Hitler, rather than the characters of those making 
the sightings or spreading the rumours, we do not have the sufficient 
data to fully understand the motivations of these individuals.
That survival stories continue to emerge in the twenty-first century 
owes much to an enduring popular fascination with the Third Reich and 
the knowledge that other Nazis, such as Adolf Eichmann, did indeed 
manage to escape to far-flung locations after the war. More significant, 
though, is the fact that there remains some reasonable doubt about the 
thoroughness of the Soviet autopsies and the identification of the few 
body parts that have been retained since the exhumation of the Reich 
Chancellery gardens. In 2000, the skull fragment that had been retrieved 
in 1946 was “rediscovered” in the Russian archives and placed on public 
display in Moscow, generating a whole new wave of interest in the cir-
cumstances surrounding Hitler’s death. In 2009, however, DNA analysis 
conducted by researchers at the University of Connecticut revealed that 
the fragment actually belonged to a woman under the age of 40, a result 
that immediately stirred up new conspiracy theories that rejected the nar-
rative of Hitler’s suicide in the bunker.42
The controversy surrounding the death of Adolf Hitler, then, shows no 
sign of abating. For the Allies operating immediately after the war, the aim 
was simple: find conclusive proof of the Nazi leader’s death so that Nazism 
itself could be rendered truly dead. The western Allies, in particular, were 
all too aware that a lack of evidence could foster martyrdom myths, or fuel 
belief in Hitler’s continued existence, thereby encouraging people to cling 
to the tenets of his ideology and fight on. A definitive end to the matter 
was considered not just desirable, but also achievable. An American cartoon 
published on 2 May 1945, the day after Dönitz’s official announcement of 
the Führer’s death, depicted a swastika draped body being removed from 
the ravaged Berlin landscape and asked whether this constituted “the end 
of the road”.43 Similar, if fleeting, optimism was expressed amid the initial 
confirmation that the charred remains discovered by the Soviets matched 
the available dental evidence for Hitler and, in 1956, there was renewed 
hope for closure when the district court in Berchtesgaden formally declared 
Hitler deceased and placed the death certificate on public display.44 Hitler’s 
“death” has thus occurred at multiple junctures. It is the failure, however, 
to unite legal, forensic and anecdotal proof of his demise that has enabled 
alternative versions of Hitler’s fate to endure and keep him very much alive 
in the public imagination for all this time.
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“When is death?” is an apparently simple question; this chapter argues 
that death has an impossible date. This rather enigmatic response is 
teased out in three sections, each of which briefly surveys different ways 
that the question can be tackled: Chronological Precision, Life-course 
Narratives, and Existential Anticipation. The first presents some cultural 
measures on the timing of death, including a Mormon case study; the 
second surveys perspectives from anthropology and bereavement studies; 
the third offers further anthropological perspectives taken in a more exis-
tential direction.
chronologicAl precision:  
culturAl meAsures of deAth
Death Certification
In British society, the question “When is death?” is primarily answered 
on a medical death certificate where we find a date and place of death, 
but not the time of death as such. A medical doctor marks this event 
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and becomes the agent of society in accounting for death. The cer-
tificate then becomes a valuable document in how people manage the 
numerous legalities involving the dead person’s estate. Assessing death 
after the event is, of course, a more complicated medical task and may, 
if circumstances demand it, require forensic pathology, or even a police 
investigation of the circumstances surrounding death. In some cases, the 
dating of a death is an important factor in deciding whether a standard 
death certificate is used (as for most people), or whether a Certificate 
of Stillbirth is to be used for those who have passed 24 weeks of gesta-
tion, but did “not breathe or show any other signs of life after being 
completely expelled from its mother”. If a child was born alive and lived 
for at least 28 days before dying, then a Neonatal Death Certificate is 
required. While such timings of the death of a foetus or live-born child 
are important for legal and medical purposes, they can carry a different 
significance for parents who may well have experienced an increasing 
sense of having been “parents” or “parents-elect” during the ongoing 
nine months of pregnancy—a status enhanced by scans and photographs 
of their child in utero.
In British society today, people experiencing a stillbirth, or the death 
of a baby within that four-week period of birth, encounter a very dif-
ferent parental life-course narrative than the narratives which predomi-
nated in the past. Notably, in the case of stillbirths, the parents may 
well wish to claim their right, as it were, to parenthood. In contrast to 
the days when a neonatal death might be treated as a “medical waste” 
issue, with the mother having no contact with the “child”, there are now 
bereavement support networks available and some parents choose to 
have photographs taken with the “child”. The emergence of an appro-
priate funeral for such births has become one social marker of “lives” 
whose only biological forms are intra-uterine, but which are accorded 
social lives through commemoration. Hospital chaplains also sometimes 
baptise such births, even though in the theological terms of mainstream 
Christianity, one can only baptise biologically living people (though, as 
we will see, there is an exception to this in Mormonism). These neonatal 
death contexts make the question “when is death?” very problematic.
Medically Sustained Life
In our modern, medically-advanced society, prematurely born and ter-
minally ill babies can be nurtured through life-support systems. This 
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also applies to severely ill adults and to aged individuals in ways that 
raise complex medical, ethical, religious, and philosophical issues over 
the question “when is death?”. There are many people who would have 
died “naturally” if they had not been treated “culturally” through medi-
cal intervention. The distinctive concepts and processes of, for example, 
“brain-death” and organ donating, clearly raise question marks over 
whether a “person” is “alive” or dead, or can be given a new lease (and 
status) of life through replacement organs. Medical practitioners fre-
quently have to make difficult decisions about keeping people alive. For 
instance, should the victim of a serious accident be kept ventilated and 
on life-support, even if the victim’s brain injuries make any realistic hope 
of recovery an unlikely prospect? In this scenario, the victims’ organs 
could play a key role in the recovery of otherwise terminally ill people. 
This, in itself, raises the question: when is death for distinctive body 
parts, given that hearts may survive for four hours or so and kidneys 
might be sustained for 36 hours?1 What forms and timings does life take 
when it is sustained by the lively organs from a recently “dead” person?
The Departure of the Soul
The theme of animation must also be considered because of the wide-
spread popular idea of death as the absence of the soul, spirit, or life 
force from the body. As a near-universal perspective on life, human 
beings interpret death as the removal or loss of vitality, whether in natu-
ral philosophy, natural medicine, or natural religion. Given the power of 
what cognitive anthropologists and others call the “animacy principal”—
our hardwired capacity to sense agency or “life” in things—people have 
tended to assume that death occurs when the body no longer breathes, 
when the breath of life departs. Breath has, for millennia and in many 
parts of the world, symbolised life, while its absence marked a person’s 
death. The reification of bodily life in breath, and then in soul, has meant 
people have thought of the soul as having an existence all its own, not 
least outside, or beyond the body.
Yet, life’s departure is seldom seen as instantaneous, in that in life a 
“soul” may linger around the body; be offended if relatives mourn too 
much or do not mourn enough; and move on to some new identity 
in another domain. Today, in Britain, for example, Muslims are bur-
ied in such a way that they can sit up shortly after burial to answer key 
questions put to them by the post-mortem visiting angels. Or again, 
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traditional Rabbinic Judaism echoes the idea of a lingering spirit, alert to 
the behaviour of surviving family members. This should not be provoked 
by bodily activities, including sexual intercourse, in which that spirit can 
no longer participate.2 These and many other cases suggest that a body/
soul distinction is a means by which death can be thought of as impos-
sible, despite the presence of a corpse.
This impossibility comes from the idea that there is no mortality as far 
as vitality-force is concerned; “persons” do not die, they change. Belief 
in the existence of an after-life can be found in countless religious and 
cosmological traditions, such as the karma-related transmigrations in 
Indian-derived worldviews and the journey through judgement to para-
dise in middle-eastern traditions. Even in secular societies, where many 
people think of death as the complete end of a person’s vitality-existence, 
memorialising behaviours mean that the memory of the dead lives on 
and influences the behaviour of the living. The “when” of death, in other 
words, is hard to calculate when the presence of a person is obviously not 
erased when he/she dies.
Mormon Death
My previous work on Mormonism suggests that timing death is some-
thing that involves the manifestation of “life” in a series of its modes.3 
In Mormonism, each person is thought of as pre-existing as an entity 
known as “intelligence”. That intelligence then comes under the influ-
ence of a more advanced intelligence known as Heavenly Father who 
transformed or engendered “intelligence” into a spirit-child. This spirit 
then comes into existence in a kind of pre-mortal heavenly domain 
where it joins with an earthly body to create a “soul”. This Mormon ter-
minology is often seen as counter-intuitive by other Christians because 
it speaks definitively of spirit plus body producing a “soul”, rather than 
speaking loosely of a soul and body as constituting a human being. For 
Latter-day Saints, however, death is thought of as the spirit leaving the 
body (meaning the “soul” no longer exists). The soul then passes to the 
spirit world and the body to the grave until the day of resurrection. At 
this time, the spirit will engage with a resurrected body in a transformed 
unity that will now be judged and move into one of a whole series of 
post-mortal domains, known as kingdoms or degrees of glory.
So, for Mormons, the question “when is death?” is answered on the 
one hand by the separation of spirit from body when the “dead” body 
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is washed and dressed in sacred clothing before being buried (burial 
being more usual than cremation in Mormon culture). On the other 
hand, the spirit now exists elsewhere and will, at a future date, be reu-
nited with its transformed body and move onwards into cosmic glo-
ries. However, even this is but a partial picture of life and death, for the 
devoted Mormon will have spent a significant amount of earthly time 
performing rituals within the distinctive sacred space of the temple. 
These are not the ordinary churches found in most towns, but the one 
or two temples present in most nations into which only accredited and 
approved church members can gain access. In the intense ritual activity 
of these Mormon Temples, the living are baptised on behalf of the dead, 
for whom they have collected family history. As spirits, the dead await 
the living and avail themselves of the dynamic opportunities available to 
them once vicarious baptism and other key rites, such as ordination and 
marriage, are conducted on their behalf. Temple and genealogical work 
is frequently said to bring the living and those in the spirit world close 
together, signified by the saying that in the temple the “veil is very thin” 
between this world and the next (a metaphor materialised by the literal 
veils which separate different qualities of existence in the temple).
The Mortality Paradox
The Mormon case illustrates the fact that “the dead” are, in a sense, alive 
for them. In the after-life they wait for the living to engage in the ritual 
activity that offers an enhanced form of eternal-cosmic life after the God-
given resurrection of all. The extensive genealogical and ritual work of 
Mormons on behalf of the dead keep the living in mind, not in the sim-
ple memorialist sense of a family tree, but in a pro-active sense of creative 
endeavour on behalf of forebears. The Mormon case also pinpoints what 
we might call the mortality paradox. This feature of many religious tradi-
tions sets an emotional awareness of loss against a belief in the continu-
ing existence of the dead, albeit in a changed state, “place”, or condition. 
Grief, the result of this dissonance, implies that there is no precise timing 
to death, only a set of timings to different states of being.
In other Christian traditions, the life of the “dead” person has been 
variously described in terms of being asleep, or in some post-mortal 
intermediate state prior to its final destiny with God. Inspired by the 
early work of Sir James Frazer, anthropological accounts reveal that 
the mortality paradox is also widespread in non-western societies.4 For 
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instance, traditional Indian-originating views on birth, dying, death, and 
afterlife rites speak about the animating force that comes to the foetus in 
utero via its cranial sutures, and which departs when the skull is cracked 
on the funeral pyre. The very notion of transmigration of the life-force 
under the dynamic moral schemes of karma attests to its non-death and 
samsaric processing from agent to agent over expanses of “time”.5
In many contemporary cultural domains, traditional worldviews have 
given way to a secular ideology where the mortality paradox takes quite a 
different form. Here, the “when is death?” question becomes subject to 
medical judgement and to ethical issues of identity and the dignity of the 
person’s body. In the context of euthanasia, organ donation, and termi-
nal illnesses, people on ethics committees now play roles in the timing of 
death and declarations of “social death”.
life-course nArrAtives
A high proportion of our lives are taken up by talking about the lives of 
others: from family and friends to strangers and celebrities, humans gen-
erate social narratives by speaking, gossiping, writing, consuming media, 
praying, and so on. One way that people engage with others who are 
deceased is through the notion of a “continuous present”. In his famed 
essay on funerary rites, Robert Hertz argued that “[s]ociety imparts its 
own character of permanence to the individuals who compose it: because 
it feels itself immortal and wants to be so, it cannot normally believe that 
its members … in whom it incarnates itself should die”.6
Despite all the criticism that can be laid against Hertz’s Durkheimian 
reification of “Society”, he offers a powerful image of how individu-
als are entangled with society; this idea undergirds practically all social 
theory concerning identity but also, by extension, theories of grief. 
Immortality, according to Hertz, is not an absence of death: rather death 
is timed according to a sense of value derived from the experience of 
relationships, not in terms of chronology as such. When, for example, 
Scots toast “the immortal memory” of Robert Burns at innumerable 
Burns Night Suppers across the world, they are referring to his cultural 
value and its identity-generating capacity, rather than his timelessness. 
At the family level, too, this happens when many ordinary families pos-
sess a sense of three or four generations from a set of ancestors, but can 
still speak of their dead as inhabiting some “timeless” realm. Hertz, then, 
brings our analysis of death and time into the world of social relation-
ships, identity, and embodiment. What he says of death raises similar 
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questions about life, for societies have differed over the age at which they 
accord some firm identity to “first-life” (i.e., to a child), especially in cul-
tures where infant mortality was common and where, we might say, no 
cultural energy would be invested in an infant until it looked as though it 
would become a valuable social commodity. This is not to say that moth-
ers, or others, might not grieve over an infant’s death, but it is to note 
the attitudes of social networks into which infants are only more clearly 
drawn over time. We have already indicated the significance of medical 
technology in contemporary Britain, enabling pre-birth images to ascribe 
the foetus its own kind of social personhood. In other words, the ques-
tion “when is death?” is now haunted by its double: “when is life?”.
“Grief Mean Time”
What, then, of bereavement in life-narratives? One way to think about 
the timing of death is through the notion of a “Grief Mean Time” 
(GMT), a standard orientation point of loss in time that is nonetheless 
experienced by people in different ways. Here care is needed lest the 
mind fly too rapidly to Elisabeth Kűbler-Ross, whose stage theory of 
bereavement was adopted as a chart-index with its “denial, anger, bar-
gaining, depression, and acceptance” phases.7 While extensive criticism of 
the schematized version of this perspective reveals an absence of a solid 
empirical base, its popularity reflects how important a narrative journey is 
for the bereaved.8 Another 1960s volume, Geoffrey Gorer’s Death, Grief, 
and Mourning (1965), described grief as a “long-lasting psychological 
process with physiological overtones and symptoms”, especially “distur-
bances of sleep and weight loss”. For Gorer, this GMT begins before 
death, as in cases of incurable illness when “a great deal of mourning 
may take place during this period so that the eventual death is felt emo-
tionally, as well as intellectually, to be a release”.9 The question “when is 
death?” thus becomes “when is grief?”—a question that pivots on shared 
understandings of the staged timings of bereavement. Grief can com-
mence when a person dies socially, long before biological death occurs. 
For instance, the issues of identity-loss and recognition in Alzheimer’s 
disease highlight the bio-cultural nature of death, suggesting an increas-
ing arc that may plateau out in the social path to death, but also falls as 
biological life is maintained whilst a person’s social significance declines.
In terms of theories of grief, Gorer’s encompasses both the attach-
ment-loss theory of grief and of the “continuing bonds” tradition. The 
qualitative nature of time in emotions is also evident in Peter Marris’s 
110  D.J. DAVIES
1956 study of 72 working-class widows in the East End of London, 
Widows and Their Families. This offered a “three stages of loss of contact 
with reality” that moved from an “initial period of shock”, to “violent 
grief and disorganization” (of about 6–12 weeks in Britain), and a final 
“longer period of reorganization”.10 These stage-theories of grief sug-
gest that death’s “mean time” is experienced as a series of emotional pat-
terns that may come and go or re-pattern themselves in the time before 
and after the biological death of a loved one.
Experiencing the Dead
It is important to recall that we experience the presence of the dead 
every day. As phenomenologists frequently argue, we live in a world of 
multiple realities constituted by our interactions with places, minds, and 
bodies. The dead feature in these interactions in popular concepts like 
nostalgia, homecoming, and ghost-seeing. Indeed, in a major research 
project published in 1995, 1603 people were interviewed in their homes 
and asked if they had experienced a sense of the presence of a dead per-
son after they had died.11 A sizable minority of people—roughly 35%—
said that they did have such an experience, as Table 7.1 indicates.
The relationship to the deceased person is given in Table 7.2 (the rea-
son why the total percentage comes to 40% and not 35% as above reflects 
the fact that a few experienced the presence of more than one relation). 
The experiences were said to have taken place mostly at home or at a rel-
ative’s home (approx. 54%). Other contexts for the experience included, 
in a dream (4%), when ill or in hospital (3%), in association with a pen 
(3%), at a Spiritualist meeting (2%), at a graveside (1.6%), or when driv-
ing a car (1.4%).
While these analytical categories are far from perfect, they indicate an 
aspect of life that is easily ignored by outsiders, but can be profound for 
the bereaved individual. The fact that 23 individuals said they were not 
sure if they had had such an experience suggests an inability among some 
people to establish hard lines between memories and emotional aware-
ness. Indeed, this is a hard thing to do because, apart from palpably 
Table 7.1 Experienced 
presence of the dead Often Occasionally Just once Rarely
8.5 13.6 7.3 5.9
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sensing presences in a supernatural or unexplained way, every day mil-
lions of Britons look at photographs of the dead or think about people 
they have lost (see Table 7.2).
Liturgical Time and Death: Triadic Moments
In a separate study focused on Anglican churchgoers, it was found that 
approximately 36% of people who attend the Holy Communion Service 
said this helped give them a sense of presence to their dead.12 That, we 
might, suggest is not an unexpected finding for a formal ritual that nor-
matively names the dead, prays for the departed, and speaks of a united 
community on earth and heaven. The liturgy of the Eucharist—one of 
the most long-lived and cross-culturally widespread of all human ritual 
behaviour—is especially important for the “when is death?” question 
since its very nature is embedded in the notion of the historical death 
of Christ, coupled with belief in his resurrection from the dead. Those 
dynamics then frame the life, death, and promised eternal life of believers 
participating in the rite of Holy Communion. Communicants participate 
in the complex ritual symbolism of the Eucharist every time they eat and 
drink the body and blood of Christ. These are elements that stand, at 
one and the same time, for the death of the Saviour whose “living pres-
ence” frames the devotional piety of Christians. Given that the saintly 
dead, as well as those who might have died recently, are often named 
during the Eucharist, and given that churches often also conduct the 
funerals of the dead at the same time as the Eucharist, it is not surprising 
that Christian churches foster the mortality paradox.
In her research on bereavement, Christine Valentine recounts inter-
view situations in which, as one person talks about the dead, a period 
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actively present to interviewee and interviewer.13 This kind of third-party 
“presence” is, I suspect, likely to be familiar to many who engage in pas-
toral work with the bereaved. Here, narrative comes into its own as it 
generates a form of momentary transcendence. The story of a dead per-
son told to others, in other words, creates a presence from the absence. 
Talking to the bereaved reveals a triadic relationship: an interviewer 
becomes aware of the intensity of your relationship with someone who 
lives in your life-narrative in such a way that the third-party assumes a 
kind of invisible social presence. As for narrative accounts of the dead, we 
have already mentioned that the time of death may be largely ignored in 
medical-legal certification, but such timing is often quite different in life-
course narrative where relatives detail the story of a death, of their own 
presence or absence, and of the time of day. When and where their rela-
tive died is significant: perhaps in the early hours of the morning when 
they were at the bedside, perhaps the fact that they managed to get there 
in time, or arrived too late. In such contexts, time matters more than 
dates, and in this death-bed sense, death is usually marked with specific-
ity. Moreover, the mortality paradox seldom seems relevant, or emerges 
in a distinctive way, as relatives comment on the fact that the body that 
now lies there is no longer the “person” they knew and loved. In the 
moment, death’s all too evident date also marks life’s departure, and it is 
often through such moments that popular beliefs about the mobility of 
the soul seem self-evident.
Body-Recall
A related form of sensed presence comes in what might be described as 
“body-recall”. By this, I refer to the experience of seeing in one’s physi-
cal form something one recalls from their deceased parents’ bodies. This 
could be an ageing face, a mode of walking, the sound of a cough, or 
indeed any number of things that remind us of our dead parent or blood 
relation (I stress such consanguineal kin precisely because of genes and 
body shape). At this moment of body-recall, the memory of the dead 
is activated in my living body and may, or may not, be a reminder that 
I am aging and will die. Such experiences are linked to another distinc-
tive body technique, where the recall of another person’s bodily deport-
ment is evoked by my own body. In one striking case, a retired Anglican 
bishop who was interviewed for a study, indicated a pen that happened 
to be at hand and said that whenever he wrote with it he recalled his 
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father in the act of writing.14 Perhaps the most interesting factor of such 
“memories of the flesh” are that they require both the death of the par-
ent, and the aging of the child to be close to the adult age of the dead 
parent.
Old Graves
In the final survey of this section, I return to the Report on Popular 
British Attitudes, mentioned above. In this study, 1603 individuals were 
specifically asked: “What do you think would be a respectable time lapse 
before an old grave might be used for new burials by a different fam-
ily?” Respondents were free to give any number of years they wished, 
and of the total sample, only a slight majority 55% (or 875 individuals) 
did feel able to give an answer. Among these, a 50-year period attracted 
approximately 20% of support, and a 100-year period 39%.15 Another 
question asked for reasons why there should be a time lapse before a 
grave is reused. The responses included: that there would be no one left 
to tend a grave (44%); that the dead should rest in peace and not be 
disturbed (24%); that the body would be decomposed (9%); and that 
time is needed to grieve (7%). If not providing an absolute answer to the 
“when is death?” question, these responses do provide a sense of how 
long it might take for people to redefine their relationships with bodies 
in graves. Here, images of continuing bonds combine with processes of 
separating from the dead. These responses show that “when?” is marked 
not by a specific date, but by change over time and, in that sense, we are 
reminded again of the narrative nature of death within its cultural frame.
existentiAl AnticipAtion
In this section, I survey the theoretical ideas of dual sovereignty and 
paradigmatic scenes.16 The first idea, dual sovereignty, concerns forms of 
authority in human life that are balanced between jural (legal) author-
ity and mystical authority. In terms of death, mystical authority ranges 
from the ancestral capacity to bless or curse descendants to modern soci-
ety’s concern with ideas of respect, dignity, and a “good send off” for 
the dead. Its complement, jural authority, also covers a spectrum of exist-
ence including what ecclesial or civic authorities allow to be inscribed 
on gravestones; legal decisions covering the duty of care; and issues of 
harm, murder, and suicide. In terms of the “when is death?” question, 
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these dual forms of authority are non-controversial together in situations 
where, for instance, medical certification of death complements a fam-
ily’s desired funerary provision. Problems emerge if and when, for exam-
ple, a religious group might want a rapid burial of a dead body (meeting 
its mystical authority), while the state requires much more time for full 
authorisation. Another flashpoint concerns assisted dying. If I think I 
have the right to choose assisted dying, but the law in Britain prevents it, 
the dual sovereignty balance is upset and a certain social disease ensues. 
This problematic ethical, medical, and religious topic leads immediately 
to the complementary theoretical issue of the paradigmatic scene. In a 
media-flooded world where photographic images carry powerful sig-
nificance, paradigmatic scenes (e.g., icons, art, and statuary) sustain the 
core messages of religious traditions, not least in terms of death tran-
scendence. In terms of the “when is death?” question, people imagine an 
apartment in Switzerland where a person goes to die, or the image of an 
old-age home, a television and a circle of arm-chaired and relatively inat-
tentive viewers. Each is a paradigmatic scene capturing core values and 
reflecting the demise of vitality; in the one, a life is intentionally ended 
because it is felt no longer to be a flourishing; in the other, life seems 
interminably protracted and lacking in vitality.
By contrast, another paradigmatic scene, one framed by a balanced 
dynamic of dual sovereignty, is that of the “woodland”, “natural”, 
“green”, or “ecological” burial. Emerging in the UK in the mid 1990s, 
these kinds of burials now occur in about as many sites as there are cre-
matoria. Here, people generate a paradigmatic scene in a kind of hospi-
table garden-centre-like locale where the body is thought of as passing 
into the natural environment.17 Such an anticipated context resets the 
“when” of “when is death?” as a “where” of an anticipated merger of 
self and world. This kind of shift in discourse is not unique in relation to 
death in Britain: it occurred both in the late nineteenth century with the 
innovation of modern cremation and in the 1970s in terms of how cre-
mated remains were dealt with.
conclusion
“When is death?” strikes me as a question that has something of the 
character of a koan about it. The koan is a Zen Buddhist presentation of 
a problem “insoluble by, and nonsensical to, the intellect”. It is aimed 
at “breaking through intellectual limitations” to produce “a flash of 
insight”.18 For example, the popularised koan “What is the sound of one 
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hand clapping?” temptingly provokes a logically consistent “answer”, 
rather than being taken as a verbal form aimed at catalyzing a differ-
ent form of understanding.19 One such shift in understanding might 
involve the difference between the dual classification of things (as in 
“two hands”), and the singularity of things (“one hand”), all as part of a 
reflective-meditative tradition of self-understanding. Committing to such 
word-play practice can, experientially, shake the easy confidence that the 
everyday use of language confers. When reading the thoughts of philoso-
phers on death, I am often possessed of an eager anticipation that soon 
passes into disappointment. It is as though I am sure that each sentence 
will lead to another in a logical flow that will end in satisfaction: the con-
clusive key will open the safe to reveal the desired sight. However, while 
sentences help set the scene, and offer some glimpsed novel vista, the 
horizon remains shrouded in mist.
If “when is death?” stands as a question grounded in the ideas of 
both mortality and time, then my title, “death’s impossible date” stands 
as something of a different logical type. This is why no answer can be 
given to the question, and why the koan motif provides both a constraint 
on answering and a freedom not to answer. It provokes a shift in under-
standing. So, I conclude with a formulation rather than an answer: death 
attracts some emotional affect to render it as a value; for some, this value 
enters into a person’s sense of identity and thus becomes a belief; and for 
some others this belief constitutes a sense of identity and becomes a reli-
gious belief. Death has an impossible date because the “when” of death 
is not coeval with “the time of not being”. Death can mean the begin-
ning of a sensed presence of the dead, or of an eternal God with whom 
a sensed affinity seems to guarantee one’s own immortality. Experience 
counts, and behavioural acts frequently foster experience. This is where 
philosophy is at a disadvantage since its westernised manifestation knows 
no ritual but the lecture and seminar. Theology, meanwhile, possesses 
the advantage of being able to ritualise its utterances in liturgy or in pri-
vate prayers. These may prompt an insightful awareness of mortality and 
vitality in “death’s impossible date”.
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CHAPTER 8




The law engages with the issue of death in various manners and contexts. 
For example, criminal law prohibits killing; inheritance law regulates 
the redistribution of property after death; and medical law determines 
when a patient should receive life-sustaining treatment, as well as when 
a body’s organs become available for transplantation purposes. The law 
provides regulation and clarity to the life-death boundary. It is greatly 
influenced, however, by clinical, social, and moral conceptions of death 
and dying. Indeed, the legal definition of death in the UK is merely the 
judicial application of the current medical definition of death. In this 
chapter, the relationship between the legal definition of death and the 
legal protection of a right to life in human rights law will be considered 
in order to provide some legal perspectives on the eternally challenging 
question of “when is death?”
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the legAl definition of deAth
There is often perceived to be a clear distinction between life and death. 
Indeed, it is the most fundamental distinction in the experience of 
humanity. In reality, however, the line is blurred. In traditional biologi-
cal understandings, death occurs when an individual ceases breathing or 
when his or her heart stops beating. Such cardio-respiratory failure is 
no longer an adequate conception of death, however, because advances 
in medical technology have enabled the restarting of a heart that has 
stopped beating, as well as artificial respiration to counter a cessation in 
breathing independently. The consequence of this is that a person who 
would once have been regarded as dead—one who is not breathing 
and/or whose heart is not beating—can now be revived. Death, in the 
sense of cardio-respiratory failure, has been conquered. And yet, death 
remains.
From a legal perspective, such ambiguity is unsatisfactory. The line 
between life and death must be differentiated for a variety of social and 
legal reasons. The availability of organs for transplant, rules of inherit-
ance, criminal liability for causing death, and the need for disposal of the 
body are all issues necessitating a clear line between life and death. There 
needs to be a clear-cut, and unambiguous, definition of death within the 
law because legally we treat a dead body very differently from the way we 
treat a living person.
The law’s response to the indeterminacy of cardio-respiratory failure 
has been a focus upon the death of the brain. A committee of the Harvard 
Medical School in 1968 first offered a set of criteria by which doctors 
could establish that a patient had suffered permanent loss of all brain 
functions. Significantly, the Committee also proposed those criteria as a 
diagnosis of death.1 Subsequently the United States adopted a uniform 
model death law. The Uniform Determination of Death Act is now law 
in 36 US states and contains a split legal standard: both cardio-respiratory 
failure and whole-brain death are regarded as legal death in these jurisdic-
tions. This does not, of course, mean that there are two different ways to 
die in the US today. Rather, it means that there are two different ways for 
doctors to determine that somebody has died. The brain death variation 
avoids any possibility of subsequent medical intervention; once a brain has 
died, there is no known treatment for revival.
The whole-brain death criteria has been somewhat modified within 
the UK where both the clinical and legal emphasis is on brain stem 
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death. The brain stem’s functions include responsibility for generating 
the capacity for consciousness and the respiratory centre. Significantly, it 
is also the part of the brain least effected by a lack of oxygen and; there-
fore, it can be assumed that if the brain stem is irreversibly destroyed 
by a lack of oxygen, so too are the other parts of the brain. Brain stem 
death (BSD) has been accepted by the courts in the UK as the legal 
definition of death. This was first apparent in the case of Re A (1992) 3 
Med.L.R. 303 involving a young boy taken to hospital with head inju-
ries suggesting a non-accidental injury. He was placed on a ventilator, 
but was subsequently declared brain stem dead. His parents wanted him 
to be maintained on the ventilator to enable their own experts to exam-
ine him in the light of potential legal proceedings. The court refused, 
however, holding that the boy was legally dead and the doctors would 
not be acting unlawfully by disconnecting the ventilator. This judicial 
acceptance of BSD as legal death was subsequently confirmed by the 
House of Lords in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 831, 
a case concerning a young man—Anthony Bland—who suffered severe 
brain damage in the Hillsborough disaster and was left in a persistent 
vegetative state (PVS). The Law Lords confirmed that this man was still 
legally alive. Lord Keith, for example, said that “In the eyes of the medi-
cal world and of the law a person is not clinically dead so long as the 
brain stem retains its function”.2
It seems clear that BSD is accepted as the legal definition of death 
in the UK. Globally, a focus on the brain in defining death has broad 
acceptance, although some cultures, including Orthodox Jewish, Native 
American, and Japanese cultures reject it.3 Typically, this rejection is 
founded upon a discomfort in regarding someone as dead if he or she is 
still breathing, whether artificially assisted or not. Perhaps for the same 
reason, brain stem death is not without its critics even in societies which 
have accepted the brain death concept, many of whom argue that it is 
counter-intuitive to classify an individual with a heartbeat as dead.4 This 
view implies that the law currently regards a dying patient as already dead. 
If true, this would be a serious encroachment into any ethical or legal 
protection of life, such as through a right to life. However, as destruc-
tion of the brain stem is irreversible and the last part of the brain to be 
effected by a lack of oxygen, most, including the medical profession, 
judge BSD as a sign of death rather than dying. There are also some com-
mentators who oppose BSD from the opposite perspective, arguing that 
we should go further and accept the concept of higher-brain death.
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higher-brAin deAth: its proponents  
And problems
Proponents of higher-brain death argue that it is the irreversible loss of 
consciousness which signifies the end of life. An example of such a loss is 
a patient in persistent vegetative state (PVS). This condition entails irre-
versible damage to the higher brain when the brain stem is still function-
ing. The normal functioning of the brain stem means that the patient 
may be breathing independently, but the destruction of other parts of 
the brain means that the patient will have no awareness or conscious-
ness of the world around him or her. It is the tragic condition suffered 
by Anthony Bland in the Hillsborough disaster and has challenged the 
courts many times since then. The PVS condition therefore poses con-
siderable ethical and legal dilemmas across the world. PVS patients do 
not meet the criteria for either whole brain death or brain stem death but 
everything that made that patient a person has gone: memories, the abil-
ity to communicate, conscious awareness. Is this patient really still alive, 
or is death of the person that he or she used to be a sufficient criterion 
for the end of life?
Even in the Bland case mentioned above, some judges are uncomfort-
able with leaving the issue at an unambiguous acknowledgment of the 
patient being alive. Lord Goff, for example, raises a doubt about this con-
clusion when he states that the patient’s condition “is such that it can be 
described as a living death”.5 He proceeds to outline the reason for the 
introduction of the BSD concept, explaining that “because, as a result of 
developments in modern medical technology, doctors no longer associate 
death exclusively with breathing and heartbeat”. This, however, is a mis-
leading diversion because in the traditional cardio-respiratory definition 
of death, Bland is also still alive because he is clearly still breathing. The 
“living death” concept introduced by Lord Goff seems to underlie many 
of the judgments and adds unnecessary ambiguity to the legal situation. 
Hoffmann LJ in the Court of Appeal fell into the same trap, confusingly 
stating that the patient’s “body is alive but he has no life”.6 While these 
judicial comments raise concerns about the full extent of the law’s protec-
tion for a human life in the “twilight zone” between life and death, the 
judges were not advocating a change in the legal definition of death. Some 
commentators do, however, adopt such an approach.
For such commentators, patients in PVS are already dead due to the 
loss of their higher brain functions, even though their body lives on. 
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Jeff McMahan, for example, argues that this organism should be treated 
as a dead body because:
a mere organism does not have interests and cannot itself be benefited or 
harmed. To end its life is no more objectionable than it is to kill a plant, 
provided that what is done does not contravene the posthumous inter-
ests of, or manifest disrespect for, the person who once animated the 
organism.7
Such an approach makes a clear distinction between the “person” and 
the “organism” and, as such, is part of a broader ethical movement to 
distinguish between a person and a human being. The so-called “per-
sonhood theory” proposes that not all human beings are “persons” with 
rights. Although the exact requirements of personhood tend to vary 
between writers, they all focus on a disembodied mind. Consciousness is 
widely regarded as a minimum characteristic, and other proposed criteria 
include capacity for reason,8 capacity to value one’s own existence,9 and 
moral agency.10
Personhood theory’s focus only on a person with some degree of 
capacity takes the “Cartesian” model to its extreme manifestation. The 
seventeenth-century philosopher René Descartes explains reality as con-
sisting of only res extensa (encompassing the corporeal body) and res cog-
itans (encompassing the mind). Not only are the body and mind thus 
distinct under Cartesian dualism, but the body is also subordinated to 
the mind, meaning that cognitive rationalisation dominates. Indeed, 
both Kant and Locke utilise a concept of a dominant mind over a mecha-
nized body in order to establish a focus on rationalism. Unfortunately, 
the dominance of the rational mind over the emotional body under 
Cartesian dualism has gender-specific implications. As Shildrick notes, 
women are traditionally viewed as more intimately associated with their 
bodies and as “intrinsically unable to transcend them”.11 For example, 
hormones, PMT, pregnancy, menopause, “hysteria”, and anorexia are 
just some of the ways in which a woman’s body has, over the centu-
ries, been regarded as affecting her rational mind. If a person is morally 
valuable because of the dominance of a rational mind over an unreliable 
body, women may face greater hurdles in maintaining and proving that 
distinction.
A further significant problem with the personhood theory is that it 
either includes other species within the concept of personhood (not 
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necessarily objectionable in itself but requiring significant changes to our 
treatment of other species) or it excludes many human beings, including 
neonates and PVS patients. Proponents of the personhood theory, such 
as Peter Singer and John Harris, seem to be comfortable with exclud-
ing these categories of human beings from personhood, and thus from 
moral status. However, this does not sit easily with a human rights per-
spective. International human rights law places great value on underly-
ing principles, such as equality of rights and respect for human dignity. 
Indeed, the underlying principle of human rights law is that all human 
beings are entitled to the same fundamental rights due to their status as 
human beings, regardless of distinctions such as nationality, race or gen-
der. While very few human rights are absolute in their legal protection 
(and thus, for example, can be infringed where it is proportionate and 
necessary to do so), they do have universal application. The exclusion 
of a category of human beings from the protection of human rights law 
due to a particular physical or mental characteristic of those individuals is 
irreconcilable with equality of rights. Of course, if those individuals are 
no longer living human beings, they would not be entitled to equal pro-
tection with the living. The (legal) line between life and death is thus 
fundamental.
deAth And the right to life
Every human being has a legally enforceable right to life. This right 
can be found, for example, in Article 2 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) and Article 6 of the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights. Article 2 ECHR is also protected in domestic 
law by means of the Human Rights Act 1998. This does not, of course, 
mean that we can require our government to keep us alive indefinitely. 
It is an inherent fact of life that we will all die. Nonetheless, the right to 
life does impose a variety of obligations on the state. At its core, the right 
to life prohibits unjustified killing by the state. However, increasingly its 
interpretation requires far more than that core minimum, including posi-
tive obligations to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those 
within its jurisdiction.
In Osman v United Kingdom (1998) 29 E.H.R.R. 245; Reps 1998-
VIII at para 115, the European Court of Human Rights held that 
Article 2(1) “enjoins the state not only to refrain from the intentional 
and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safe-
guard the lives of those within its jurisdiction”. This means that state 
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authorities must do all that could reasonably be expected of them to 
avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they have, or ought to 
have, knowledge, although the Court did recognise that this obligation 
must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or 
disproportionate burden on the authorities.12 A government committed 
to the right to life must, therefore, not merely refrain from killing, but 
also govern in a manner that seeks to preserve human life wherever rea-
sonably possible. Arguably, the most important principle underlying the 
right to life is not the sanctity of life but rather a requirement of respect 
for all human life.13
The right to life protects all living human beings (with some lin-
gering ambiguity about its application before birth (Vo v France (App. 
53924/00), 8 July 2004 [GC], (2005) 40 EHRR 259, ECHR 2004-
VIII). As discussed above, under the BSD definition of death, that 
includes patients in PVS whose brain stem continues to function even if 
the aspects of their higher brains which made them who they were have 
been destroyed. Does the state have an obligation under the right to life 
to maintain the life of patients in PVS? It would appear not. The land-
mark English case of Airedale NHS Trust v Bland confirmed that it is 
lawful to withdraw life-sustaining treatment (commonly artificial nutri-
tion and hydration (ANH)) from a patient in PVS. The key to the legal-
ity of such a course of action is that it is no longer regarded as in the 
best interests of a patient in PVS to receive the life-sustaining treatment. 
In the absence of patient consent, medical treatment can only be pro-
vided if it is in the best interests of the patient. The best interests test was 
developed at common law in a very different context (non-therapeutic 
sterilisations) but is now at the core of the statutory regulation of persons 
who lack capacity. Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 requires 
that all decisions about persons lacking capacity are taken in their best 
interests and includes a checklist of factors to be taken into account in 
determining that. When applied to a patient in PVS, this means that a 
decision has to be taken whether continued treatment (usually compris-
ing ANH) is in the patient’s best interests and, if it is not, then it must 
(rather than may) be withdrawn. Under the Mental Capacity Act, the 
best interests test is more patient-focused than before, with a require-
ment to take into account the patient’s own past wishes and feelings, val-
ues and beliefs, rather than merely medical evidence as to prognosis. The 
latter is still likely to be very significant, however, and thus it is still not 
an entirely subjective test of interests. In Bland, the Law Lords were ada-
mant that the relevant question was whether treatment is in the patient’s 
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best interests rather than whether death is in the patient’s best interests 
but, given that a withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment will inevitably 
cause death, this is a somewhat meaningless distinction.
The Bland case was decided before the enactment of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA) and thus the court gave no weight to issues of 
patient rights, including the right to life. However, subsequent to the 
HRA’s coming into force, the courts have sought to reconcile the Bland 
judgment with the right to life. In NHS Trust A v M; NHS Trust B v 
H [2001] 1 All ER 801, Butler-Sloss LJ explained that there is no vio-
lation of Article 2 ECHR’s right to life when life-sustaining treatment 
is withdrawn because it is no longer in the patient’s best interests. This 
approach to interpretation of Article 2 seems to have been plucked from 
thin air given that there is no precedent for reading the state’s obliga-
tions under Article 2 as subject to a best interest determination. In terms 
of the right to life, this may look suspiciously like we have a right to life 
until it is not in our best interests to continue living. While this may be 
a sensible, even justifiable, approach in the context of PVS patients, it is 
surely worrying in more general terms? Who is to decide when our lives 
are no longer in our best interests? And how will they know?
The withdrawal of medical treatment leading to death needs to be 
acknowledged as a legitimate exception to the right to life, but it is a pity 
that more explicit reasoning has not yet been provided to reconcile the 
right to life with end-of-life decision-making. As the state is only ever 
obliged to take reasonable steps to preserve life, it may be that a focus 
upon both autonomy and quality of life could cast a clearer light upon 
when it is no longer reasonable to preserve a life. Even in the context 
of a PVS patient, however, the right to life and other human rights do 
still have meaning and value. A doctor might be able to withdraw treat-
ment to allow the patient to die, but it would not be lawful for a hospital 
intruder to shoot the patient in the head, nor for the hospital to throw 
the patient out onto the street. We would not accept a degrading use of 
the patient’s body even though he is not aware of it. Thus, we do still 
value this human being—and the law does too. It is a living person, not 
just an empty shell, or an organism which the “person” has vacated.
life, deAth, And embodied selves
The most objectionable element of the personhood theory’s approach, 
discussed above, is that it does not regard patients in PVS (or indeed 
many other living human beings) as persons with moral value. 
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Personhood theory entirely overlooks the value of the human body in 
its rush to remove rights from PVS patients. By contrast, embodiment 
theory focuses upon the whole person as a union of body and mind.14 
It recognises the interaction and relationship between our mental selves 
and our bodies, and gives value to the body in contrast with the tradi-
tional division of body and mind under Cartesian dualism, which views 
the body as little more than a machine. A focus on the embodied self 
would put the body back into the equation and, in relation to the defini-
tion of death, would rule out any move towards higher brain death.
As noted above, higher-brain death proponents view a living body 
devoid of the mind as already deceased. This is in stark contrast to an 
embodiment approach which views both body and mind as crucial to 
moral status and legal respect. As Martin Pernick explains, the “con-
troversy between advocates of whole-brain and higher-brain criteria for 
diagnosing brain death often reflected a much older conceptual con-
test over whether mental activity or bodily integration constituted the 
essence of human life”.15 Advocates of higher-brain death recognise only 
the human mind and not the human body as being morally valuable. As 
such, this definition of death would rest upon a concept of the disem-
bodied self. It connects naturally with personhood theory which similarly 
affords respect to the mind as distinct from the body. Indeed, as Harris 
confirms, under the personhood theory, persons need not be organic life 
forms at all.16
So, what of an organic life form devoid of a functioning mind? Is it 
conceivable that a deceased person residing in a living body could be 
buried or cremated? This is the inevitable consequence of both person-
hood and higher-brain death theories. Lizza explains why it is not an 
insurmountable hurdle for him as he regards the continuation of the 
organism that once constituted the person as a non-critical issue, argu-
ing that mere organic integration is insufficient for the continued life of a 
person.17 By distinguishing between the life of the person and the life of 
the human organism, Lizza is able to envisage the burial of a living and 
breathing human body: “Instead of a person’s death resulting in remains 
in the form of an inanimate corpse, a person’s remains can now take the 
form of a living being devoid of the capacity for consciousness and any 
other mental function”.18 Such an approach has so far deviated from 
legal concepts of human rights and human dignity as to be irreconcil-
able with existing international and national law commitments to human 
rights law, as well as ethical and moral obligations to humankind. The 
law unsurprisingly rejects such an artificial distinction between deceased 
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persons and living human bodies and instead, as explained above, regards 
the irreversible death of the brain (or brain stem) as the point of death. 
At this stage, and not before, legal obligations to respect the rights of a 
human being cease. Thus the right to life, and the (albeit limited) pro-
tection it affords, ends only when life itself has ended.
The question of why human life is protected in the first place—why 
human life matters—seems to be closely tied to the concept of conscious-
ness. The higher level of consciousness enjoyed by humans as compared 
to many other species is, arguably, the underlying reason why human life 
should be regarded as more valuable and given greater protection, morally 
and legally, than the life of a virus or a plant or an animal.19 There is not, 
as yet, any clear explanation for how consciousness arises or why, although 
there is an indisputable link with electrical brain activity. As Merlin Donald 
explains, “conscious effort is the single most reliable predictor of the pat-
terns of brain activity”.20 However, science still cannot tell us why this 
is so: “Brains that pulse with certain patterns of electrical activity are con-
scious. Why? They just are”.21 Human life matters, it is argued, because 
of human consciousness.22 But this does not inevitably lead to the person-
hood theory’s controversial approach of excluding certain human beings 
from moral status and legal protection due to their loss of a characteristic 
such as consciousness. If human life matters, then it always matters, regard-
less of personhood, rationality, moral agency, capacity or consciousness. The 
life of an individual human being matters not because that organism is sen-
tient or rational (or free of pain, or values its own existence) but because 
it is a human life.23 This point is supported by the ethical and legal princi-
ple of equality which is well established in the field of human rights. A core 
requirement for an individual human being to be regarded as possessing 
a life may be regarded as basic integrative functioning of the organism. In 
other words, (from viability) until brain death, while a human organism has 
the potential to function in an integrative manner, an individual has a life 
equal to that of all other human organisms. In terms of defining death, this 
means that life ends only when the human organism—the body and mind 
together—dies. This cannot sensibly require the death of all of the body’s 
cells, but rather the death of the organism as a whole. In other words, life 
comes to an end when the integrative action between the organs of the body 
is irreversibly lost. The death of the brain, or the brain stem, is one, and per-
haps currently the best, means of discerning that end. It is fitting, therefore, 
that the law has adopted this stage for the legal definition of death.
8 THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF DEATH AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE  129
conclusion
The law has a crucial role in regulating issues of life and death. In 
addition to its essential role in clarifying legal responsibilities, it is an 
important influence on social and ethical perspectives regarding the 
inevitable endpoint of life. Furthermore, the entire concept of human 
rights law is based around the idea that all human beings are enti-
tled to equal legal protection for a range of rights and freedoms, thus 
necessitating an unambiguous dividing line between a rights-holder 
and a deceased body. Death is not unambiguous, however, at least 
not in its appearance to modern medical technology and understand-
ing of the human mind and body. The point at which the law draws 
the line between life and death, or more specifically between dying 
and death, is always likely to be controversial. The contemporary focus 
on the irreversible destruction of the brain—brain stem death in the 
UK—builds upon the current state of medical technology and its abil-
ity to revive certain parts of the human body. It also fits well with an 
embodiment approach to valuing human life which strives to include 
both mind and body within conceptions of the person and moral sta-
tus. The alternative, albeit increasingly influential, personhood theory, 
with its singular emphasis upon the mind, would lend support to a dif-
ferent conception of death: one that hinges upon the destruction of 
the higher-brain and certain mental capacities. As tragic as such a trans-
formation in life can be, it is not appropriately regarded as a death of 
a human being, and to label it a death of a person is dangerously mis-
leading. We are not just our minds, but also our bodies, which serve 
as our homes, our transport, our clothing, our identities.24 They are 
also inevitably our ultimate cause of death, for we will not survive the 
loss of our bodies. This focus on the embodied self does not neces-
sitate a striving to sustain all permanently comatose human lives. The 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment is not only lawful under spe-
cific circumstances, but is also sometimes ethically appropriate, mor-
ally good, and respectful of the human being’s rights. But let us never 
forget, or worse ignore, that the human being who has lost so much of 
what made her an individual, is still alive and entitled to a right to life; 
a right that is always limited, both in terms of state obligations and its 
application to mortal beings.
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For many years, studies of death have been dominated by the distinction 
made by Philippe Ariès between modern ways of dying, hidden away in 
a hospital room, and traditional death-bed rituals, where friends gather 
round and celebrate the process with stories, music, art and prayer.1 The 
difference is obviously connected with a re-orientation in metaphysical 
opinion about the afterlife: if you believe that the dying person is going 
to live on and meet you again, then you will do your best to part on 
good terms; but you have no reason to bother if you are a materialistic 
modernist who thinks that death means total annihilation.
The contrast is somewhat overdrawn, however, not only historically 
(as we all know) but metaphysically too. If you have a robust belief in 
individual survival, you will still be prey to doubts about life on the other 
side, and once you try to envisage it in detail—what people will look like, 
whether they will change over time, and how friendships will be con-
ducted—it is liable to lose both its attraction and its plausibility. On the 
other hand, if you are a secular rationalist grieving for someone you love, 
your unconscious can be counted on to supply you with fantasies about 
escapes from death and renewed encounters. If we met someone whose 
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attitude to death was untouched by conflict, doubt, and an uneasy sense 
of mystery we would, I think, conclude that they were not really human.
The scenarios of post-mortem encounter that play themselves out in 
our imaginations are of enormous interest, both historically and psycho-
logically; but they tend to distract us from a phenomenon that is per-
haps equally significant, and equally fundamental: from what might be 
called the fascination of the last moment. When we get news of the death 
of strangers—famous people, perhaps, or victims of a mass-shooting or 
a plane crash—we find it hard not to wonder what it was like for them 
in their last hour, their last minute, or their last second: what were they 
thinking about; what did they know; and how did they feel? In the case 
of close friends and family, we will speculate rather more intrusively: were 
they inwardly angry or were they serene; were they in pain; and as they 
departed this world, did they cast a glance back at someone in particu-
lar—for example, did they spare a thought for me?
If we are modern and rational, we will try not to be so sentimental. 
Why should any special interest attach to the last moment of a life? What 
makes it different from any other segment of time? All of us are subject 
to ups and downs in our moods, and why worry about which part of 
the cycle we are in when it stops? The historians among us may offer 
explanations in terms of inherited religious traditions which portray us 
facing our maker and being made to answer for how we spent our life on 
earth. In that case, our dying state of mind might possibly swing the case 
for us: a lifetime of wickedness could be cancelled by last-minute repent-
ance, and perhaps the converse holds as well. The absurd disproportion 
between the dying moment and eternal punishments, or rewards, may 
have been a challenge for subtle theologians, but the deathbed industry 
got on with the business of conversion, confession, indulgence, unction, 
absolution and prayer. It is easy to make fun of these last-chance rituals, 
comparing them perhaps to stand-and-deliver academic exams, or a game 
of roulette; but I would like to suggest that the fascination of the last 
moment has roots that reach far deeper than the contingencies of reli-
gious doctrine.
Death has a special presence in everyone’s life, even for those who 
encounter it as an everyday reality—priests, doctors, nurses, and under-
takers, or, in a different way, historians and archaeologists. If we are 
living like human beings as well as fulfilling our occupational roles, 
then every moment of our existence has the characteristic that Martin 
Heidegger called Sein zum Tode, or being-towards death.2 Our activities 
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get their significance from our sense of them as episodes in a life-story 
that began earlier than we can remember and will end with our death 
even if we never think about it explicitly; death will always be, as a phe-
nomenologist would put it, the “horizon” of our existence. Hence, the 
peculiar thrill of witnessing a death, or of death as a spectacle; however 
much we differ from each other in particular ways, the anticipation of 
dying is something we all have non-contingently in common. We can 
hardly stop ourselves feeling some kind of sympathy, or personal involve-
ment, with people on the brink of death; we identify with them, because 
we know that our own turn will come one day.
***
This perspective—call it existential or phenomenological if you like—may 
cast some light on the salience of the moment of death in fine art, high 
tragedy, and grand opera, or more particularly, in narrative fiction, since 
the middle of the nineteenth century. Take Leo Tolstoy’s 1886 story, 
“The Death of Ivan Ilych”, which opens with a character called Peter 
Ivanovich learning that his old friend Ivan has died, still young, though 
no longer full of promise. Even though Peter Ivanovich has known Ivan 
Ilych all his life—they used to play together as little boys—he receives 
the news with apparent indifference. He pays an obligatory visit to 
Ivan’s widow, even though he dislikes her; but to his surprise he is ter-
ribly moved, at least briefly, when she tells him how Ivan passed his last 
hours: he “screamed incessantly”, she tells him, and was “conscious all 
that time”, right up to “the last moment”.
‘Three days of frightful suffering and then death! Why that might sud-
denly, at any time, happen to me’, he thought, and for a moment felt ter-
rified. But…the customary reflection at once occurred to him that this 
had happened to Ivan Ilych and not to him…after which reflection Peter 
Ivanovich felt reassured…as though death was an accident natural to Ivan 
Ilych but certainly not to himself.
But the act of repression requires an effort that Peter Ivanovich is unable 
to sustain; despite his outward nonchalance, he knows that death is the 
great leveller, eventually making equals of us all.
Ivan Ilych had known it too; the truth had impressed itself on him as 
he talked to the peasant lad who looked after him in his final illness. The 
boy seemed happy in his work, however repulsive his duties were, and he 
explained that he was sustained by the knowledge that “we shall all of us 
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die”, telling Ivan that he “did not think his work burdensome… because 
he…hoped someone would do the same for him when his time came”.
But all of us know—we the readers, and Ivan, Peter, and the peasant 
boy—that the fellowship of death goes deeper than some intergenera-
tional compact about end-of-life care. Ivan died in terrible pain, but his 
spiritual anguish was far worse: “I am leaving this life”, he said to him-
self, “with the consciousness that I have lost all that was given to me and 
it is impossible to rectify it”. He “had not spent his life as he should have 
done”, and he “struggled”, we are told, “as a man condemned to death 
struggles at the hands of the executioner, knowing that he cannot save 
himself”.3
The analogy between being condemned to death in the special sense 
of facing judicial execution, and being condemned to death in the way all 
of us are, has tremendous emotional and literary resonance. Dr Johnson 
was right, no doubt, to say that “when a man knows he is to be hanged 
in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully”.4 But that tells only 
half the story, because the prisoner will not be the only one counting 
down the minutes that remain: anyone who knows about the impend-
ing event will be doing the same. Crowds of us will gather at the spot, in 
imagination if not reality, to project ourselves into the consciousness of 
the prisoner and rehearse for the time when our own end is near.
Claude Lanzmann (the filmmaker who made the documentary film 
Shoah (1985)), began his autobiography by saying that he could not 
remember a time when he was not entranced by the idea of being sen-
tenced to death. In 1938, when he was 13, he read about the death by 
guillotine of a murderer called Eugen Weidmann in the street outside 
the prison in Versailles. (It would be the last public execution in France, 
and the newsreel is available online). Lanzmann was struck by the resem-
blance, such as it was, between his own name and that of the man about 
to be decapitated, and he was never able to shake off the fantasy that a 
similar fate awaited him; and as he wrote his memoirs seventy years later, 
he still imagined himself as a prisoner on death row, struggling to give an 
account of himself before his appointment with death.5
But it is not just Lanzmann; law has always aspired to the condition of 
theatre, and judicial executions are its masterpiece, generating an appe-
tite for tales of the prisoner’s last moments. But execution narratives, as 
they are sometimes called, come in two very different kinds. Some are 
hostile: they work to place those condemned to death at a great distance 
from us, beyond the pale of common humanity. Take, for example, a 
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pamphlet about the execution in 1606 of the conspirators in the gun-
powder plot—a “horrible and abominable Treason”, as we are informed: 
“detestable in the sight both of God and man” and “odious in the eares 
of all humane Creatures”. We are invited to shudder at the thought of 
their “bewitched hearts”, to wonder at their refusal to exercise the “true 
repentance, that in true Christians may be required” and, in short, to 
marvel “that so many monsters in nature, shoulde carry the shapes of 
men”.6
Then there are the sympathetic execution narratives, which ask their 
readers to identify with those about to die, and enter into their inner 
world; the corpus could be thought of as reaching back to Plato on the 
death of Socrates, or to the gospel accounts of the crucifixion, and it 
would include hagiographies of Christian martyrs, and heroic accounts 
of royal beheadings. The genre seems to have remained distinctly aristo-
cratic in focus until the middle of the nineteenth century, when it took a 
turn towards literary realism, and its protagonists became more plebeian.
The closing pages of Charles Dickens’s Tale of Two Cities (1859) 
provide a transitional case, with Sydney Carton achieving greatness by 
choosing to die in the place of Charles Darnay (perhaps in the place of 
us all) and eliciting our tears (for him, for us) with the supreme pathos 
of his inner monologue (“It is a far, far better thing that I do, than I 
have ever done; it is a far, far better rest that I go to than I have ever 
known”) on the scaffold. The situation poses a problem from the point 
of view of narrative technique, and the solution chosen by Dickens was 
bold if not crude: if Sydney had “given utterance” to his thoughts, he 
wrote, “they would have been these”.7 The problem seems to have 
defeated Herman Melville, who was never able to complete his complex 
and multi-perspectival execution narrative, Billy Budd. His contemporary 
Ambrose Bierce was apparently unfazed by the difficulty, and his “An 
Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge” (1890), became the founding classic 
of sympathetic execution narratives. Without fussing over the question of 
narrative point of view, Bierce offered direct access to the consciousness 
of a “man who was engaged in being hanged” and the lifelike world he 
entered as he “closed his eyes in order to fix his last thoughts on his wife 
and children”.8
Albert Camus offered a fully first-person execution narrative in the 
last chapter of L’Étranger (1942), where the unrepentant murderer 
Meursault fills his notebook with reflections on the prospect of being 
guillotined the next morning. “I regret not paying more attention to 
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tales of execution”, he says, as his imagination scurries around search-
ing for a way out; for example, if the blade of the guillotine gets jammed 
in mid-fall. He also remembers that his father once attended a pub-
lic execution and ended up sick with rage and fear. “From that point 
on my father rather disgusted me”, he recalls, but now he thinks he 
understands:
How could I have failed to see that there was nothing more important 
than an execution and that in fact it was the only really interesting thing in 
a human life? If I got out I would certainly make it my business to go and 
watch every public execution I could.
But he knows it is not going to happen; instead of witnessing the execu-
tion of others, he will have to participate in his own, and he ends his 
account with the words: “I only hope there will be plenty of spectators at 
my execution, and that they will greet me with cries of hatred”.9
Grammatically, L’Étranger is an exercise in first-person narration, but 
it keeps spinning round to a third-person perspective in a way that seems 
to be characteristic of sympathetic execution narratives. Or equally the 
other way around: a third-person narration will directly evoke a first-per-
son perspective—as for example in George Orwell’s essay “A Hanging”, 
which describes an incident in Burma in the 1920s. As an officer of the 
British Imperial Police, Orwell was required to supervise the execution 
of a poor Hindu, after which he met up with his British colleagues and 
found himself laughing far too much as he tried to conceal his anguish at 
what he had seen and done:
It was about forty yards to the gallows. I watched the bare brown back of 
the prisoner marching in front of me…At each step his muscles slid neatly 
into place…and once, in spite of the men who gripped him by each shoul-
der, he stepped lightly aside to avoid a puddle in the path.
That little gesture, the deft avoidance of the puddle, stuck in Orwell’s 
memory like a dart:
It is curious, but till that moment I had never realized what it means to 
destroy a healthy, conscious man. When I saw the prisoner step aside to 
avoid the puddle I saw the mystery, the unspeakable wrongness, of cutting 
a life short when it is in full tide. This man was not dying, he was alive just 
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as we are alive…His eyes saw the yellow gravel and the grey walls, and his 
brain still remembered, foresaw, reasoned—even about puddles. He and 
we were a party of men walking together, seeing, hearing, feeling, under-
standing the same world; and in two minutes, with a sudden snap, one of 
us would be gone—one mind less, one world less.
Orwell flips the third person into the first (“one of us would be gone”) 
and we are inside the world of the condemned man.10
The shuttle between different points of view at the execution scene 
becomes more elaborate in the final chapter of Truman Capote’s In Cold 
Blood (1966), which tells the story of the gruesome murder of a farm-
ing family—Herb Clutter and his wife and two children— in Kansas in 
November 1959, and of the two obtuse young lads, Richard Hickock 
and Perry Smith, who committed the crime in the mistaken belief that 
they would find large sums of money in the house. When their trial 
ends and Hickock and Smith receive their death sentences, they laugh 
loudly as they are taken to their neighbouring prison cells, out of sight 
of each other, but not out of earshot. After five years of incarceration, 
their appeals are exhausted, and Capote describes how they spent their 
last day—Tuesday 13 April 1965—looking forward to being hanged one 
after the other, in alphabetical order (as they had chosen), just after mid-
night. They both ordered a large meal: shrimps, fries, and strawberries 
and cream. When the time came, Smith was, as usual, rather withdrawn, 
but Hickock, who was the intellectual of the two, extended a warm wel-
come to those who came to witness his death (“nice to see you!”), and 
expressed disappointment that no members of the Clutter family had 
bothered to come (“as though he thought the protocol…was not being 
properly observed”). “I just want to say I hold no hard feelings”, he said 
as he stepped up to the gallows: “you people are sending me to a better 
world”. Then it was Smith’s turn: “It would be meaningless to apologise 
for what I did”, he said: “but I do: I apologise”. And then, as Capote 
puts it, “the thud-snap that announces a rope-broken neck”.11
***
The rise of the sympathetic execution narrative went alongside a strik-
ing alteration in ordinary attitudes to the death penalty, and was, 
no doubt, in part responsible for it: a public that has learnt to iden-
tify with the prisoner as the last seconds tick away is likely to find the 
very idea of judicial execution unconscionable and to lose any capacity 
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to imagine how enlightened opinion could ever have taken a dif-
ferent view. John Stuart Mill was acutely aware of swimming against 
the tide when, during his brief career as a member of parliament, he 
gave a magnificent speech on the subject in 1868. He was embar-
rassed, as he put it in his Autobiography, to find himself advocating a 
position “opposed to what then was, and probably still is, regarded as 
the advanced Liberal opinion”. It struck him as inconsistent to say that 
every citizen has a right to life, which the state can never abridge; after 
all, every citizen has a right to liberty too, but no one has any prob-
lem allowing the state to withdraw it in the case of certain kinds of 
crime, and for that matter extreme insanity. He therefore defends the 
death penalty (provided it is restricted to “atrocious crimes” that have 
been proved beyond all possible doubt), and he defends it on enlight-
ened, modern grounds—“on the very ground on which it is commonly 
attacked—on that of humanity to the criminal”. We may think it would 
be merciful to spare the life of the criminal; but, Mill asks, “what kind 
of a mercy is this?”
There is not, I should think, any human infliction which makes an impres-
sion on the imagination so entirely out of proportion to its real severity as 
the punishment of death…Is death, then, the greatest of all earthly ills?…Is 
it, indeed, so dreadful a thing to die? Has it not been from of old one chief 
part of a manly education to despise death—teaching us to account it, if an 
evil at all, by no means high in the list of evils.…The human capacity for 
suffering is what we should cause to be respected, not the mere capacity of 
existing.
Mill’s argument strikes me as impeccable: executing a murderer might 
indeed be an act of mercy, and some execution narratives could be 
cited in support of it. Camus’s hero was, you might say, begging to be 
executed, and he would have been horrified to be reprieved; and as for 
Hickock and Smith, I, for one, find it hard to put down Capote’s book 
without thinking that it would have been cruel to condemn these two 
young men, both in their thirties, to “existing” for its own sake; however 
long they might have lived, they could never have amounted to anything 
more—in their own eyes or those of others—than exceptionally stupid 
and cruel murderers. If they had any sense, they would have wanted to 
take their own lives, and the death sentence was enabling them to get 
what they wanted. But then, as Mill admits, the question turns, for many 
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of us, not on the “real severity” of the punishment, but on the way in 
which it “makes an impression on the imagination”.12
***
I conclude with another sympathetic execution narrative—a descrip-
tion of a hanging in Georgia, USA, in 1893, by the French writer Paul 
Bourget. The prisoner was Henry Seymour, a young “mulatto” (as 
Bourget calls him) who had once enjoyed the affection and patronage 
of a gentleman called Colonel Scott, accompanying him on some of his 
hunting expeditions. But Seymour had gone off the rails, first commit-
ting a murder for which he was condemned to death, and then killing 
one of his warders and escaping. He was apprehended by Scott him-
self, who gently dressed his wounds and returned him to prison, leav-
ing him with a bottle of fine whiskey—the same brand they used to 
drink together when they went hunting—urging him to finish it before 
he dies. The encounter with the hangman was fixed for the following 
day, but with a choice of times—any time between 9am and 4pm—and 
Seymour settles for 1:45pm, so that he can enjoy a good meal, waited on 
by the sheriff in person.
Bourget was issued with a ticket to witness the execution, but as a 
man of sensibility, he screwed it up and threw it away in the street. But 
then he reflected on the seriousness of what was about to be enacted in 
the prison:
Any person of culture who has entertained the thought of observing a 
public execution has probably been through the same nervous emotions 
as I. The mysteries of death, of moral responsibility and of justice and 
social right…together with the most intimate frisson of existence, as at the 
approach of inexorable tragedy…are all wrapped up in an execution of this 
kind.
In the end he retrieves his ticket, and on admission to the prison, he is 
able to gaze on Seymour—a lean figure of arresting beauty, reminiscent 
of a “bronze statue”, except for his warm vitality and the “simple play of 
his muscles”—and he observes him tucking into a plateful of fried fish. 
Seymour notices Bourget and says with a smile: “I will carry with me a 
belly full of fish, where I go!”, before washing his hands, combing his 
hair, and walking out to greet the witnesses gathered round the gallows. 
(His wife and young children were not admitted, but they were waiting 
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in the street outside.) He mounts the scaffold with a firm tread, and if 
he feels any anxiety he shows it only for a moment, when the cigar he 
kept for the occasion falls from his lips; and once the noose is round his 
neck, he turns to Bourget, Scott and the rest, utters a brief prayer, and 
finishes with “I am all right now”, and “good bye everybody…good bye 
colonel”.13
Bourget was impressed by the “irony” of the scene: by the fact that an 
ignorant mulatto who seemed to live only for whiskey and fried fish had 
faced his executioner with a display of courage that was “suddenly enno-
bled by a touch of the ideal”.
What an irony, that a man of this character—an orang-outang with the 
capacity to…speak—suddenly achieved what philosophers regard as the 
supreme fruit of their teaching: resignation in the face of the inevitable.
Philippe Ariès refers to Bourget’s story and finds his analysis absurd: 
Bourget failed to appreciate that Seymour did not belong to the same 
modern rational world as him, and that his behaviour was simply a mani-
festation of the pre-modern tradition of “immemorial resignation in the 
face of death”.14
This dispute strikes me as artificial. Seymour’s death was part of a 
public ritual—a piece of legal and political theatre belonging to a par-
ticular place and time, and as such, it is open to investigation by the 
methods of the historian. But between the lines of Bourget’s evolution-
ary racism, we can glimpse something more primordial: Seymour as 
someone just like us, trying to make sense of a difficult situation, and 
facing a death like any other, in which everyone can see a prefiguration 
of their own. He was not appropriating a few lines from an incongruous 
modernity, as Bourget seems to have supposed, but neither was he con-
fined, as Ariès suggested, within the limits of pre-modern tradition. He 
had never really been traditional, and he was never going to be modern, 
but he was caught up, like everyone else, in the existential fascination of 
the last moment.
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King Lear gets it right for the ages:
And thou no breath at all? Oh, thou’lt come no more,
Never, never, never, never, never
he says holding the body of the dead Cordelia. Breath—or more pre-
cisely the possibility of future breaths—is still what matters, as it always 
has, in answer to the question “when is death?”
Before the widespread use of positive pressure ventilators in the last 
three or four decades of the twentieth century, making this sort of prog-
nosis was, in general, not very hard. If there was no breath for a few 
minutes there would never—never, never—be breath in that body again. 
(There are only three “nevers” in the quarto text of King Lear; this 
suffices).
Of course, there were exceptional circumstances, increasingly recog-
nised in the late eighteenth century, that might make it more difficult to 
say for sure that breath, after it had stopped, might not return and there-
fore to be sure that the condition of death—being dead—might not have 
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been misdiagnosed. “When is death?” “Not now, not in this instance”, 
the answer might be. People who had drowned and whose bodies were 
chilled could be “revived” [Anglo-Norman; Middle French; Latin: made 
to live again, to be given fresh life] or resuscitated—revived from a mori-
bund state. Their breath could be restored.
The same might be the case for those who had succumbed to carbon 
dioxide—fixed air, or carbonic acid gas as it was called back then—that 
had replaced oxygen in ships’ holds, fermenting vats, or other closed 
spaces. So too people who had stopped breathing for a few other select 
reasons: being struck by lightning, for example. “[T]he unfortunate 
objects are too often deserted, when they might every now and then be 
resuscitated by the various means employed”, we read in an issue of the 
late eighteenth century Transactions of the Royal Humane Society, one 
of scores of organisations founded to teach the ways in which breath 
could be restored and a mistaken prognosis set aside. But even under 
such special circumstances, the window between the temporary cessation 
of breath—that is life—and its eternal absence was narrow—measured in 
minutes not hours.
Other instances besides these in the general category of “apparent 
death” seemed to present further important difficulties for deciding 
whether breath was truly gone forever, or just in temporary abeyance. 
Comas, for example, might mimic a deep sleep in which breath, presum-
ably still present, might be so shallow as to be difficult to detect. Thomas 
Willis, eponymous discoverer of the anastomotic system, the circle of 
arteries that sits at the base of the brain, recognised this state in the late 
seventeenth century. Between the middle of the eighteenth and end of 
the nineteenth century, meanwhile, there was, in the western world, a 
minor epidemic fear of being buried alive. It was fed by gothic fiction, 
medical papers reporting on strange cases of mistaken death diagnoses, 
the popular press, and, as Brian Parsons suggests, the commercial inter-
ests of those selling remedies—coffins with bells that could be rung from 
inside and heard above ground.
But in fact, in cases of suspected apparent death, it would have been 
clear relatively quickly whether breath would “never, never, never” come 
again. The dead body, that is, the eternally breathless body, cools to the 
ambient temperature at a rate of about 1.5 °C per hour. It would not 
take long for it to feel cold. In very hot climates, rapid onset of decom-
position would give the story away. Rigor mortis of the small muscles 
of the face starts within hours. The blood pools and things begin to fall 
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apart. In short, a body whose breath is never to return comes to look 
dead because it is dead within a very short amount of time. Only in the 
modern age, when death certificates demand a precise hour of death is 
there a need for more precision.
In the 1960s a new, adjectivally limited, kind of death made its 
appearance—brain death—and with it, a new kind of answer to the 
“when” question. Lear’s answer, resonant since the beginning of human 
contemplation on the subject—never, never, never, never, never more 
breath—seems to have been replaced by a novel, technologically and 
philosophically, mediated one that to lay people can seem strangely 
counter intuitive: “How can a rosy breathing body, even one breathing 
with the help of a machine, be dead?”, a person might ask. And she has 
a point. But never, never, never, never, to breathe again is still what mat-
ters behind all the talk and technology.
To begin with, brain-dead people—that is, people whose whole brain, 
and not just its higher parts, have ceased to function—may subsist quite 
well in medical facilities and even private homes for decades hooked up 
to ventilators and sustained by enteral nutrition. The record for “chronic 
brain death” is now well over 20 years. Brain-dead women have carried 
their foetuses to term; brain-dead adolescents grow and mature sexu-
ally. No death certificate is issued in these cases of the purportedly dead 
who subsist among us and not in morgues or in the ground. They make 
ongoing claims on the resources of society if, as occasionally happens, 
family members insist. (Not many do; most brain-dead people actually 
die.) They are, in short, not dead except in some metaphorical sense—
gone as we knew them perhaps—and are not treated as dead, because we 
have not yet determined definitively whether they will ever breathe again. 
(In fact, no properly diagnosed brain-dead person ever has.)1
A death certificate with the time and date of death duly noted is not 
issued until the brain-dead person in question has passed—perhaps failed 
is the better term—the so called “apnea test:” the breathing test, the 
never, never, never, never, never test.2 (The technical term qualification 
for being really dead in these circumstances is “a positive apnea test”.) 
The brain dead, in short, are not dead until they have demonstrated the 
“irreversible loss of capacity for spontaneous breathing”, which is the 
modern British medical way of saying what Lear said more poetically.3 In 
the United States, the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research’s devel-
opment of the concept of “Brain Death” puts the King Lear standard 
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more prolixly: permanent inability of an organism to perform its “funda-
mental work”, the main fundamental work being the “drive” exhibited 
by the whole organism to bring in air.
So-called “brain death” or “whole brain death” is therefore the status 
of someone who shows no cognitive functions and has taken a series of 
preliminary examinations that qualify for the only test that in the end 
matters—the apnea or breathing ever again test. They are rather in the 
situation of students who have to attend medical school and pass all sorts 
of examinations in order to gain admission to the one test, which, if 
passed, qualifies the candidate as a doctor. These qualifying tests for the 
final apnea test are themselves not new or technologically sophisticated, 
although some jurisdictions might add electroencephalography (EEG), 
or other modern procedures to create a visually enduring and rhetori-
cally more demandingly high bar for taking the test that counts. A pro-
nouncement of brain death mobilises century old knowledge to decide 
whether to subject someone to the King Lear test for the only kind of 
death there is: never to breathe again.
This is what happens: First, doctors use clinical criteria to rule out 
other reasons for someone being in a deep and persistent coma rather 
than whole brain death: abnormally low body temperature; evidence 
of barbiturate poisoning, for example. Then, they administer a battery 
of neurological tests, dating back to the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, that cumulatively show whether the lower brain, the part that 
controls breathing, is functional. Each test focuses on one, or several, of 
the cranial nerves that originate there and control particular reflexes: the 
oculovestibular reflex is elicited by pouring ice and/or warm (44 °C +) 
water into the ear and watching for the absence of eye motion which 
normally works via cranial nerve VIII through Scarpa’s vestibular nerve 
ganglion and the vestibular nuclei in the brainstem (Robert Bárány, a 
Hungarian Jewish physician, won the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1914 
for this discovery); the gag reflex is tested by inserting a stick into the 
back of throat; the corneal or blink reflex, is normally produced by 
touching the cornea, and is absent in those without a functioning brain 
stem; the photo pupillary reflex is checked by shining a light into the 
eye and observing whether the pupil contracts; irritating the mucous 
membranes with ammonia inhalants—smelling salts—would produce the 
inhalation reflex if the lower brain were intact. There are many more. 
All bear testimony to the glorious history of nineteenth-century neurol-
ogy and, cumulatively, to the destruction of the place in the brain that 
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controls breathing as well as so much else. Only when all of these exami-
nations indicate that the brain stem, and hence the whole brain, is indeed 
dead is a person eligible for the determinative test for death.
The candidate is given a big hit of pure oxygen so that her blood is 
fully saturated: (10 minutes pre-oxygenation). Then the ventilator is shut 
off. If she does not breathe within three minutes—in some jurisdictions, 
five or even eight minutes—she will never never never never breathe 
again. We know this because the part of the brain that controls breath-
ing is, as the earlier tests had suggested, truly gone. The physiological 
foundations for this inference go back to the middle of the nineteenth 
century and were securely settled by the 1920s: in the absence of oxy-
gen, that is, breath, the level of CO2 in the arterial blood rises; this, in 
normal circumstances, would raise the acidity of the spinal fluid, which 
would be registered by the medulla oblongata of the brain stem, which 
would, in turn, trigger a reflex and produce inspiration. In the United 
States, a direct measurement of PCO2 (partial pressure of CO2) rather 
than how long the candidate for death has not breathed, is what counts 
(a value above 60% is considered definitive, but because this level is 
reached within minutes the two criteria are essentially the same). Now, 
and only now, after the would-be dead person fails the apnea test, i.e., 
has a positive apnea test, is it considered as certain as is possible to be—
in our macro-physical natural world—that she will never never never 
never breathe again, and is therefore dead by a standard that was ancient 
when Shakespeare had King Lear use it. The time of death, to repeat, is 
recorded not when the patient, already suspected for some time of being 
brain dead, on the basis of various neurological tests, but when she failed 
the apnea test and was dead in the old- fashioned way.4
In some cases, the body will be relegated to the ordinary fate of dead. 
In others, it will be hooked up to a ventilator again to keep its organs 
alive so that they can be harvested for transplantation. Surgeons in keep-
ing with the so-called dead donor rule cannot take a heart and a liver 
from someone who is alive, nor can they use tissues too long deprived 
of oxygen. Organ donors are not so much brain dead—they might have 
been that for a long time—but very recently, i.e., within minutes, really 
dead, and predictably without breath for ever. The answer to “when is 
death?” even today is simple: when breath is irrevocably gone.5
But of course, it is not quite so easy. Modern technology allows us to 
widen the scope of “never, never, never, never, never” breath to “never, 
never, never, never never,” something else. “Never to be fully human 
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again” is roughly the standard for what has been called “higher brain 
death,” the death of the brain where memory, reasoning, and conscious-
ness reside. So higher brain death might mean “never to be conscious 
again” or “never to have what is taken to be the essence of a human 
being”, or “never to recover what had given someone their identity”. In 
these cases, there is no question that the person is dead by any histori-
cally defensible category, but rather that she is in such a state that she 
is already socially and culturally dead and that therefore the living are 
justified in stopping measures which keep her biologically alive, that is, 
enteral nutrition and perhaps some assistance in breathing. Of course, 
we often stop these treatments, assuming for a moment that we consider 
providing food and air treatments, along with others—antibiotics, vaso 
suppressors, specific therapies—when death in its old-fashioned sense is 
taken to be imminent and all interventions hopeless. “Pulling the plug”, 
that is, removing the most critical intervention—the ventilator—is the 
main way of allowing death to enter. But this is another matter.
The machinery of the intensive care unit has made biological death 
comport more closely with various conceptions of death as understood 
culturally even if “really dead” means what it has always meant. If the 
decision is taken that someone is “never to have the essence of being 
human again”, then the removal of technological life support can trans-
late that decision into biological reality. But technology has done little to 
alter the rhythms of becoming dead in a broader cultural sense except, 
perhaps, to expand the lives of the dead among the living.
They speak, as they always have, before and after, at the end of 
Shakespeare’s plays and in many other instances, sometimes as ghosts, 
but often not. “He being dead yet speaketh,” St. Paul said of Abel, slain 
by his brother Cain. By his faith he speaks from the grave. We are about 
to read “the work of a dead man,” announces the nineteenth-century 
Brazilian narrator in the prologue of The Posthumous Memoirs of Brás 
Cubas by his compatriot, the novelist Joaquim Maria Machado de Assis. 
Just to clarify, he wants to make readers aware of the “radical difference 
between [his] book and the Pentateuch:” Moses waited until the end to 
speak of the circumstances of his death; our author gives it away at the 
start. And lest we still miss the point: “I am not exactly a writer who 
is dead but a dead man who is a writer, for whom the grave was a sec-
ond cradle”. “I expired” he continues, “at two o’clock on Friday after-
noon in the month of August, 1869, at my beautiful suburban place in 
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Catumbi”. (Machado de Assis, the other author, died almost four dec-
ades later in Rio de Janeiro.)
The very first of the many narrators we encounter in the Nobel prize 
winner Orhan Pamuk’s novel My Name is Red similarly begins by telling 
his readers that he is dead: “I am nothing but a corpse now, a body at 
the bottom of the well”. His head is smashed, his bones are scattered, his 
mouth filled with blood. He hopes that his wife and children miss him; 
he isn’t sure and thinks, “how dismal it is” that they may have gotten 
used to his absence. But he hasn’t gotten used to being dead: “here, on 
the other side, one gets the feeling that one’s former life persists”.
Few of us will not have heard the voices of the dead.
They also continue to work for the living in all sorts of ways. “For 
us they are not dead”, said Hitler of those who were killed in the 1923 
Beer Hall Putsch: “this temple is no crypt but an eternal watch. Here 
they stand for Germany, on guard for our people.” They continued, as 
Caroline Sharples described earlier in this book, Nazi martyrology “to 
fight for Germany as part of an immortal, spiritual army”. These are very 
old tropes. As early as the eleventh century, King Arthur was also said 
not be dead at all, but waiting somewhere to return. And the same goes 
for the twelfth-century Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, who 
was, and perhaps still is, asleep in his cave in the Kyffhäuser mountains 
of Thuringia. There, in the 1890s, a gigantic tower, 81 meters high, was 
built on top of an ancient castle in honour of the dead Kaiser Wilhelm I 
who could be seen as either the reincarnation of Frederick, or as his suc-
cessor who presided over the founding, in 1871, of the Second German 
Empire. Huge statues of both men share the mountain where the dead 
Barbarossa sleeps. In 1941, the great German assault on the Soviet 
Union was named Barbarossa. Vladimir Mayakovsky’s famous propa-
ganda slogan: “Lenin lived, Lenin lives, Lenin shall live forever” makes 
the same point.
I would not want to deny that modern medicine, science, and tech-
nology have greatly altered the real and imaginative possibilities for blur-
ring the boundaries between life and death and therefore making it more 
difficult to answer the question “when is death”. People who appear fine, 
if deeply asleep, on ventilators do not seem minutes from death; those 
declared dead by the old-fashioned criteria of breath still look alive as 
their organs are harvested. People who are “not there” by many of the 
criteria we think of as having made them human, and not dead, can be 
sustained and often breathe on their own. Science fiction, meanwhile, 
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dreams of downloading the whole contents of our brains and offering 
us a new sort of cyber immortality. Or maybe the answer to “when is 
death” is never, if our telomeres—the part of human cells that affect how 
we age—can be manipulated in just the right way.
But the essays in this volume, as well as this Afterword, suggest that 
little has really changed from very long ago. To be dead is still not to 
breathe again—ever—and this prognosis is not very hard to make accu-
rately within minutes or hours of its coming to pass. Anyone who has 
lost someone they love can attest to this. The dead by this standard are 
gone in almost an instance. Brain death is a distraction from this very 
basic fact. And the dead still do a great deal for us, individually and col-
lectively, as they have always done. “Becoming really dead,” as I wrote 
elsewhere “takes time”.6 “Never, never, never, never, never” to return to 
the living as voices, bodies, or ghosts can take years and years, sometimes 
centuries and millennia.
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